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Summary of the Thesis 
The thesis attempts to examine the character and 
motivation of the Catholic royalist movement in the 
Gard from the fall of the First Empire to the eve of 
the Second Empire. The thesis proceeds chronologically, 
with six chapters and a conclusion. 
In chapter one, the origins of the Catholic royalist 
movement are traced to the antagonism between Catholic 
and Protestant elites in the late eighteenth century, 
and to the subsequent ascendancy of the Protestants 
during the Revolution and the Empire. During the First 
Restoration, Catholics resented the moderation of the 
royal government. The Hundred Days gave them a pretext 
to plan the counter-revolution they desired. 
Chapter two presents the White Terror of 1815 as a 
calculated measure, designed to eliminate the Protestants 
as a political force, and to ensure Catholic royalist 
domination in the department. 
Chapter three examines the unsuccessful struggle of 
the Catholic royalists to retain their grip on the Gard 
during the "liberal phase" of the Restoration. 
Chapter four presents the revival of Catholic royalist 
dominance after 1820., when the murder of the duc de Berry 
discredited the liberal policies of Decazes, and the 
ascendancy of Catholic royalism until 1830. 
Chapter five examines the transfer of power to the 
Protestant bourgeoisie after the July Revolution. Until 
1833, Catholic royalists waged a "guerilla" campaign 
against the Orleanist authorities, but the failure of 
military opposition led many young Catholics to challenge 
the July Monarchy in elected assemblies. By the 1840's, 
there was a strong Legitimist opposition group in the 
Gard. 
In chapter six, the effects of the 1848 Revolution 
on Legitimism are studied. Universal suffrage gave 
Catholics a numerical majority in the department, but 
revealed a split between the notables and the working 
classes. Nevertheless, in 1851, the coup d'etat received 
the support of the Catholic population, while it was resisted 
by the Protestants. 
The conclusion stresses the local nature of Catholic 
royalism in the Gard, and the importance of sectarian 
rivalry in sustaining it. 
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I 
CHAPTER 1 
When the Constituent Assembly abolished the old French 
Provinces in 1789 and replaced them for administrative pur- 
poses with Departments, the Gard was one of eight new Dep- 
artments created almost entirely from the former Province 
of Languedoc. As the other departments did, the Gard took its 
name and boundaries from geographical features. The Gardon 
rivers of Alas and Anduze join near Vezenobres to form the 
Gard or Gardons reunis which flows into the Rhöne at Remoulins, 
between Nimes and Avignon. The Gard is bounded on the east 
by the Rhone, the principal trade and communication route 
from north to south, and the old boundary between the Comtat 
Venaissin and Avignon, both Papal possessions, and Provence. 
The northern and western limits, -with the new Departments of 
the Ardeche, the Lozere, Aveyron and Herault were determined 
by two more rivers, the Ardeche and the Vidourle, and by the 
Cevennes, the southernmost part of the Massif central. With 
the exception of the Rhone, the boundaries were, socially 
and economically, quite artificial. 
The new Department of the Gard contained contrasting 
geographical features. 
' To the south and east of Nimes, the 
chef lieu of the department, there is a fertile plain that 
constitutes some 24% of the department's territory. There, 
vines, fruit, olives and cereals were cultivated on relatively 
large domaines which extended to the edge of the marshy and 
inhospitable Camargue. To the north of Nimes, the land rises 
1 Brugeirolle, editeurs, Geographie du Departement du Gard 
(Ales, 1837). 
2 
steadily from the plain, determining the lines of communication 
between Nimes and the sub prefectures of Ales, Uzes and Le Vigan. 
In this chalky Garrigue, a living could still be made from 
the land, but many of the inhabitants wove silk for the small 
entrepreneurs of Uzes, St. Chaptes, Sauve, St. Hippolyte 
and Anduze in order to supplement the produce of their holdings 
or property. 
2 In the small towns-themselves, small scale 
industry, usually connected with textiles, flourished. 
3 In 
the north and west of the Gard, where the Cevennes rise steeply 
from the Garrigue, geography and climate differ significantly fr( 
the department's Mediterranean coastline and from the Rhone 
valley. In isolated valleys and on the lower slopes of the 
mountains which rise to the barren peaks of the Mont Lozere 
and Mont Aigoual, small peasant communities eked a living from 
chestnuts and goats., then from' the cultivation of mulberry 
bushes that nourished the silk worms which were introduced 
to the area in the sixteenth century. In small towns like 
Ganges and St. Jean du Gard, situated on rivers at the "foot 
of the mountains, or Lasalle, Sumene, St. Andre and Valler- 
augue, in sheltered valleys, small textile manufacturers 
flourished thanks to the abundance of water that flowed from 
the Cevennes. These manufacturers and peasants would sell 
their merchandise in the commercial centres of Montpellier, 
after 1789 chef lieu of the Herault, and Nimes. 
4 
2. D. Robert, Les Eglises reformees en France 
1960), p. 149. 
1800-30 (Paris, 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
3 
Names has a history that goes back to the Roman Empire, 
and the site is said to have been a prize offered to succesful 
imperial war veterans. To this day, Nimes boasts of many 
fine monuments to its founders: the arena -a large tenement 
and shopping centre at the time of the Revolution-, the 
Temple of Diana, the Maison Carree and the Tour Magne. 
5 One 
of the outstanding advantages the Roman colony enjoyed was its 
position on the main routes from Spain to Italy and, via 
the neighbouring colony of Arles, to the north. After the 
Middle Ages, Nimes grew from the size and importance of 
a trading centre to the status of eighth, city of France 
at the end of the eighteenth century, when it was a major 
commercial, administrative and industrial centre. The city's 
expansion reflected its function as business centre for 
the buying and selling of silk and cotton which was farmed 
out by merchants to workshops in the nearby towns and to 
cottage producers in the hinterland. This function was 
undoubtedly enhanced by the proximity of one of the most 
important Mediterranean trade fairs which took place in 
the small town of Beaucaire, situated on the Rhone, just 
twenty five kilometers east of Nimes. 
The fair took place each year and lasted for eight days 
in the month of July. It attracted merchants from all parts 
of France and from the whole Mediterranean world. They came to 
5 For a history of Nimes, see: H. Rivoire, StatistiQue du 
Departement du Gard (2 vols., Paris, 184-25; P. L. Baragnon, 
A de 1 is toire de Nimes de Menard (4 vols., Nimes, 18 31 
A. Pieyre, Histoire de la Ville de N mes (3 vols., Nimes, 1886- 
88). 
4 
purchase silk and cotton goods, oils and wine. For a con- 
siderable area of France, frone Toulouse to Lyon, the fair was 
the principal barometer of prosperity, and its importance 
was stressed by the presence in Beaucaire each year of 
a representative of the Intendant of Languedoc, inspectors 
from the Nimes factories and workshops, and the represent- 
atives of the Fermiers-Generaux. The fair gave Nimes and 
its hinterland direct access to foreign markets for the purch- 
ase and sale of textiles, and the negociants of Nimes, who 
rented spacious premises in Beaucaire, provided the lucrative 
function of middlemen. In 1788, in spite of the economic 
crisis that had been affecting France for some fifteen years, 
two hundred cargo vessels put in at Beaucaire for the fair. 
Of these, twenty-six were Spanish, and fifteen were Genoese. 
Sixty large French vessels arrived, as well as a hundred smalle 
ones that came on the Rhone'and on the Languedoc canal. 
6 
Nevertheless, the economic crisis , then the internal 
disorders in France and the British blocade severely 
reduced the importance and prosperity of the fair? The value 
of goods sold fell from 31 900 000 F in 1806 to 19 700 000 F 
in 1811.8 
6 H. Chobaut, "La Foire de Beaucaire de 1789 ä 1796", 
Annales histori ues de la Revolution fran aise, 1929, 
pp. 359-71; Ch. de Gourcy, a Foire de Beaucaire 
(Montpellier, 1911). 
7 Chobaut, op. cit. 
8 J. Vidalenc, "La Vie economique des Departements medit- 
erraneens pendant 1'Empire", Revue d'fIistoire moderne, 
1954, p.. 196. 
5 
During the period between 1790 and 1841, the population 
of the Gard increased from 313 000 to 376 000, reflecting a 
national tendency to a slight increase in the years after 
the Revolution. During the revolutionary period, the pop- 
ulation had decreased temporarily to' 300 000, but by 1806 it 
had risen again beyond the 1790 level, and some 315 000 people 
were recorded. Thereafter, the population rose constantly 
with a significant increase from 334 000 to 357 000 between 
1821 and 1831. From 1814 to 1830, that is, during the 
9 
period of the Bourbon Restoration, the annual net increase 
was about 2 000 per annum. The first years of the July 
Monarchy indicate an annual net increase of 3 000. Through- 
out the period 1790 to 1840, the population of Nimes itself 
fluctuated around the 32 000 mark10 
The population of the Gard was, however, unique in one 
respect. The presence of a Calvinist minority, representing 
about one third of the population and about one third of the 
total Calvinist community in France 
ll, 
complicated politics 
and society in the department and had a decisive effect on 
the political allegiance of the population during the Revolu- 
tionary period which, in so many parts of France, determined 
political choices and divisions for several generations. In 
9 Rivoire, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 307-8. It should be rem- 
embered that tie-population figures for the period are 
approximate and often unreliable. 
10 ibid.. , pp. 309-13. 
11 Archives nationales (hereafter AN) F7 9049. Notice sur les 
Protestants du Gard. (anon, n. p. n. d). The document states 
that there were 112 000 Protestants on a total population 
of 322 000 in 1815. Also, Rivoire, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 397, 
says there were 128 533 Protestants on a total of 376 062 
in 1841. 
6 
the Gard, the Revolutionary struggle was largely reduced 
to deep seated antagonisms, and served to impose fresh layers 
of resentment on them. 
From its establishment in the area, the Calvinist comm- 
unity had developed quite apart from the Catholic majority. 
This separate development partly reflected Calvinist 
doctrine, but it stemmed also from physical isolation, 
largely imposed by the officially sponsored persecutions 
of Calvinists during the Wars of Religion and the seven- 
teenth century. Even in the cities, each community had 
well defined residential quarters. 
12 Indeed, Protestant 
Catholic relations were characterised by clashes rather than 
by integration. The Catholics recalled the Michelade of 
1567, when Calvinists massacred Catholics in an attempt to 
impose their will on the affairs of the city, and the 
Camisards, the Protestant peasant guerillas who had wrought 
havoc at the beginning of the eighteenth century* 
13 Conversely, 
the Protestants recalled the Dragonnades and forced con- 
versions that marked the seventeenth century. 
14 
The distinct; developments of the two groups produced 
quite distinct elites, each with a popular following. The 
Protestant elite, however, systematically excluded from 
12 J. N. Hood, "Patterns of Popular Protest in the French 
Revolution: The Conceptual Contribution of the Gard", 
Journal of Modern History, 48, pp. 259-93. (p. 264) 
13 J. N Hood, " Protestant-Catholic Relations and the Roots 
of the First Popular Counterrevolutionary Movement in 
France", Journal of Modern History, 43, pp. 245-75. 
(pp. 249-251 
14 ibid., p. 249. 
7 
public office by the Royal authorities, consequently 
turned to commerce, industry and banking. By the second 
half of the eighteenth century, there was a powerful and 
wealthy Protestant Bourgeoisie that had a significant interest 
in the capitalist economy of Languedoc. Frequently, this 
strength was purchased at the cost of nominal conversion to 
Catholicism, particularly for trading purposes in towns like 
Nimes, where the Protestant merchants were moderate enough to 
be outraged by the Camisard s 
The Protestant wealth was increased by those Calvinists 
who fled the country to avoid persecution. Through them, 
links were established with important European commercial 
centres like Amsterdam, Geneva and London. 
16 Unable to 
spread their growing wealth, Protestant families created 
dynasties through careful marriages with other entrepreneurs 
of their religion, and gradually established an exclusively 
Protestant commercial network . Thus, the Favantine family 
began its rise to power by purchasing wool from Protestant 
farmers in the countryside around Le Vigan and selling it 
to coreligionists in Montpellier. Gradually, Favantine 
accumulated enought money to process the wool himself and 
then retail woollen garments made up by Protestant cottagers. 
The Hotel Favantines in Le Vigan is ample testimony of his 
success. 
17 Other striking examples of the growth of Protest- 
15 Hood, "Protestant-Catholic Relations", pp. 250-51. 
The accommodation of the Protestant bourgeoisie to 
conditions in and around the main cities is stressed by 
D. Ligou in his article "L'Eglise reformee du Desert", 
Revue d'Histoire economique et sociale, 1954, pp. 146-67. 
16 G. Chaussinand-Nogaret, Les Financiers du Languedoc au 
dix-h uitieme Siecle (Paris, 1970)', p. 35. 
17 See Chaussinand-Nogaret, op. cit. , for a detailed account of 
this and other Protestant fortunes. 
8 
ant capitalist wealth are afforded by the Bonnier, Gilly and 
Mazade families. The Bonnier, residents of Montpellier for 
many years, illustrate the ease with which many of the bourgeoi, ý 
avoided persecution by their position in the king's service 
while furthering their own commercial interests in textiles 
and metallurgy. The family counted among its members in the 
eighteenth century a conseiller du roi, a tresorier de France 
and a commis special des vivres aux armees de sa Maiestelg. 
The Gilly family, originally from Calvisson, had settled 
in Montpellier in the sixteenth century. The Gilly had taken 
a commercial interest in textiles, but two sons of Simon 
Gilly had emigrated after the revocation of the edict of Nantes. 
Instinctively they went to Geneva, where one of them married 
the daughter of another textile manufacturer from Montpellier. 
The other son went on to become Chamberlain to the King of 
Prussia. Other children established a trading agency in 
Cadiz, developing interests in the West Indies, and married 
into the Hugla family, as a result of which the Hugla bank 
was founded. The Gilly and Hugla were united to yet another 
Gard Protestant family, the Fornier19. 
Like the Bonnier and Gilly families, the Mazade had been 
in the Bas Languedoc area since the sixteenth century, and 
held the posts of Receveurs de Tailles ä Lunel et ä Toulouse 
and Conseillers ä la Cour des Comptes ä Montpellier. From 
1754 to the Revolution, the post of Tresorier general de la 
Bourse de Montpellier remained in the family. In the period 
18 Chaussinand-Nogaret, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
19 ibid., pp. 72,73. 
C) 
1725 to 1790, the Mazade could count among their close 
relatives twelve Fermiers-Generaux, twelve Receveurs des 
Finances and three Tresoriers-Generaux de France. 20 
When Toleration enabled the Protestant merchants to 
act with greater freedom in the eighteen sixties and seventies 
21 
their economic power as employers and capitalists aroused the 
hostility of Catholic producers and workers in an economic 
climate that was deteriorating. 
22 Economic pressures on 
textile workers and Guild masters who began to realise 
that the greater part of their livelihood was effectively 
in the hands of Calvinists, who could dispose of work as 
they saw fit, encouraged working class loyalties to divide 
along sectarian lines. 
23 
At the same time, the emergence of a Protestant elite 
that was increasingly liberated from the traditional legal 
disablements brought it into conflict with the Catholic 
elites, the Church, lawyers and landowners who had been able 
to occupy unopposed the public offices of the Senechaussee. 
The clash between the two elites became evident in the 1780's, 
when a group of Protestant Merchants, with the support of 
some Catholic businessmen, sought membership of the city 
council, a body that had hitherto been composed entirely 
20 ibid. , pp. 250-8. 
21 Hood, "Patterns of Popular Protest", p. 265. 
22 See E. Labrousse, La Crise de 1'Economie fran aise- a la Fin 
de l'Ancien Regime aris, 1944), pp. xxii-lii; E. Labrousse, 
R. Romano, F-G Dreyfus, Le prix du Froment en France, 1726- 
1913 (Paris, 1970), pp. xiv-xv; 23.; G-R Galy, 'L Exploi- 
tation des Houilleres du Languedoc au dix-huitie`me Siecle", 
Annales du Midi, 81, pp. 163-95. 
23 Hood, "Patterns of Popular Protest", p. 267. 
10 
of Catholic notables, 
4 
and. it came to head in 1789, when 
the admission of all sects to full citizenship was combined 
with political participation based on wealth. These measures 
did not merely enable Protestants to compete for political 
power, but positively favoured the rich Protestant merchants, 
who were finally able to break into local government. When 
a Conseil permanent was formed in Nimes in the summer of 
1789, eight of its twenty-one members were Protestants. 
2S 
Protestants thronged to another Revolutionary institution, 
the Legion nimoise, a local militia set up to defend order 
and property. Indeed, Protestants were generally better 
able to meet the costs of equipment necessary for this body, 
essentially bourgeois in character. 
26 
The sudden emergence of Protestants into political 
life was, then, immediately identifiable with political 
change in France 'as a whole. Moreover, it coincided with 
the first moves by the National Assembly to reduce the 
influence of the Catholic Church. In an area so sensitive to 
religious cleavage, the Church symbolized the supremacy 
of the Catholic community in public affairs in the minds 
of all social and economic classes that made up the Catholic 
24 ibid., pp. 269-70. 
25 Ph. Wolff, editor, Histoire du Languedoc (2 vols., 
Toulouse, 1972), I, p. 453. 
26 B. Poland, French Protestantism and the French Revolution 
(Princeton, 1957 , P. M. 
11 
community, and it guaranteed that certain positions would 
always be held by Catholics. 27 Thus, to many Catholics, 
it appeared that the Revolution and the emergence of 
Protestantism as a political force were inextricably 
bound, and that the gains of the minority had to be offset 
by the losses of the majority. Consequently, the ant- 
agonism aggravated by the Revolution polarized along the 
lines of the traditional sectarian rivalry. 
At an early stage of the Revolution, Catholics expressed 
open hostility to the changes taking place. Among the 
most vocal opponents of the Revolution was Francois Froment, 
whose hostility was indeed associated with a bitter anti- 
Protestantism28and with his family's economic dependence 
on the Church 
2q At great personal cost, Froment was to 
remain a leading agent of the Princes until 1814,30 
27 The Froment family had traditionally held the post 
of Receveur des Biens du Cler e. Ch. Pouthas, 
Une Familie de Bourgeoisie ran aise de Louis XIV a 
Napo on (Paris, 1934), p. 89- 
28 In the 1780's, Froment's father had been forced to 
flee from Nimes after accusations that he had been 
misappropriating Church revenues was made by a commercial 
interest group that included Protestant merchants. 
The family never forgot the accusation, for which it 
held the Protestants responsible. G. Lewis, 
"The White Terror in the Gard: Counter-revolution, 
Continuity and the Individual. " Past and Present, 
No. 58, pp, 108-35 
29 See note 27 supra. 
30 For an account of Froment's activities on behalf of the 
princes, see: Froment, Lettre a Monsieur le Marquis de 
Foucault, Rapporteur de la Commission des anciens 
'öficiers (Paris, 1817). Eventually, abandoned by 
the restored monarchy, Froment attempted to take legal 
action : Proces de Froment contre Monsieur, frere du 
ROi (Paris, 1-823)- 
12 
As early as the autumn of 1789, Froment was liaising 
with the Princes in Turin, and he had taken command of the 
embryonic counter-revolutionary faction in N4mes. 31 Shortly 
after the formation of the Legion n1moise, Froment, 
seconded by his brothers and other Catholic officials 
including Vidal, Procureur of Nlmes, formed a number of 
Catholic militia companies drawn from the ranks of those 
Catholics who were financially ineligible for the new 
Legion. 32 In 1790, Froment presided over an assembly 
of Catholics that drew up a document condemning the 
policies of the National Assembly with regard to the 
Catholic church. 
33 The declaration was overtly anti- 
revolutionary and anti-Protestant. It was made just after 
a Catholic victory in the Nimes municipal election, and 
Froment pledged the support of his Catholic irregulars to 
the Catholic council. 
The response of the Protestants to this onslaught 
was a reaffirmation of Protestant loyalty to the new 
institutions. The Protestant bourgeoisie hastened to 
found a Societe des Amis de la Constitution, hostile to the 
31. Archives parlementaires, Jere serie. "Comte rendu 
les 22 et 23 f vor er 1791 ä 1'Assembl6e nationale 
au nom de laMunicipalite de Nimes par le Baron de 
Marguerittes". Vol, 18, pp. 406-431; 470-487. ; Wolff, 
Histoire du... Languedoc, p. 458; Pouthas, op. cit., 
pl3- 89-900 
32 Poland, op. cit., pp. 122-35; Wolff, op. cit., pp. 457-8. 
33 P. J. 
eLauze 
de Peret. Eclaircissements histori ues 
en reponse aux calomnies ont les Protestants du Gard 
sont 1'o et, et r cis des -agitations et troubles e 
artement de 1790 nos o urs , (Paris, 1818) 
", T'p ce e 
p. 206=. 
P. Wolff, op. cit., pp, 488-90. 
13 
attitudes of the Municipal Council. 35 By late Spring, 1790, 
the "peaceful year of the Revolution"36, mutual hostility 
was at its peak because it was evident that political change 
was transferring power to the Protestant community's rep- 
resentatives at the expense of the Catholics. At the same 
time, the very symbol of Catholic ascendancy, the Church, was 
itself coming under attack. 
Elections were held in June 1790 for a. new body, the 
Conseil general, or departmental council. The Catholic party 
increased its counter-revolutionary agitation. White cocardes 
were flaunted, and Froment's men styled themselves Aris tocrates . 
37 
At the same time, they endeavoured to exclude the Protestants 
from the new council. 
38 
The efforts of the Catholic militants were in vain, and 
the Protestant bourgeoisie won a majority on the Conseil 
general. This left the Catholics with no other solution 
but force against their rivals if they were to try and 
salvage the situation, and the more exasperated Catholics 
sought a confrontation with the representatives of the new 
regime. 
Such a confrontation did take place on 13 June, when 
firing broke out between Froment's militia and the official 
Legion nimoise. The result was full scale civil war, 
35 Pouthas, op_ cit., p. 95 
36 The quotation is from S. Scott, "Problems of Law and Order 
in 1790", American Historical Review, 80, pp. 859-88. The 
article examines disturbances that took place at a time that 
is held to be a quiet period of the Revolution. 
37 Archives parlementaires lere Serie. Assembl'ee nationale, 
S6ance du 11 mai, 1790. 
38 Lauze de P6ret, o . cit., p. 15; Pouthas, op. cit., p. 96 
14 
the Bagarre de Nimes, which lasted two full days and cost 
c some three hundred lives39. While the counter-revolutionary 
faction counted on assistance from the Catholic villages to 
the south and east of Nimes, the Protestants received support 
from the western part of the department which was predominantly 
40 Protestant 
Thus, the first concerted and popularly supported attempt 
to resist the changes brought about by the Revolution was 
made along confessional lines. It was a failure, and its 
leaders were killed or forced to flee41 . The National 
Assembly, after demanding an inquiry into the affair, dis- 
solved the Nimes municipal council, and so removed the only 
remaining Catholic controlled body in the new order of things. 
From February 1791, the Protestant bourgeoisie remained the 
42 undisputed political masters. of local politics. 
The Bagarre de Nimes is significant not simply because 
it was the first serious, popular challenge to the course the 
Revolution was taking, but because the lines of division were 
confessional - familiar and easily assimilable by the local 
population. Moreover, because the conflict took place during 
39 For a detailed analysis'of the Bagarre see J. N. Hood, "'The 
Riots in Nimes in 1790 and the Origins of 'the first 
popular Counter revolutionary movement" (Princeton Ph. D 
thesis, 1968). 
40 "Comte rendu les 22 et 23 fevrier 1791 a l'Assemblee 
nationale au nom de la municipalite de Nimes par le baron 
de Marguerittes. " Archives parlementaires, lore serie, 
23, pp. 406-431; 470-48". 
41 Froment., whose brother was killed, escaped from the massacre 
and fled to Turin from which town he renewed his counter- 
revolutionary endeavours. Lettre a Monsieur le Marquis de 
Foucault, p. 15. 
42 See Alquier's report to the National Assembly, 19 Feb- 
ruary 1791, Archives Parlementaires, lere serie', 23, pp. 299-320 
15 
an early phase of the Revolution, before the monarchy was in 
danger, while the Assembly was still moderate and reforming, 
Catholic royalism in the Gard could be seen clearly to be lin- 
ked closely to confessional rivalry and to distinct views 
of how local society should be organised. In the liberal 
atmosphere of France of the Constituent Assembly and of the 
Federation, 
change by 
the rigid and apparently brutal rejection of 
Catholics was discredited. Nipped in the bud, Catholi 
royalism in the Gard was never to achieve the degree of im- 
portance or notoriety that the Bretons and Vendeens were to 
achieve later. 
The clash did, however, reinforce the belief of many 
Catholics that Revolution and Protestantism amounted to the 
same thing in practical terms3. The defeat of 1790 was 
4 
added to the list of previous misfourtunes brought about by 
the presence of the Calvinist community. Consequently, when 
revolutionary regimes were brought to an end or appeared to 
be tottering, the opponents of these regimes struck at the 
most apparent representatives of the regimes - the Protestants. 
Barely two months after the Bagarre, in August of 1790, a 
gathering of National Guards from the Gard, Ardeche and Lozere 
was held at the Chateau de la Banne, near Jales in the Ardeche. 
It was convoked at the request of local counter-revolutionaries 
and sponsored by the Turin emigres. Among the resolutions 
moved by the gathering, the most concrete were to march on 
43 Many years later, in 1815, a Catholic Royalist prefect 
could state that "the Protestant religion has always 
formed a political party, and this party is anti-monarchic 
in principle". AN F7 9049. D'Arbaud Jouques to the 
minister of police, 26 October, 1815. 
16 
Nimes in order to release those Catholics held in custody 
since the Bagarre, and to massacre the Protestant populations 
of the south4. 
4 
While neither of these proposals was acted upon, the 
permanent committee elected by the assembly at Jales con- 
tinued to conspire and it convoked a second assembly to meet 
in February 1792. The revolutionary authorities were aware 
of the movements of the committee, and a number of National 
Guard detachments were persuaded not to attend the assembly. 
Some groups did assemble at the Chateau de la Banne, and 
once againtthe demands were to march on Nfines and Uz6s, but 
'moderate' views carried the day. The assembly disbanded 
shortly before patriot guardsmen from the towns marched to 
45 
the Chateau in order to put an end to the deliberations. 
Then, in April 1792, the outbreak of war between France and 
Austria and Prussia inflated the hopes of the emigres. Jales 
became the focal point of a projected popular rising which 
would help to crush the Revolution from within France. In 
many respects, the choice of the south east was obvious as 
far as the emigres were concerned. They knew of its almost 
constant agitation since 1789, and they were informed by such 
men as Froment. However, they had very little direct in- 
formation, and their agents in the south were already well 
known. When an attempt was made to organise an insurrection 
46 in July 1792, it was quickly arrested. 
44 J. Godechot, The Counter-revolution. Doctrine and 
action 1789-18ý04 (London 1972), pp. 231-'33. 
45 ibid.; pp'. 233-234. 
46 ibid., pp. 234-235. 
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It is significant that in these abortive counter-rev- 
olutionary attempts, the designated target of political 
violence was the Protestant community. The Protestant 
bourgeoisie was the very embodiment of Revolution in the 
early years, before the Representant's en Mission brought 
Parisian zeal into the provinces, and before, the Societes 
popul ai res cast off the tutelage of the economic elites. 
Indeed, at the outbreak of the Revolution, Froment saw 
clearly the value of sectarianism in his plans to organise 
opposition to the Revolution in Lower Languedoc, and he 
and the Turin committee believed that the area was the 
most propitious terrain for mounting a-. counter-attack. 
47 
The most celebrated areas of resistance q Brittany and 
the Vendee, were still far from the thoughts of the 
princes. 
Because of its domination of local politics from the 
outbreak of the Revolution in the Gard, the Protestant 
bourgeoisie was closely involved in the Federalist revolt 
of 1793 and the ensuing reprisals and purges. Thus, among 
the 150 persons who died under the Terror in the Gard, 117 
are indicated as Protestants. 
48 Even though the failure of 
47 Francois Froment, Lettre ä Monsieur le Marquis de 
Foucault, pp. 15,71; P. J. Lauze de Peret, claircisse- 
ments historiques, p. 13. 
48 A. N. F7 9049. Anon. Mss. n. d. Notice sur les Protestants 
Tu -Gard; BB3 154. Cavalier, Procureur gen ral de Nimes, 
to minister of Justice, 12 November, 1815: It is no less 
certain that, In 1793, the Protestants of this town 
furnishec more victims to the Revolution than did the 
Catholics. " Statistical evidence is given by H. Fajon, 
Pieces et Documents officiels pour servir a 1'Histoire 
de la Terreur a Nimes et ans le D&partement du Gard, 
An II de la Re ubli ue Une et Indivisible Nimes, 1867); 
and Liste des Condamnes Mort par les Divers Tribunaux 
et Cours Nimes de 1791 a 1884 (Nimes , 1884 . 
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federalism temporarily broke the local political power of 
the Protestant bourgeoisie49, the Protestant community 
was able to reassert its supremacy after Thermidor, and 
to consolidate that ascendancy under Napoleon. so 
But if the fall of Robespierre signalled the end of 
the Terror and of the short lived rule of the Sooietes 
populaires, it heralded, too, the emergence of royalism 
and of a counter terror, organised by counter revolutionaries, 
which took a form of violence that was particularly 
49. D. Ligou, "Sur le Protestantisme revolutionnaire. " 
Bulletin de la Societ6 our 1'Histoire du Protestantisme, 
January-March 1958, pp, -4 . 
M. Ligou contends that there was no distinct peu le 
protestant to replace the Protestant bourgeoisie in 
1793 because of the pre revolutionary persecution that 
had weighed on the lower classes more than on the 
bourgeoisie. (p. 39) 
50 Public Record Office, London (Hereafter PRO), Foreign 
Office series 27/130. Colonel Ross to Sir Charles- 
Stuart, 21 January, 1816: "The superiority of power and 
influence they (Protestants) enjoyed under the pro- 
tection and fostering care of Bonaparte. " 
Also: 
A. N. BB3154. Cavalier, Procureur general de Nimes to 
minister of justice, 12 ovem er, 1.815; D. Robert, 
op. cit., pp. 151-2. Although smaller in numbers than 
the 
Paris community, 
the Nimes Protestant community was 
more cohesive and prestigious, second only to Geneva. 
Moreover, certain clauses in the Concordat of 1802 had 
enatfled Protestants to challenge successfully the right 
of Catholics to hold public religious processions. Nimes 
was the only large town south of the Loire where this 
prohibition was successfully enforced for a considerable 
period. - (ibid., pp. 97-8). 
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acute in the south east of France. Sl 
Professor Godechot points out that the intensity and 
different 'waves' of counter-revolutionary terrorism coin- 
cided with laws repealing the prohibition of hitherto 
proscribed categories of enemies of the people. 
52 
Many of the southern towns, particularly those along 
the Rhone valley, were the scenes of violence that usually 
stemmed from a thirst for revenge. Bands of counter-revolut- 
ionaries styling themselves Compagnies de Jehu or Compagnies 
du Soleil were involved in many such acts of revenge. Leading 
Revolutionaries were incarcerated and formally executed if 
they had not already fallen victims of popular retribution. 
53 
In Nimes, the former mayor, Courbis, and other members of 
the Revolutionary Committee and Tribunal were massacred by a 
a mob, notwithstanding the presence of a military escort, in 
February 1795 as they were being taken to prison. On 25 
May and 28 June of the same year, nearly one hundred pol- 
itical prisoners were massacred in the prisons of nearby 
51' Excellent insights into the White Terror can be found in 
two of Professor R. C. Cobb's books: The Police and the 
People (Oxford, 1970), pp. 131-50; Reactions to the 
French Revolution (Oxford, 1972), Chapter 1. 
52 J. Godechot, o_ý 
ý. 
cit., Chapter 13. The law of 20 Nivose, 
An III, authoris the return of those who had fled after 
31 May 1793. The law of 3 Nivose, An III, authorised the 
reopening of churches. The law of 5 Ventose, An III, ordered 
the arrest of all members of Comit6s de Surveillance 
and of local administrative bodies disbanded after 10 
Thermidor. 
53 In Vaucluse immediately after the fall of Robespierre, 
some 500 peasants accused of 'fanatisme' or federalism 
were released. Many were from te eastern Gard. This 
measure was followed by the release of 'tous les pretres 
et nobles' by Perrin and Goupilleau. Patriots were 
disarmed and arrested. See P. Vaillandet, "Les Debuts 
de la Terreur blanche en Vaucluse", Annales histori ues 
de la Revolution francaise, 1928, pp-. 1-U-9-27. 
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Tarascon by groups of counter-revolutionary terrorists. 54 
The elimination of local Jacobins like Courbis enabled 
the Protestant bourgeoisie to regain control of the Gard. 
During the Empire, the Protestant community flourished. 
Bonaparte granted the Calvinists freedom of worship and 
gave them their own churches, thus assuring their loyalty 
and adding another layer of resentment and hatred that would 
be exploited by the Catholics, still firmly attached to the 
monarchy. 
55 
In spite of the ascendancy Protestantism schieved during 
the Empire, Gard Protestants were not unduly disheartened 
when the Empire collapsed in 1814. Economic matters counted 
for more than loyalty to a man who appeared to be bent on 
personal glory rather than the prosperity of the nation, so 
the Protestant bourgeoisie accepted the Restoration of the 
Bourbons with the guarantees of religious freedom and 
full citizenship contained in the Charter 
56 The promise of 
a document like the Charter appeared to rule out ar- 
54' Godechot, op. cit., p. 254. 
55 See note 50, p. 18 supra. Also, a group of English 
ministers, writing in defence of the Protestants of the 
Gard in 1816, stressed the consolidation of Protestant 
power under Bonaparte: "Those among them who solicited 
public offices obtained them... Could they do otherwise 
than bless a reign which recalled to their minds that of 
the bon Henri? " Notes intended as Materials for a 
Memoire in Justification of the Conduct of the Prot- 
estants of the Gar Lon on, 1816), p. 7. 
D. Robert, op. cit., p. 150, states that the power of the 
Protestant bourgeoisie and its sense of superiority made 
it many enemies between 1802 and 1814, notably in Nimes, 
where Protestant merchants were the wealthiest citizens. 
56 Articles 5 and 8. 
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bitrary government or reprisals and it guaranteed the in- 
violability of private property, including those biens nation- 
aux that had been purchased57. Consequently, when the news 
of the Restoration reached Nimes on 13 April, 1814, the 
white flag, the standard of the Bourbons, was raised over the 
town, and the prefect of the Gard reported that both parties, 
that is, Catholics and Protestants, had received the news 
with joy. 
S8 
The key to the subsequent events which led a future pre- 
fect of the Gard to describe his department as 'the most 
disgusting administration in the kingdom'59 lies in the at- 
titudes of the local Catholic Royalists who hailed the re- 
storation of the Bourbons as the signal to re-establish in 
the Gard the status quo of the ancient regime and thus to re- 
store to themselves the monopoly of local office and prestige 
10 
which had been lost to the Protestants in 1790. Moreover, 
the humiliation of 1790 had to be effaced. The single motive 
of revenge, of excluding from power the traditional enemy, 
was to, colour politics in the Gard through the first half of 
the nineteenth century, so that sectarianism was at the bottom 
of political affiliations, and changes of government and 
regime fed sectarian bitterness. Further, the confessional 
dimension in the Gard meant that, whilst Ultra royalists in 
57 Article 9. 
58 A. N. F7 9049. Baron Roland, 'Prefect of the Gard, to director 
of police, 2.. 7 April, 1814. D. Robert, op. cit., p. 260, 
argues that there were no signs among the Protestants of 
open regret at Napoleon's abdication, and no evidence of 
what he calls an association de fait of Protestantism- 
and Bonapartism. 
59 A'. N. FlbI 176, dossier 14. Villiers du Terrage to the 
minister of the interior, 5 February, 1820. 
0 
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many parts of France aspired to a vaguely medieval France, 
Catholic Royalists in the Gard sought to realise precise and 
concrete aims: the exclusive control of a locality. 
That the exclusion of the Protestants from local affairs 
and the achievement of some measure of revenge were major 
elements of Catholic Royalism in the Gard was revealed by the 
observation of a police agent, Claude Eymard, who was sent 
to the Gard in the summer of 1814 to provide first hand in- 
formation on the quality of the local officials for the 
government60. In September, 1814 Eymard wrote: 
"One can say without exaggeration 
that royalism had survived the fall 
of the Monarchy in the Catholic 
community of the department, and 
that it was not a shallow sentiment. 
Their part in the Camps de Jales (61) 
their desire to contribute to the Lyon 
insurrection, the plan they had laid to 
hasten the end of Buonaparte's govern- 
ment are proof of it. The love of the 
king, which they never lost, was 
strengthened by the memory of the ills 
they had endured and the humiliations 
they had suffered by seeing themselves 
under the domination of the Protestants 
who occupied all the positions, having 
had only a few previously. Injured 
pride and resentment were powerful 
barbs which were linked in their case 
to the soverign's cause. " (62) . 
Lauze de Peret, who was to become one of the principal pub- 
licists of the Protestant cause, alleged that the raising of 
the white flag to acknowledge the restoration was accompanied 
60 A. N. 124 A. P. (Archives priv6es) 
2 letters from B. eugnot, director 
Bymard, 16 July, 1814. 
61 See pp. 1-5-16 su ra. 
1. Papiers Eymard. 
general of police to 
62 A. N. 124, A. P. 1. Eymard to director general of police, 
6 eS ptember; -1814. 
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by outbursts ofanti protestant sentiments, II Ic luding per- 
sonal attacks on the Protestant mayor of Nimes, Roi lulu de 
Castelneau63. Far from being an isolated incident, an ex- 
pression of spontaneous triumphalism, the attack on the mayor 
Summed up the desire of certain people to 'de-protestantise' 
the administration, and it was but the first of a series of 
concerted attacks on Protestants in public office in the 
early days of the first restoration. Thus, in mid-April, 
in the course of a free gala put on in the salle des 
spectacles, there were cries of Vive le Roi! A bas le 
maire !. On 1 May, a delegation of citizens from Beau- 
caire travelled to Nimes for the ceremony of planting a 'May 
tree' in front of the Hötel de la Prefecture. Another pro- 
minent Protestant, Vincens St. Laurent, conseiller at the 
Prefecture, was insulted. . 
No changes in the departmental 
64 
administration had been made by the royal government which 
had not yet arrived in Paris, and the public could not have 
been aware of the degree of reconciliation Louis XVIII in- 
tended to foster in France, reconciliation that contrasted 
starkly with the demands of the group in Nimes that was, by 
the month of May, identifiable by its composition and demands. 
Thus, on 28 April, a group of citizens of Nimes drew up and 
circulated for signatures an address to the king, urging the 
rejection of compromise and the restoration of absolute power 
63 Lauze de Peret, op. cit.., pp. 95-7. 
64 A. N. 124 A. P. 1. Eyinard memorandum to airector general 
of police, n. d. 
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to the royal person.. The petition caused considerable 
unrest among the Protestants, who saw in it a conscious 
reproduction of the counter-revolutionary Deliberation 
des Citoyens catholigues of 1790, drawn up under the 
guidance of Froment, and condemned as sectarian and inflam- 
matory by the National Assembly. 6S 
The new petition emanated from a gathering that had 
adopted the title Societe royale de Nimes. According to 
Eymard, the society had some two hundred members, but most 
of its meetings were attended by a small number of these. 
The meetings were directed by a committee of twelve, and 
they took place in a room above a cafe. 
66 This society, 
or its committee, was at the centre of the extreme royalist 
agitation that hadbeen taking place, and much of the 
unrest was provoked by its members. 
67 
However, the society's interests went beyond displays 
of anti Protestantism. At its head were men who had been in 
touch with the emigres during the Revolution, and who had 
worked for the exiled court in an energetic fashion. 
68 Thus, 
65 Baragnon, op. cit., vol 4, pp. 201-2. See pp. 12,13, 
supra for the context of the 1790 Deliberation. 
66 A. N. 124 AP 1. Eymard memorandum to the director gen- 
eral of police, n. d. 
67L avondes , Terme and 
Vampe re , three members of the 
Soci6te royale, had been largely responsible for the 
anti Protestant demonstrations of April 1814. 
A. N. F7 9,049. Rolland to Latour-Maubourg, 8 June, 1814. 
68 A. N. 124 AP 1. Eymard to director general of police, 
1 eptemher, 1814: "By the end of 1813, individuals 
devoted to the king had set up, on the instructions of 
the agents of the princes, groups in Nimes, Arles , 
--Marseille and Saint Gilles in order to assist the return 
of the royal family. " 
25 
it enjoyed access to exalted royalist circles in Paris 
after the abdication of Napoleon, and was in a position to 
respond rapidly to changes in policy in Paris and so take what- 
ever action suited the moment. In June 1814, the Societe was 
in receipt of regular instruction from FranSois Froment, then 
in Paris in the service of Louis XVIII. It was then that 
69 
the prefect of the Gard, Rolland, decided to detain the prin- 
cipal N4mes agents of the society, in an attempt "to intimi- 
date the society and put an end to its agitation''70. The 
interrogation of Lavondes, Terme and Vampere revealed that the 
extreme royalists were dissatisifed with the policies of Louis 
XVIII, and that they were now pinning their hopes on his bro- 
ther, Monsieur, comte d'Artois, making "Vive les Bourbon! 
their slogan, not "Vive le Roi: "71. 
The dissatisfaction continued through the summer of 1814 
with groups of men, women and children gathering to sing 
royalist songs and to insult passing Protestants. Men like 
Vampere and Terme were observed at the head of these gatherings 
on several occasions72, and were often seen travelling through 
the Nimes countryside on the business of the societe royale 
73. 
69 A. N. F79049. Rolland to Lautour-Maubourg, 17 June 1814. 
70 A. N. F79049. Rolland to Latour-Maubourg, 8 June, 1814. 
71 A. N. F7 9049. Latour Maubourg to director general of 
police, 3 August 1814. 
72 A. N. F7 9049. Rolland to director general of police, 
3 August, 1814. 
A. N. F7 9049. Inspector of the departmental gendarmerie 
. to 
director of police, August, 1814. 
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These disturbances increased after the arrival in Nimes of 
Boyer, a lawyer, who was said to be one of Froment's as- 
sociates in Paris, and who was the author and bearer of the 
petition of 28 April 74. Lavondes had nailed a slogan "Les 
Bourbon ou la Mort'l above his door 
75, 
-and, because of his 
violent passions, the Commissaire extraordinaire du Roi, 
Latour-Maubourg, decided it was necessary to have him incar- 
cerated in the fortress prison at Agde76. By his action, 
Latour-Maubourg uncovered quite accidentally another dimen- 
sion of the political unrest in the Gard. No sooner was 
Lavondes in custody than the director general of the Police, 
Count Beugnbt, ordered his release77. The dossier on the 
matter reveals that the Marquis Dreux-Breze, Grand Master 
of Ceremonies of the. King's Household, and the Chancellor 
of France, Dambray, had interceded on behalf of this man who 
was a bankrupt and had some twenty convictions for violence 
to his credit78. They had been approached by a number of 
Gard notables, including the Vicomte de Rochemore and Baron, 
a Nimes lawyer with pronounced anti-Protestant sentiments79. 
74 ibid. 
75 A. N. F7 9049. Mayor of Nimes (Boileau Castelneau) to prefect June , 181z 
76 A. N. F7 9049. Commissaire general de Police (Herault) to 
director general of police, 1. July 1814, 
77 Archives d6partementales du Gard (Hereafter A. D. Gard) 
6M 3. Beugnot to baron, Rolland, 13 August 1814. 
78 AN. F/ 9049. Latour Maubourg to Rolland, 8 June, 
1814. Latour Maubourg addel that Lavondes was taking ad- 
vantage of the political changes to intimidate his creditors. 
79 In 1814, he was one of the most7vociferous denouncers of 
'disloyal', Protestants. A. N. F 9049. Baron to Eymard, 
12 September, 1814. 
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The relationship between these notables and a man like Lavon- 
das is more comprehensible when one learns that he was pro- 
scribed by the Revolutionary Committee of Nimes in the Year 
II for having "persisted in counter-revolutionary princi- 
ples"80" Lavondes was mentioned, too, by Eymard as having 
been one of the chief royalist agents in the Nimes area 
during the Empire81. It was possibly this kind of dis- 
covery that led Decazes and Beugnot to send Claude Eymard 
to the area in order to assess the reliability of the admin- 
istrators in the Summer of 1814. Unlike Latour-Maubourg, 
the Commissaire extraordinaire du Roi, Eymard was from the 
south but was unknown in Nimes. Decazes, in particular, 
was to make much use of him in 1817 in his attempts to destroy 
the Catholic Royalist network in the Gard. 
In the Summer of 1814, one incident in particular re- 
vealed the strength and intransigence of the Societ6 royale. On 
25 August, instead of participating in the municipal celeb- 
rations in honour of Saint Louis, the royalistes purs as 
they were now called, held a separate reunion in a cafe on 
the edge of town. The dinner and speeches were observed 
by Eymard, who drew up a list of people present. The list 
comprises Catholics from all walks of life - negociants, 
fabricants, avocäts, nroprietaires, taffetassiers, employ6s 
and crocheteurs. Among the individuals Eymard identified - 
thirty-five in all - were Lavondes, the Terme brothers, 
80 A. D. Gard* L 1198. Compte rendu des operations du comite 
r volutionnaire de Nismes, 4 Prairial An II. 
81 A. N. 124 A. P. 1. Eymard memorandum to director general 
oF Police, 1 September; 1814. 
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Vampire and Thomas Froment82. The membership of the societe 
was, then, broadly based within the Catholic community, and 
the societe had strong links with notables in Paris and 
with the Catholic working classes of Nimes which it could 
mobilise to cause trouble. After the celebration, Vampere 
publicly insulted a retired officer who had chosen to wear his 
cross of the Legion of Honour in honour of the day83, thus 
giving some indication of the tenor of the gathering in which 
he had participated. 
The societe royale was taking up a position of hostility 
to the administration in the Gard which, they said, was still 
in the hands of the king's enemies 
84. In July, the mayor, 
Boileau de Castelneau, resigned. Boyer, author of the April 
petition, announced on his arrival from Paris, that he would 
be nominated85. In the event the government chose to ap- 
point another Protestant, David Daunant, who had been honoured 
by Napoleon with the title of baron. The government was not 
only unwilling to dismiss Protestants from the administration, 
but it was not even prepared to appoint royalists to vacant 
82 A. N. 124 AP 1. 'Etat nominatif des particuliers qui, 
le 25 aoüt 1814, ont dine dans la guingette tenue par 
le Sr. Nicolas Auzias, fixee sur 1'Esplanade. " 
83 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Mayor of Nimes to director general 
fjiolice, 7 October 1814. 
84 A. N. F79094. Dreux Breeze, when he interceded on behalf 
o Lavondýs, had been told that Lavondýs was the victim of 
"a party only too powerful in the department". Letter to 
Beugnot, director of police, 6 August, 1814. 
Baron, writing to Dambray on behalf of Lavondes said it 
was another case of "good royalists ill used by the op- 
posing party which is still in control of the authorities". 
Extract of a letter written by Baron to the Chancellor of 
France, 10 August, 1814. 
85 A. N. 124 AP 1. Eymard to director general of police, 30 
August, 1814. 
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positions. ' What must have been the anger of the Catholic Royal- 
ists, who had believed that their counter- revolutionary pe- 
digree would entitle them to occupy public office once more 
and enable them to humiliate the Protestants? At the end 
of August, Eymard reported that extreme royalist opinion had 
concluded that the king was not going to carry out a 'new 
revolution'86. They looked even more to the Comte d'Artois 
for the realisation of their aims and even began to spread 
rumours of the imminent abdication of Louis in favour of his 
87 brother. Shouts of 'Vive le Comte d'Artois" symbolised 
the hopes of the royalists88. 
At the same time, their determination became greater 
and their intentions more sinister. As Daunant said, the 
extreme royalists expected a bloody reaction after the return 
of the Bourbons; for their part, the royalists of Nimes had 
redoubled their communications with their associates in Paris, 
but had, at the same time, gone 'underground', hiding the 
minutes of their committee meetings and passing messages and 
instructions to each other orally8.9. 
By the autumn, Daunant was sure in his own mind that 
the royalists had rejected the restoration as it was evolving. 
They awaited a true counter-revolution to re-establish all 
that had been destroyed by the Revolution, and to achieve 
86 A. N. 124 AP 1. Eymard memorandum, 30 August, 1814. 
87 A. N. F79049. Rolland to director general of police, 
8 September 1814. 
88 A. N. F7 9049. Rolland to-director of police, 8 September, 
1814. 
89 A. N. 124 AP 1. Daunant to Eymard, 10 Septdmber, 1814. 
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their aim, they intended to use all the methods of the re- 
volution - "all the odious forms of Jacobinism" - and, more 
significant in the area, "the firebrand of religious fanaticism: "90 
Religious fanaticism was the term used by Daunant to 
describe the royalists' attempts to secure an all-powerful 
role for the Catholic Church in the area, as this would 
restore the supremacy of the Catholic community and eliminate 
Protestantism as a political and economic force. The pe- 
tition the Societe royale sent to the King in April had been 
intended to warn the Protestants not to expect any toleration 
of their rights as defined by the Revolutionary and consular 
laws as much as it had been a loyal protestation to the 
monarch not to accept any limitation of his powers. That 
petition was followed in January 1815 by a new address in 
which the Societe royale urged the King to authorise the re- 
establishment in France of the Society of Jesus. 
91 The 
Protestants were left in little doubt of the fate reserved 
for them if the royalists had their way. A contemporary 
wrote: 
"By January 1815, the Protestants 
could have no more illusions 
regarding the intentions of their 
adversaries; their most deep seated 
fears were only too well feunded. 92. 
90 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Daunant to minister of the interior 
7 October, 1814. 
91 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Daunant to minister of interior, 
11 February, 1815. The address was described as dangerously 
inflammatory by the abbe M'ontesquiou, minister of the 
interior. A. D. Gard 6M 2. Memorandum, February, 1815. 
92 J. A. Dulaure, Les Tueurs du Midi (Paris, n. d. ), p. 28. 
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However, there was little to suggest in January 1815 that 
the extremists would have their way in the Gard. The 
prefect and conseillers had not been changed, the sub prefects 
had not been changed, and a Protestant mayor of Nimes had been 
succeeded by another Protestant mayor. It required the return 
93 
Bonaparte in March 1815 and the ensuing civil strife to give 
the Gard extreme royalists the opportunity to take what - 
steps they felt appropriate to crush the Calvinists. They had 
seen the spoils of victory slip from their hands in 1814, and 
were to make 'certain that there was no mistake made when the 
next opportunity arose. In many respects, the period known 
as the Hundred Days was an unexpected second chance for them. 
In the complex and confused circumstances of the Hundred_ 
Days, Protestants became closely identified once again with 
bonapartism and treachery, while the royalists were forced to 
flee . The link. -between religion and politics was glaring. 
Catholic commentators were quick to point out that few Pro- 
testants rallied to the Royalist Volunteer batallions recruited 
by the duc d'Angouleme in order to halt Bonaparte's progress. 
94 
Protestant commentators protested that those who did volunteer 
were rebuffed by the diehard royalists. 
95 After the rout of 
the Volunteers at La Palud, four volunteers returning to Nimes 
were murdered in the Protestant village of Arpaillargues in 
confusing circumstances. 
96 While the Protestant accounts 
93 Almanach imperial 1813; Almanach royal 1814-15. 
94 See R. de Bernis, Precis de ce qui s'est nasse dans le 
Gard et la Lozere (1818), Pp. 10-15. 
95 Lauze de Peret, op. cit., p. 37 . 
96 A. N. 'F7 9049. Bulletin d'Inspection de la Gendarmerie 
du Gard, 21 April, 1815. 
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Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that the Catholics 
% projected onto the Protestants a role that the latter were 
attribute the murder to panic because of rumours of assaults 
carried out by returning volunteers, 97 the Catholics saw it 
as another example of Protestant perfidy and used it to 
promote, then to justify, the White Terror that- was 
unleashed in the summer. 
reluctant to accept. Official reports dating from the period 
March to June stressed that the Protestant cantons of the 
department, Albs and Le Vigan, were soundly bonapartist. 99 
When the local administrators who refused to serve Napoleon 
resigned, they were replaced by Protestants in the main. 
100 
97 Lauze de Peret., op. cit., pp. 88-92. 
98 J. Ch. A. d'Arbaud Jouques, Troubles et Agitations du 
departement du Gard en 1815 -Par is , 1818), p. 5. 
99 A. N. F7 9049. Baron Roggieri (Bonapartist prefect) to 
minister of police, 2 May 1815. 
100 
A little later, Roggieri wrote that the patriots of 
Nimes were"not so much patriotic as anti-Catholic. "19 
May 1815. 
Rolland, before his dismissal, had reported that the 
Protestants were showing their anger at the Catholic 
party"which supports the claims of nobles, priests and 
emigres'' 13 April 1815. This attitude contrasts with 
the silence of the Protestants in the face of provocation 
d-uring the, first restoration. 
A. N. Flb II Gard 4 shows that a numberof posts went to 
men who would become leading Orleanists after 1830. It 
is also noteworthy that the Gard deputies to the new 
Corps Legislatif were protestants; Gilly, the general 
who had anded over the Nßmes Garrison; Teste, and Vincens 
St. Laurent. 
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Daunant, the mayor 
his office and did 
ther the interests 
councils of many t 
conditionally. 
102 
of Nimes since July 1814, was maintained in 
not resign. But he did not actively fur- 
of the new regime, 
101 
nor did the municipal 
owns wish to commit themselves to it un- 
Nonetheless, the fact that the Protestants 
had come into their own under Napoleon and that they were not 
seen to be actively opposing him now was enough for the Cath- 
olic extremists to identify Protestantism with Bonapartism. 
That Nimes had been taken over by the so called bataillon 
sacre103, a band of demi-soldes, while the royalist vol- 
unteers were on the Rhone trying to stop Napoleon was for many 
people reason enough to impute treason to the Protestants as 
wall as collusion. 
The Royalist volunteers raised by the duc d'Angouleme 
were, with the prominent extreme Royalists of the first res- 
toration, marked men. Many, including Lavondes, Terme and 
Vampere were exiled from the department and put under surveil- 
lance. 104 Many volunteers who decided not to return to their 
homes went south to the coast, where they formed a number of 
camps in the Camargue, thus avoiding capture and establishing 
contact with the duc d'Angouleme and his entourage, who had 
taken ship to Spain. 
105 Throughout the Hundred days, these 
101 A. N. F7 9049. Roggieri to minister of police. n. d. 
102 A. N. F7 9049. Roggieri to minister of police, 19 May 
1815. 
103 A. de Beauchamp, Histoire des campagnes de 1814 
et 1815 (2 vols ., 'Paris, 1817) . 
104 A. D. Gard 6M 7. Minister of police to Roggieri, 6 May 1815. 
105 F. Daudet, -Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste(Ninies, 1884). 
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Royalists created disturbances in the Gard and neighbouring 
I1erault, keeping royalist sentiments alive and organising 
support for an insurrection, 106 
6 The Hundred Days throw light on another aspect of Ca- 
tholic Royalism in the Gard, the involvement of a number of 
very influential and wealthy local landed notables whose af- 
filiations with the Societe royale had not existed or had not 
been noted during the first Restoration. The count Rene de 
Bernis and his brother-in-law, Marquis Jacques-Alexis de 
Calviere were among those who followed the duc d'Angouleme 
to Spain, 107 while a cousin of the latter helped organise a 
royalist network in the Aigues Mortes area, 
108 
aided by the 
Marquis de Montcalm. 109 De Bernis and De Calviere were landed 
by boat near Aigues Mortes shortly before Waterloo and were 
given command of the Gard and Lozere royalists. 
Not only was an armed insurrection prepared. From exile 
in Spain, Francois Froment wrote a bitter letter to the duc 
de Blacas, whom he held responsible for the policies that had 
led to the usurpation. Froment outlined plans for France 
once Napoleon was defeated. The Press and mail, he said, must 
be censored, and in each department, a corps of loyal men must 
be set up under the command of a gentleman, armed and ready 
106 A. D. Gard. 6M 7 and A. N. - F7 9049 contain many gendarmerie 
reports of seditious gatherings, posters and slogans, maini 
in the south and east of the department. 
107 Chateau de Vezenobre. 
Marquise de Calviere, 
108 A. N. Flb I 157, dossier 
109 A. D. Gard 6M 7. Lieu 
p refect of Gard. 
Mss, notes by Pulch6rie-Cecille, 
nee Saint Priest. 
3. 
tenant of police, Montpellier, to 
3S 
to defend the Monarchy against treachery. 110 Within 
months, such measures, which call to mind chapter twenty- 
three of Stendhal's Rouge et Noir, would be implemented 
in the Gard so systematically that it is not possible to 
accept the assertion of those historians who explain the 
White Terror after Waterloo as a spontaneous occurrence, 
an act of popular justice or revenge rather like the 
1944 reaction to collaborators, 
lll Amidst the apparent 
confusion and widespread bloodshed that the Midi experience 
in the summer of 1815, it is possible to detect, in the 
Gard and neighbouring areas, at least, a determined 
and carefully orchestrated endeavour on the part of the 
Blancs to chastise their rivals, and to realise by their 
own methods the outcome they had expected of the first 
Restoration, but had failed to achieve by pacific 
means. 
110 In Froment, Recueil d'Ecrits relatifs a la Revolution 
Mss. document, A. D. Gard, Fon ds legal, 341. 
111 The most eminent exponent of this view is Bertier 
de Sauvigny. See La Restauration (Paris, 1955), p. 128. 
The view is also held by D. Resnick, The White Terror 
after Waterloo (Harvard, 1966). 
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Chapter 2. 
The second restoration of Louis XVIII to the throne of 
his ancestors could have none of the optimistic joy of the 
first. The victory of the exasperated allies had overthrown 
Bonaparte and it was in the wake of the advancing allied 
armies that Louis and his exiles made their way to Paris. 
' 
Moreover, unlike 1814, the second restoration could not claim 
that it would reconcile old wounds. On the contrary, there 
were now victors and vanquished, for those Frenchmen who 
had supported the Hundred Days could be charged with treason. 
At the same time, the facts were embarrassing: a significant 
number of Frenchmen had rejected the Restoration, and their 
defeat was due entirely to foreign armies. Thus, the Bourbons 
could in no way identify with patriotism. Also, their pos- 
ition as rulers of France was delicate, for the allies had 
even less reason now than in 1814 to restore the monarchy. 
At least in 1814 it appeared to enjoy the good will of the 
population and to be able to promise peace and stability in 
troublesome France. Ironically, it was largely due to the 
cunning of Fouche and the presence of Wellington that Louis 
XVIII was able to regain his throne a second time. The le- 
gitimacy of the restored monarchy was compromised even more 
by the emergence of a deep split between constitutionalists 
f 
1J "Cabanis 
Charles X (Paris 19 7 2), pp . 109-111. It was on 
instructions 
of Wellington that Louis and his followers made their way 
from Ghent to Cambrai, from Cambrai to Roye, then to 
Gonesse and finally to the Tuileries after the Prussian 
and English armies had camped in Paris. 
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and Ultra royalists, as they were now called. Those royal- 
ists who had rejected the principle of a constitutional mon- 
archy in 1814 now had their fears and prejudices vindicated. 
The Hundred Days had hardened their attitudes and had en- 
couraged their emergence as a coherent political force, whose 
leadership was to revolve around the Pavillon de Marsan, the 
residence of the Comte d'Artois, whose intransigence on 
constitutional government was no secret. A current of opinion, 
ill assorted and lacking cohesion in 1814, Ultra royalism 
was to be a constant embarrassment to the constitutional 
monarchy, refusing its support on the one hand, and pro- 
yoking suspicion among "Revolutionaries" on the other by its 
indiscretion and provocation. The intransigence of the Ultra 
party can be held largely responsible for the failure of 
the constitutional experiment between 1814 and 1830. The 
Ultras constantly identified themselves with reactionary 
policies, pressing for the isolation and punishment of those 
who had played any part in the events between 1789 and 1814 
in France. 2 
2 Thus, in 1815, the Ultras favoured the allied occupation 
of France. Three years later, in the Note secrete, they 
argued for a fresh occupation to put an end to the shift 
towards liberalism encouraged by Decazes. See Pasquier, 
Memoires du Chancellier Pas uier (6 vols., Paris, 1893-5), 
vol. 4, p. 251. The Note secrete also contained plans 
to destroy irrevocably te system of representative 
government. Later examples of the Ultras' intransigence 
can be seen in the bills concerning the Milliard des Emigres, 1825; the question of primogeniture rather than 
the Napoleonic equal inheritance, 1825; and the question 
of punishment of sacrilege, 1825. 
-ü 
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Coupled with their rejection of the Revolution, its 
principles and its works, the Ultra royalists displayed 
deep hostility towards the centralised state. In their 
demands for extensive decentralisation, Ultras were re- 
iterating the demands of the 1788 Assembly of Notables, and 
were setting themselves squarely in the provincialist 
tradition that had already shown its strength in the Fronde, 
and tended to view with equal suspicion royal absolutism 
and democracy. The effects of the Revolution had, however, 
gone some way to reducing the differences between the 
Absolutists and Feudalists. In practice, decentralisation 
was the only practical way of ensuring that the counter- 
revolution triumphed when the king was deemed to be weak 
or suspect. In the South, a large measure of autonomy was 
sought by the local notables3 who had already accepted 
gladly the governorship of the duc d'Angouleme during the 
Hundred Days! The intensity of the White Terror would reveal 
the support enjoyed by men who sought freedom from the 
constraints imposed by Paris. 
On their return to Paris, believing that they would 
enjoy great influence, the Ultras sought a severe purge 
3. M. de Santi, "Notes et Documents sur les Intrigues royal- 
istes dans le Midi de la France, de 1792 a 1815", 
Memoires de 1'Academie de Toulouse, 2e serie, 4, pp. 37-114. 
. 4. See pp. 33-5 supra 
Ult-ras, believed that 
agreement on the ques 
d'Aulps, Extrait d'un 
p. 7. ... 
Blacas; ' now the scapegoat of the 
Artois and Angoule"'me were in 
tion of local autonomy. Blacas 
Memoire justificatif (n. p. , 1815) , 
i 
.1 
ý) 
of the nation and harsh punishment of those who had shown 
their true colours. According to Guizot, it was held that, 
of ten men who had served the king in 1814, seven deserved 
hanging, two the galleys and the tenth might just be consid- 
ered an 'honnete homme'. 5 During the exile of the Hundred 
Days, the Marquis de Chabannes had reflected the views of men 
like Froment when he wrote that 'a few years of absolute des- 
potism' were the only remedy for the spirit of discussion and 
revolution that had afflicted France. 
6 Thus, from July 24 
on, a series of measures were taken, by the king and by the 
Chambre introuvable, to seek out and punish those accused of 
aiding the usurpation, culminating in the laws which enabled 
the authorities to imprison without trial any person suspec- 
ted of plotting against the royal family or the security of 
the state, and to have them tried, where appropriate, by 
? 
special courts without the right of appeal. D. Resnick has 
calculated that in the twelve months following the second res- 
toration, some 3,476 convictions for political offences were 
secured in the ordinary courts of the land, while there were 
a further 3,382 arrests without trial, resulting in detention. 
8 
It is noticeable that the southern departments accounted for 
the highest number of political convictions in relation to 
5 In Cabanis,, 0P. cites p. 105 
6 Ms de Chabannes, Lettres au comte de Blacas (London 1815), 
pp. 55-56. 
7 Bertier de Sauvigny, op. cit,, ppl30,131. 
8 D. Resnick, The White Terror after Waterloo, 
pp. 126-139. 
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the size of their population, 9 and that among these, the 
Gard figured prominently with 154 convictions in the courts 
and 57 detentions without trial out of a population of 
333 000.10 Yet the legal consequences of the restoration were 
simply one manifestation of the repression that was unleashed 
on France in the summer of 1815. 
The events of the White Terror that raged across the 
south are well documented. 11 The massacres in Marseille, the 
murder of general Ramel in Toulouse, that of Marshal Brune in 
Avignon are, with the events in Nimes, the most notorious 
examples of violence enacted in the name of royalism. This 
chapter will seek to examine the events in Nimes and its 
neighbouring towns in the context of a carefully planned 
effort on the part of certain Catholics to recreate a society 
in which they and their interests prospered, and to eradicate 
as fully as possible the Protestant party. Thus, the White 
Terror in the Gard was both a means to an end, and the occasion 
for settling old accounts. 
12 
9 The 8 departments of Ardeche, Aude, Bouches du Rhone, Gard, 
Herault, Lozere, Pyrenees orientales and Tarn, with a com- 
bined population of 2 120 000, accounted for 678 convictions. 
The 10 south eastern departments accounted for 478 convic- 
tions, while 12 in the south west accounted for 593. 
D. Resnick, op. cit., pp. 128-9; 132. 
10. ibid., p. 128. 
11 See H. Houssaye, 1815 (3 vols., Paris, 1905); E. Daudet, 
La Terreur blanche (Paris, 1906); G. Lewis, "La Terreur 
blanche dans le Midi", Annales historiques de la Revolution 
francaise, 36, pp. 174-93. 
12 An example of this re lement de comptes is offered by 
Lavondes. Already, in 1814, he was abusing his royalism 
to intimidate Protestant creditors. A. N. F7 9049. Latour- 
Maubourg to prefect, 8 June, 1814. See also G. Lewis, 
" The -White Terror of 1815 in the Department of the Gard: 
Counter-revolution, Continuity and the Individual", Past 
and Present, 58, pp. 108-35. 
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Towards the end of June, when news of Waterloo had reached 
the south, the royalists, under the leadership of the duc 
d'Angouleme's special envoys13 began to congregate in the small 
town of Beaucaire, some 24 kilometres east of Nimes. By the beginning 
of July, Beaucaire, Villeneuve les Avignon and IJzes were in 
their hands. 14 From Beaucaire, Rene de Bernis and Jules de 
Calviere issued an ultimatum to the inhabitants of the Card, 
urging them to consider their position carefully and to sub- 
mit to the lawful government of France. 
15 This ultimatum 
was issued on the very day that five houses in Beaucaire, 
including those of the mayor's adjoints, were devastated. 
16 
Royalist horsemen, wearing uniforms and white cocards were 
reported to be requisitioning horses in the area around Saint 
Gilles, a town to the south of Ntmes. 
17 
On 7 July, the municipal council of Nimes, realising 
that a change of regime was imminent and fearful of the re- 
action of those royalists who had been singled out during the 
Hundred Days, sent delegates to Beaucaire in order to negotiate 
a peaceful transfer of authority in the department. The del- 
egates returned to Nimes with a written guarantee, signed by 
13 See p. 34 su ra. 
14 A. D. Gard 6M 7 -contains a number of reports 
from Communes on the eastern side of the department re- 
cording the arrival of groups of royalists. 
15 Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis des Troubles , p. 14S 
16 A. D. Gard 6M 28. Mayor of Beaucaire to Marquis 
de 
Calve re, 3 July, 1815. 
17 A. D. Gard 6 M 7. Commissaire de Police, 
St. Gilles 
to prefect, 3 July 1815. 
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Rent de Bernis, Jean de Barre and Jules de Calviýre, that 
life and property would be respected if Nimes offered no res- 
istance to the Armee royale as it styled itself. 
18 The roy- 
alists entered Nimes on the evening of July 17th and met no 
resistance from the Garde urbaine, the bonapartist national 
Guard, which allowed itself to be disarmed and stripped even 
of its uniforms, normally the property of each member. 
19 Then, 
the royalists approached the Barracks which contained a detach- 
ment of regular troops. The royalists demanded the artillery 
pieces in the charge of the troops, but these refused in the 
absence of any agreement. The commander of the barracks, 
Maulmont met Jean de Barre that evening to negotiate an hon- 
ourable surrender. It was finally agreed that the troops 
would leave their weapons in the barracks and march out the 
next morning. As a matter o. f protocol, officers would be 
permitted to wear their swords. But while the negotiations 
were taking place, sporadic firing had broken out between 
royalists demanding the surrender of the cannons and the 
troops who refused to hand them over. The next morning, as 
the troops marched out of the barracks, Royalists demanded the 
surrender of the swords and fell upon the unarmed troops, 
murdering as many as they could lay their hands on. 
20 The 
massacre of the Bonapartist soldiers marked the first outrage 
among many that were to take place in the department of the 
18 A. D. Gard 6M7. Document dated 
7 July, 1815. 
19 Lauze de Peret, Causes et. Precis, pp. 182-3. 
20 A. D. Gard 6M 3S, Dossier 10. Proces verbal 
de Charles 
Lef vre . 
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Gard in the next two months by the so called royalist troops. 
Who then, were they? 
Eyewitnesses of the entry into Nimes, both royalists and 
liberals, agree that the Armee royale was composed of three 
groups -a body led by orderly officers which observed strict 
discipline, a second group, armed with a variety of weapons 
from rifles to pitchforks and batons, and a third group, a 
rabble, composed of the dregs of the population of the Gard 
and Bouches du Rhone, hoping to take advantage of the chaos 
to loot and steal. 
21 These men, calling themselves Miguelets 
and wearing a red fleur-de-lys on their coats, were responsible 
for the raids on the homes of guardsmen in order to get weapons 
and uniforms. Whatever their status, these bands of irreg- 
ulars proceeded to pillage property in the town the day after 
they arrived22 and were able to do so unhindered, for the 
royalist leaders did not arrive in Nimes until the evening of 
the nineteenth of July. Thus, in the words of a contemporary, 
"the pillage had been organised for some thirty hours! ' 
23 The 
. murder and violence that took place on the eighteenth and nineteenth was 
directed against Protestants, and the space of thirty hours or 
more was enough to allow the rank and file royalists to strike 
terror into the hearts of those known, or believed to be 
21. F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux Royaliste, (Nimes, n. d. ). 
Louis Coulanges, the subject of Daudet's book,.. was 
a volunteer in Angouleme's forces, and later, a member 
of the Arinee royale de Beaucaire; Ch. Durand, Marseille, 
Nimes et ses Environs en 1815, par des T 6moins oculaires 
Paris, -11,18). 
22 A. N. F79054. Anon., 25 August,. 1815. The houses of 
Vincens, Devillers, Roux Amphous, Crouzat, Coste, Negre, 
Durand and Mathieu were destroyed. In the night of 
19 August, just before the elections, the houses of 
Clore,, buffet, Salle Dhombre, Lannes, Marvejol, Salles, 
Les Rouvejols, Carcassonne, Montlut, Muscat and Delord 
suffered the same fate. 
23. Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, p. 196. 
44 
hostile to the ambitions of the Catholic royalists. More 
than simple pillaging, it was the initial assault, intended 
to 'soften up' the town, and particularly the Protestants, and 
so prepare the ground for the establishment of an adminis- 
tration that would reflect the outlook of those who regarded 
the Protestants as the natural enemy. If anyone in Nimes had 
hoped for an end to the violence and reassurances for the 
future when the royalist provisional government entered Nimes, 
they would have been quickly convinced of their error. In 
a cortege formed by royalist cavalry and footsoldiers, the 
commissaire extraordinaire, Rene de Bernis, the provisional 
prefect, Jules de Calviýre and the police commissioner, Vidal, 
rode into Nimes. All three men were wearing the green and 
white cocarde in honour of the Comte d'Artois, 
24 
a clear in- 
dication in the context of the First Restoration in the Gard 
that they were not partisans of constitutional government. 
Indeed, had the onlookers but known, a few hundred kilometres 
away in Toulouse, men were being murdered by royalists known 
as Verdets because they wore green and white in the same 
cause. 
25 Moreover, the three provisional administrators 
were local men, and their counter revolutionary pedigree was 
known to the NImois. De Bernis and de Calviere had spent 
some time with the emigres, and both men had opposed the 
24 Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, pp. 196-207. 
25 The most celebrated vi_tim of the Verdets was 
General 
Kamel, who refused to recognise the irregulars. -The 
Provisional authorities in the town did not or could 
not intervene to save-his life. 
(Houssaye, 1815, 
pp. 475-8; E. Daudet, Terreur blanche, p. 275). 
Subsequent efforts to uncover the authors of the crime 
were- blocked by local officials (Archives munic1p ales 
de Töulouse. 5S 204, Fonds Remusat. Remusat, prefect, to 
minister o police, 30 November, 1815) 
J 
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Hundred days actively. 26 But possibly the most sinister 
appointment was that of Vidal. He had been, with Froment, 
one of the instigators of the bagarre de Nimes in 1790, when 
he had been procureur of NTmes. 
27 Thus his anti-Protestantism 
was well known. Subsequently, he was condemned by the N4mes 
Revolutionary committee and spent several months of the run. 
28 
A witness to his return to power in 1815 stated: 'The re- 
surrection of M. Vidal, his appointment, indicate sufficiently 
the spirit in which the municipal authorities had been con- 
stituted'. 
29 
As provisional prefect, Calvinre's first action was to 
replace the officials who were in office, and to put the 
local authorities in the hands of Ultra royalists. In his 
first report to Paris, he stressed that bonapartist opposition 
to the Restoration had obliged him to replace 'spontaneously' 
the sub prefects of Nimes, Ales and Le Vigan and the secretary 
of the departmental council. The new appointees, de Larcy 
26 A. N. F1bI 7.57 dossier 3. - Jules de Calviere. 
Chateau de Vezenobres. Mss. notebooks of Pulcherie-Cecile, 
Marquise de Calviere. 
Both men were from families long established in the area - 
de Bernis was nephew of the Cardinal de Bernis who had 
advised the pope to reject the Civil Constitution of the 
clergy in 1790. 
27 Courrier de Beaucaire No. 58,26 May 1790. Also: 'Sommaire 
des evenements arrives ä Nismes depuis le decret de 
1'Assemblee nationale du 2 novembre 1789'(n. p. n. 
d. ), p. 18 
Vidal was inciting counter revolution in the Gard. 
01 28 A. D. Gard L 1198. Operations du comite revolutionnaire 
dP N; smes_ An II. Se 
cna 
u ler Prairial, An II. 
0 
29 Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, p. 286. 
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at Le Vigan, Narbonne-Lara at Ales and Gabriac at Nimes 
were, with the new secretary at the Prefecture, ardent 
royalists. 
30 
De Calviere wrote that the appointments were: 
"Dictated uniquely by a desire 
to serve the king well, (and) 
have received the approval of all 31 the faithful servants of His Majesty. " 
At the same time, the police officials of Nimes, Ales, 
Uzes, Beaucaire, Saint Gilles and Aigues Vives were 
changed on Vidal's orders. 
32 The eastern half of the Gard 
was completely controlled by the Catholic royalists. 
In Nimes itself, the violence wrought by the militia 
had produced a deep effect. On 23 July, the Procureur- 
General, a Protestant, wrote: 
"For the past eight days, Nimes has 
presented the unhappy spectacle of 
pillage, destruction and murder. The 
police have had no effect in repressing 
these excesses. Measures which have not 
yet had their full effect have been 
taken by the authorities to put an end 
to the excesses. " 33 
30 Narbonne-Lara emigrated in 1791 and fought in the Armee 
de Conde (A. N. Fib I. Dossier 168/1) He was found, in 
1817, to be a member of the Societe royale (A. N. F7 9050. 
Mss. document, "Cle d'une Correspon ance" 
De Larcy emigrated in 1792 (A. D. Gard L 452. Liste des 
Emigres). 
Flotte-Montauban was found to be an agent of the Societe 
royale (A. N. F7 9050. "Cle d'une Correspondance"). 
31 A. N F79657. De Calviere to minister of interior, 
July, 1815. 
32 A. Gard 6M 45. Dossier on Police officials, July, 1815. 
33 A. N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 23 
may, 1815. 
A 
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In order to escape death or summary imprisonment, many 
Protestants fled Nimes and tried to get up to the hills in 
the north west of the Gard, where Protestantism was strong 
and where they could seek refuge 34 and help. 'The flow of these 
refugees in a part of the Gard that was known to be Protestant 
gave rise to rumours that Bonapartist resistants were forming 
35 large bands in the hills. The measures Cavalier mentioned 
amounted to no more than an order to such refugees to return 
at once to Nimes on pain of having their proprty confiscated36. 
At the same time, the rumours of brigandage and political 
gatherings served to justify an intensified repression of 
suspects and the organisation of punitive expeditions to Pro- 
testant areas where gatherings had been reported. The myth 
of imminent Protestant insurrection served to prolong the 
repression and to justify a sweeping purge of the department 
to outside opinion. On 1 August, seven men accused of 
being Bonapartists were shot in the streets of N4mes. Vidal 
claimed that the authorities were powerless to prevent the 
34 A. D. Gard 6r1 28. As late as . 22 
August, a report 
__ 
came from Langlade estimating some 1 000 to 1 200 women 
and children refugees in the Arrondissement of Le Vigan. 
The same report said that the "exaltes'' wanted to march 
on the groups of refugees. 
35 A. D. Gard 6M 28. anon., 26 July, 1815, reports that the 
Cevennes, Gardonnenque and Vaunage are being fanaticised 
by rebels who have hidden there. A. N. F7 9049, 
Vidal to Director of police, n. d. Vidal states that Saint 
Jean du Gard, Anduze and Calvisson are in arms, that the 
gatherings are composed of political refugees and 
Protestants. , 
36 A. N. F79049. Vidal to minister of interior, 25 July, 
1815. 
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incident37. The punitive expeditions were often as doubtful 
as the status of the men who carried them out. There were 
reports of irregular companies disarming farmhouses and de- 
scending on villages in the night to demand contributions of 
money38. The most notorious of these was the sortie carried 
out by a terrorist called Quatretaillons against St. Maurice 
at the end of Augist, when six prisoners were taken to Uzes 
and shot under the windows of the sub prefecture39. In all 
such cases, the Gard authorities denied involvement and 
claimed they could do nothing to prevent the murders40. It 
is, of course, possible that there were armed bands of Pro- 
testants in the countryside to the north of Nimes; tradition- 
ally, the exposed Protestant communities in and near Nimes 
could rely on the intervention of the remote communities, 
and the last time this had happended was in 1790, when the 
Protestants descended upon Nimes and tipped the balance in 
37 A. D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 2 August, 
1815. 
38 A. D. Gard 6M 28. Mayor of Brignon to sub prefect of 
Ales, 27 August 1815. About 200 royalist irregulars 
commanded by the Marquis de La Calmette arrived in the 
village before sunset and, during the night, went about 
forcing villagers to part with whatever money they had. 
The same dossier contains reports of such raids in Garons, 
Bouillargues, Generac, Beauvoisin. 
39 This episode was a scandal because of the notoriety of 
Graffand, alias Quatretaillons, and because the sub 
prefect, Darnand Vallabrix, was implicated in the affair 
(Dulaure, Les Tueurs de Midi, p. 42; Lauze de Peret, Causes 
et Precis, p. 
40 For example, Darbaud Jouques says that "men of high rank, 
of great honour could not possibly have been in collusion 
with the Dupont, Graffand and Lavondes. On the contrary, 
the administrators pursued them and brought them to 
justice. '' Troubles et Agitations, p. 43. 
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the ba arre4l. The presence of the former Bonapartist 
military commander, General Gilly, a Gard Protestant, in the 
Cevennes where he had taken flight after Waterloo lent cred- 
ibility to the claim that an anti-royalist insurrection was 
4 being prepared2. On 26 August,, a detachment of Austrian 
occupation soldiers who had crossed into the Gard on the 23rd 
killed some eighty peasants near the commune of Ners, near 
Ales43. The report to Paris following this incident claimed 
that timely Austrian intervention had nipped a plot in the 
44 bud. But against the background of Catholic royalist 
aspirations and threats during the first restoration, in 
the context of a provisional government led entirely by local 
men, and in relation to concerted action by the royalists in 
other spheres which we shall be examining, the White Terror 
cannot be seen simply as a spontaneous reaction by an ex- 
asperated population, as royalist leaders tried to claim. On 
the contrary, as many contemporaries pointed out, it was tol- 
erated, if not encouraged by a number of men whose aim was to 
re-establish Catholic royalist supremacy and to pick up the 
41 G. Lewis, ! "The counter-revolution in the department of 
the Gard. " (Unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1965) 
P. M. 
42 Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, p. 208. 
43 A. D. Gard- 6M 33. Vidal to Director 
1815. Contrary 'to an agreement that 
remain east of the Rhone, ". ustrians 
the Gard in-spite of the opposition 
authorities _ 
(A. D. Gard 6M 29. 'Vida: 
police, 19 August, 1815). 
of Police, 26 August, 
allied troops would 
had crossed into 
of the local 
I to minister of 
44 A. D. Gard 6M 28. Sub prefect of Le Vigan to Prefect, 
31 August 1815. 
so 
thread that was cut in 1790, and who had sometimes taken 
part as early as 1795 in the first White Terror . 
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Ironically, the very day the provisional authorities 
took office in Nimes, the king issued an ordinance term- 
inating the special powers delegated to the commissaires 
extraordinaires. With the ordinance, a list of permanent 
appointments in each department -as published. Although it 
was promulgated on 19 July, the ordinance was not known 
publicly in Nimes until 28 July, the day that Calviere's 
successor, the marquis D'Arbaud Jouques, arrived in the 
city to take up his duties. 
46 
The arrival of a permanent 
prefect set off a series of events that illustrate another 
facet of the provisional administration in the Gard, namely 
its determined opposition to interference from Paris, even 
from the king. As far as they were concerned, the local 
Royalists had a permanent administration, and one that 
suited their requirements of a quasi-autonomous department. 
The replacement of Calviere appears to have surprised 
the Gard royalists47, although one commentator said that 
45 The most consistent and outspoken criticism came from 
Lauze de Peret, a Protestant. He said the authorities 
"absolutely needed the existence of an anti-Bourbon 
plot", (Causes et Precis, p. 340) and that the expeditions 
undertaken by royalist irregulars, sometimes commanded by 
notables, were the only causes of- disturbance, (ibid., p. 208). 
Both Peret (ibid., p. 362 and Eclaircissements, p. 9) and 
Dulaure (Tueurs du Midi, p. 42) say that Darnand Vallabrix, 
sub prefect of Uz s, refused to intervene when Quatre- 
taillons shot six men in public. 
46 A. N. F79657. Jouques to minister of interior, 28 July 
1815. 
47 A. D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 1 Aug- 
ust, 1815. 
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Calviere had known about his imminent destitution and had 
tried to prevent it as early as the twenty-first of July. 
48 
The change angered the royalists, and Vidal wrote to Paris 
that the Catholic population saw the change as a move to 
weaken the power of the duc d'Angouleme - which it was - and 
a repetition of the disastrous policy of the first restoration 
'opening the administration to those who had sworn allegiance 
4 to Bonaparte'9. Jouques, who had joined the emigres and 
fought in the armee des princes, had returned to France after 
the 18 Brumaire and had served Bonaparte as a conseiller 
in his native Bouches du Rhone. and as prefect in the Hautes 
Pyrenees in 1813, receiving an imperial barony. He was 
50 
not, then, 'pure'. But, as Coulanges, himself a Nimois and 
a royalist volunteer in 1815, points out, what made Jouques 
unacceptable to the Gard ultras was the fact that he was not 
a local man and could not be relied upon to see the situation 
51 in the Gard the way the ultra notables saw it 
However, the Gard ultras were not without support, for 
Jouques had no sooner arrived in N4mes than he was summoned 
48 E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, p. 93. 
49 A. D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal, to Minister of police, n. d. conveys 
clearly the popular allegiance to the duc d'Angouleme. 
In another letter, dated 8 August, Vidal questions the 
authority of the ministry. to modify powers vested in him 
by Angouleme; showing once more that the Paris government 
was not 'recognised' by the Ultras in the Gard. 
F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p. 24. says that 
the change was seen by the Catholics as a first concession 
to the liberals. 
50 A. N. FlbI, dossiers 155-6. Personnel of the ministry of the 
interior. 
51 F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p. 24. 
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to Toulouse, the headquarters of the duc d'Angouleme who was 
the commander of the Midi, by the duke's assistant, the 
Marquis de Villeneuve. The same communication confirmed the 
provisional prefect, Jules de Calviere, in his posts2. Jouques 
left for Toulouse early on August 1st53 and was absent from 
Nimes for eighteen days54 during the most critical stage in 
the establishment of a new administration in the Gard. His 
summons to Toulouse, the 'capital' of Ultra royalism in the 
south, placed the events in the Gard in a much broader 
context, that of organised opposition to Paris and the King 
by groups of royalists throughout the Midi, whose ambitions 
centred on the duc d'Angouleme and Monsieur, the Comte d'Artois. 
When the Marquis de Villeneuve summoned Jouques to 
Toulouse, he pointed out that only the duc d'Angouleme en- 
joyed the power to appoint and revoke officials and that this 
power had not been withdrawn. In the same letter, 
55 
Villeneuve acknowledged receipt of a letter from Jouques 
dated 28 July and written from Nimes. It seems probable 
that Jouques, on his arrival in Nfines, had encountered op- 
position which claimed authority from Toulouse. He may then 
52 A. N. F79050. Marquis de Villeneuve, prefect of the Hautes 
Pyrenees and general civil administrator of HRH le duc 
d'Angouleme, to Jouques. n. d. 
53 A. D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 1 August 
54 Vidal' said that Jouques returned on the night of 16 
August (A. D. Gard- 6M 29, report of 19-August, 181S); 
Lauze_ de 
_ 
Per t said it was, the eighteenth (. Causes et 
. 
Precis, p. 310); Daudet said it was the nineteenth' 
Terreur blanche, p. 96). 
7 
55 A. N. F9050. Marquis deVilleneuve to Jouques, n. d. 
53 
have written to Toulouse in order to seek confirmation from 
the duc d'Angouleme, who was evidently the only recognised 
source of authority in the Gard. More extraordinary is the 
possibility that the royal ordinance, known publicly in Nimes 
by the twenty eighth, was not known by the King's deputy in 
Toulouse. Much more likely is the thesis that the contents 
of the ordinance were in fact known by the Toulouse ultras, 
but that, in the chaotic situation, the duc d'Angouleme chose 
not to obey. De Sauvigny believes that Angouleme thought 
the King had made new appointments in the belief that Angouleme 
was not exercising his authority and, so, he ignored them 
and continued to create his own administration 
56. The dis- 
cord between Toulouse and Paris is reflected in a directive 
sent to the 'official' prefect of the Haute Garonne, Remusat, 
r" 
who had been unable to take office until mid August 
"The ordinance of 19 July did 
not ratify the choice of per- 
sonnel made by the commissaires 
extraordinaires. In the southern 
departments, the restructuring of 
the administration was more thorough 
than elsewhere, and most of the persons 
chosen seem to think that their 
56 G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand de Bertier 
10 et 1'Enigme de la Congregation, (Paris, 1948), p. 176. 
The view is put forward by Richardson also, who 
says that Angouleme 'established what was in fact, if 
not in intention, a quasi autonomous state'. The 
French prefectoral corps 1814-30 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 63. 
57 Bertier 'de Sauvigny, 
Le Comte Ferdinand, p. 178 
Si 
appointment is definitive. However, 
as these appointments may have been 
made in the heat of the moment, I 
have to present to His Majesty 
candidates for permanent posts. 
I am requesting a list of those 
appointments made by the comm- 
issaires, to which your detailed 
observations should be joined. " 58 
This letter is a clear statement of the King's intention 
to assert his authority alone throughout the kingdom 
in the face of what appeared to many people to be a plot to 
create a semi autonomous kingdom in the south of France. 
Certainly, throughout the first restoration, the Comte 
d'Artois and the duc d'Angouleme had cultivated links with 
the Midi. The former rapidly became the focal point of the 
extreme royalists' hopes as Louis' attempts to reconcile the 
different political traditions insensed them. Angouleme, 
too, had caught the imagination of the southern royalists by 
his spirited if ineffectual attempt to cut off Napoleon's 
advance in March 1815. So it is not inconceivable that 
they were involved in an attempt to create an ultra royalist 
controlled structure of government. 
It was thought by some contemporary observers that the 
attempt was to create an independent Royaume d'Acquitaine, 
with its capital in Toulouse and the duc d'Angouleme as its 
regent. Santi suggests that a number of local notables 
including Villele, Vitrolles and the Polignac brothers were 
involved in such an endeavour and that it was prevented by 
58 Archives municipales de 
minister of justice to 
Toulouse 5S 204. Fonds Remusat, 
August 1815. emusat, 
S5 
Paris59; de Sauvigny says that the Chevaliers de la foi 
were at the heart of the project. That the Ultras in- 
60 
tended to create a separate state is not evident, particularly 
as their ideas on decentralisation were rather vague61. Equally 
it is tempting to recall the long tradition of particularism 
in the south west and to assume that local royalists, led by 
the landed notables would seek to be independent. It is 
possible, too, that the Ultra royalists wanted to colonise 
as completely as possible local government in order to 
pressure the king and his ministers to implement policies 
that were dear to the Ultras. Control of a large, unified 
part of the country would enable them to threaten Paris with 
insurrection if necessary. 
Whatever their ultimate goal, the Ultras succeeded in 
convincing a number of people, including the court, that 
they were mounting some sort of coup62 and, in the event, 
Paris prevailed. Angouleme was summoned to Paris and the 
official prefects took up their posts in the south by 
59 M. L. de Santi, loc. cit. 
60 Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand, FF. 171-178. 
61 In contrast to their affirmation of the principle of de- 
centra1isa tion, the Ultras did not offer any radical plans, 
but limited themselves to remove from Paris certain powers 
which would be given to prefects and mauors - deconcen- 
tration rather than decentralisation. J -J. Oechslin, Le 
Mouvement ultra royaliste (Paris 1960), p. 18S. 
62 A. D. Gard 6M 25. An anonymous tract in bad French but pur- 
porting to emanate from the King circulated at the beginning 
of August and threatened punishment for those involved in 
the "infernal plot's directed by the duke and duchess 
d'Angouleme against "my person and the Protestants". 
Houssaye, op. cit., pp. 549-50, said that the court believed 
that Artois was at the head of a plan to set up a separate 
state in t'ie south. 
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the middle of August63. 
Thus, when Jouques returned to Nimes and took up his 
post on 18 August, he was not challenged by the 
retiring provisional authorities64. But his acceptance was 
not a reflection of the submission of the local ultra leaders. 
It reflected his own 'conversion' to the principles that 
the provisional authorities had sought to implement since 
they arrived in Nimes a month earlier. According to one 
commentator, Jouques had raised the hopes of liberals on his 
appointment simply because of the consternation he provoked 
among the Ultras. On his return, however, he made it appear 
that the government wanted the principles of ultra royalism 
to triumph65. For the next eighteen months, until his dis- 
missal in February 1817, Jouques would be a steadfast defender 
of the Gard ultras and enabled them to build the kind of 
empire that might have existed throughout the Midi had the 
king not removed the duc d'Angouleme. If 
'The audacious attempt by the chevaliers de la 
foi to create in the Midi a political order based 
on their intransigent ideal collapsed''66 
the attempt continued in microcosm in the Gard. 
63 A. D. Gard 6M 29. Commissaire de police to minister of 
police, 21 August 1815. 
Also Bertier de Sauvigny, le Comte Ferdinand, p. 178. 
64 Daudet, Terreur blanche, p. 96 says Jouques took up his 
duties with the devoted assistance of MM de Bernis and 
de Calviere. " 
65 Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, pp. 310-13. 
66 Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand, _p. 
178. 
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Jouques' departure for Toulouse had given the provisional 
government two additional weeks in which to lay the foundations 
of a Catholic royalist local administration. In that period, 
the ultras showed great audacity in the face of increasing 
pressure from Paris, where reports had been received from 
individuals containing details of a widespread sectarian 
pogrom, carried out with the tacit consent of the provisional 
authorities67. Because of the rumours of a concerted con- 
spiracy in the Midi as a whole, Pasquier, the minister of 
Justice, expressed his anger that Jouques had been challenged 
in the name of another authority, that of the duc d'Angoultme, 
on his arrival in N4mes. Consequently, he instructed Jouques 
to take up his duties as quickly as possible and charged him 
to restore peace in the department, to the satisfaction of 
all citizens68. 
The case of police commissioner Vidal illustrates most 
clearly the determination of the Gard Ultras to accomplish 
their designs. Vidal had been denounced to the Minister of 
police, Joseph Fouche, for his partiality and for his 
67 Anonymous letters had been written denouncing the pro- 
visional government. A. N. F7 9049, anon., 12 July. The 
writer, quite literate, speaks of the existence of a re- 
volutionary tribunal "dans le sens royaliste. " It was 
sent to Joseph Fouche comme particillier. 
A. D. Gard 6M 25. anon., n. _d. 
A letter condemns de Calviere, de 
Bernis, de Vogue, Vidal, as well as a number of the more 
zealous Miquelets like Trestaillons and Carteras. 
68 A. D. Gard 6M 10. Pasauier to Jouques10 August, '181S. 
On 16 August, Pasquier stressed to Jouques that the 
royal ordinance had instituted a normal administration, 
so all provisional authorities were terminated. 
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corruption69. In reply to Fouche, who had ordered Vidal to 
hand over his powers to the official prefect, Jouques, Vidal 
showed audacity and tenacity. He argued that he would 
normally obey the minister without hesitation, but the lawful 
prefect, as indicated by the minister, was in Toulouse. 
Then, playing on the conflict of authority that still ob- 
tained - it was 8 August - Vidal said that Angouleme had 
confirmed him in office on 29 July - after the royal 
ordinance. How could he, argued Vidal, abandon a moral re- 
sponsability placed upon him by "his prince"? 
70 When Jouques 
returned to Nimes, an ardent servant of Ultra royalism, he 
naturally supported Vidal against Fouche, claiming that it 
would be impossible to maintain order without his presence71 . 
With the support of Jouques, Vidal was able to stay in office 
until the end of 1815, in spite of the efforts of the Ministry 
to remove him72. 
Jouques returned to Nimes just in time for the elections 
to the new Chamber of Deputies. The circumstances in which 
these elections were held in the Gard are further evidence of 
69 A. N. F7 9050. M. Burnet to the Minister of Police, n. d. 
Vidal is described as "an immoral man whose wealth is the 
fruit of theft and plunder". 
A. N. F79049. anon. , n. d. 
The writer says Vidal "is using his positio 
to sell passports to people wishing to leave the city. 
He is ignoring the pro royalist criminals and is locking 
up protestants. " 
70 A. D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, bulletin 
191, a. August o 
1815. 
71 A. N. F79050. Jouques to minister of police, 16 August, 1815 
A. D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 19 August 1815. 
72 A. N. F79050. Vidal to minister of_police, 6 December, 1815. 
Vidal seeks the creation of a new post for himself. 
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the concerted efforts of the Ultra royalists to gain complete 
control of all the organs of administration and represen- 
tation in the department. 
In order to achieve as much independence and freedom 
as possible to control their own affairs in the Gard, they 
needed not only full control of the internal administration, 
but the assurance that the Gard's representation would be in 
their interest, to secure appropriate benefits and also to 
contradict publicly any allegations of unfairness or sect- 
arianism. Thus, it was vital to deny the Protestant com- 
munity access to government circles and to a high level forum 
for debate - the Chamber. indeed, by refusing the Protes- 
tants any-, -- representation at all, the Gard Catholic royalists 
would be able to deny the very existence of a coherent, 
separate Protestant community. It was in this spirit that 
the Ultras set about preparing the election in the summer of 
1815. 
Whilst the law determined the mode of election - in 
this case by arrondissement and departmental assemblies - the 
organisation of the election was the responsibility of the 
prefect, who drew up the register of citizens eligible to 
vote in the election and to stand as candidates. The most 
important qualification for voting was a tax valuation of 
three hundred Francs. Consequently, the electoral register 
could change considerably from election to election. The 
prefect was obliged to revise the register before every 
election. Moreover, if a person' s tax contribution was 
difficult to assess accurately, the prefect had the discretion 
4 
60 
to include or to exclude that person. In addition to 
these powers, in the election of 1815, the prefect was 
authorised to nominate ten additional members to the arrondis- 
cement assemblies, and twenty to the final departmental 
assembly, whose task it was to elect half of the deputies 
from among the lists of candidates chosen by the arron- 
dissement assemblies, and to elect the remaining half of 
the department's quota without any necessary reference to 
the choice made by the arrondissement assemblies. 
It is clear from these powers that the role of the 
prefect in the 1815 elections was crucial, for if he had 
any political sympathies, he could produce an artifically 
unbalanced electoral assembly. 
The dates fixed for the elections in the Gard were 
14 August for the arrondissement colleges, and 22 August 
for the departmental college. The preparations had been 
73 
made by the provisional government in Nimes, and Jouques 
had only to supervise the meeting of the departmental 
assembly, some four days after his return. De Sauvigny 
remarks that the royalist successes in 1815 are difficult 
to explain when one considers that the elctions had been 
organised nationally by Fouche and Barante, that the King, 
Pasquier and Talleyrand counted on returning a constitutional 
Assembly. In the south, and in the Gard particularly, 74 
even if the prefects appointed by the king's ministers had 
all been imbued with constitutional principles, the short 
time at their disposal and the hostility of the Ultras would 
have made the task of undoing the work of the provisional 
73 A. N. FcIII Gard 4 
l 
74- Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand, p. 184 
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authorities extremely difficult. The ordinance calling for 
the organisation of elections was issued on 21 July 
7S 
and 
most departments in the south had not returned to normality 
until August. 
76 In the Gard, where the prefect proved to be 
sympathetic to the Ultras cause, the determination to obtain 
a royalist deputation was so strong that intimidation and 
violence were used to discourage potentially hostile electors 
from coming to Names. On the three nights before the election 
was held, groups of armed men, sometimes numbering sixty, 
often wearing royalist uniforms, descended upon certain houses 
and hotels where they knew or suspected there were Protestant 
electors. They murdered as many Protestants as they could 
find, but a number of these, already frightened by the 
violence that had accompanied the far less important primary 
election a week earlier, had fled. Out of spite and greed, 
the bands pillaged the houses of these families 
77 
75 A. N. F1cIII Gard 4 
76 See pp. 55-56 supra. 
77 Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, pp. 309-20. Peret says 
some people put the death o1 as high as one hundred, 
but no conclu, ion was reached because of the lack 
of an inquiry. Among the victims were women, including 
the wife-of an intended victim, Bigot, who was absent, 
and a woman who had been a paralytic for ten years. 
Pillaging was carried out on a large scale; Peret 
records ten Protestant houses pillaged, hordes 
transporting food and valuables on farm wagons (p. 319). 
Peret remarks bitterly that the presence in Nimes of a 
police commissioner, considered invaluable by the prefect, 
a guard commander, a prefect and a contingent of royalist 
troops did nothing to deter the brigands. (p. 315). 
U'- 
The Protestants of the Gard were in no doubt about the reason 
for this outburst of violence. It was to keep them away 
from the elections, and to take advantage of the folly of 
any of those who dared to come to N4mes for the occasion. At 
the same time, the royalists were able to prove to Jouques 
that, in the Gard at least, the King's writ did not run. More- 
over, the passiveness of the authorities - armed bands and 
wagon loads of stolen property were seen passing in front 
of guard posts in the city78 - indicated that the outburst 
was not spontaneous. 
79 
On the 22nd, the elections took place in Nimes in an 
atmosphere of terror. Armed men, wearing uniforms, sur- 
rounded the building in which the electors were to meet80. 
For one observer at least, the proceedings bore a sinister 
resemblance to the elections of 1790, when Froment's and 
Vidal's militia had invaded the hall during the municipal 
elections to make sure that no voters hostile to the royalists 
g 
were present 
l. 
The intimidation produced the effect desired in the 
arrondissement assemblies and in the departmental assembly. 
Of the sixteen candidates recommended by the four arrondisse- 
ment colleges, there were only three, poorly placed moderates, 
78 Lauze de Peret, ; Causes et Precis, p. 309, states 
that the events ha 'rien aveugle; but were part of a 
reasoned plan, a cold logic. 
79 ibid ., p. 317. 
80 ibid., pp. 315-16. 
81 ibid., p. 314. 
I 
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two from Le Vigan, the third from Ales 82. None of the 
arrondissement assemblies had a full complement of electors: 
eighty-three were absent from the Nimes assembly; twenty- 
nine from A1ýs, fifty from Uzes and twenty-nine from Le 
8 Vigan3. 
The departmental college, which met in the circumstances 
described above, had been complemented by twenty men known 
for their intransigent royalism including de Calviýre him- 
self, Laboissi6re, a future ultra mayor of Nimes, de Larcy, 
the newly appointed sub prefect of Le Vigan, Charles de Vogue, 
the royalist military commander of the department since July, 
de Vallongue, the provisional mayor of Nimes and Vidal, the 
84 
police commissioner. In contrast, sixty Protestant 
electors failed to appear and gave no reason for their 
8 
absence5. 
The assembly proceeded to nominate as deputies Jules 
de Calviere, who had been prefect until 18 August, 
Rene de Bernis, the former commissaire extraordinaire, 
Charles de Vogüe and, an example of the thread of continuity 
from the beginning of the Revolution, Charles-FranSois de 
Trinquelague, senior barrister at the Nimes court, but who, 
as mayor of Uzes in 1790, had supported the Catholic counter- 
82 They were Guizot and Pieyre from Le Vigan, and Galliýre 
from Ales. The largest concentration of Protestants 
was in these two arrondissements. A. N. FlcIII Gard 4. 
83 ibid. 
84 ibid. 
85 ibid. 
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revolution actively86. There was, then, a total electoral 
victory for Catholic royalism in the Gard. Jouques' summary 
of the proceedings for Paris is a masterpiece of hypocrisy: 
"The operations of the electoral 
assemblies of the department were 
completed well before the time 
set down in the king's ordinance. 
The greatest calm reigned constantly in and 
around the assemblies, and one can say 
in truth that never were electors 
so aware of the gravity of the 
functions they were asked to discharge, 
87. 
Proof to the most incredulous Ultras in the Gard that he was 
their man. 
The electoral victory, the assurance of the prefect's 
connivance - normally the prefect was the representative of 
the central government, whose task it was to ensure that 
policies made in Paris were implemented in each department - 
meant that the Ultras realised their ambitions of making 
the local administration no more than the tool of their will 
and the department a state within a state. Consequently, 
they felt that the process of conforming local political 
life-to their ideals could be continued at a more leisurely 
pace and in much more depth. The principal organs of admin- 
istration which had contact with the outside world had been 
'colonised': the only potential political opposition, the 
Protestant bourgeoisie, had been numbed by the White Terror 
86 See Fajon, Pieces et Documents officiels, pp. 36-37. The 
Comite re-volutionnaire of Uzes described Trinquelague as "an 
'Aristocrate' since the dawn of the Revolution, Principal 
Author of the bagarre d'Uzes. " 
87 A. N. Flc III Gard 4. Operations of the Electoral Colleges 
of the Gard 1815. 
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and continued to fear new outbreaks at any moment as royalist 
gangs under the leadership of terrorists like Dupont, alias 
Trestaillons, and Graffand, alias Quatretaillons88, who was 
responsible for the particularly sinister murder of six 
villagers in Uzes on 27 August 
89, 
roamed the department 
extorting money and committing murder in the name of royalism. 
Indeed, these bands of irregulars, many of whose deeds 
recalled the brutality of the chauffeurs90, were becoming an 
embarrassment and a threat to the Ultras, having outlived 
their usefulness now that an Ultra regime had been installed. 
Incidents like that involving Quatretaillons at Uzes were 
likened by contemporaries to the worst excesses of the 
Revolution91 and brought unwelcome attention from Paris92. 
It became a matter of urgency to make respectable the 
battalions of the Armee royale of Beaucaire93 and the ir- 
regular militias that had sprung up 'spontaneously' in many 
of the towns in the department94. Because the Uzes incident 
had involved the local guard and the sub prefect, the 
government demanded the arrest of Quatretaillons and the 
88 'Trestaillons' was the name taken by Dupont after 
the story that he used to cut his victims into three 
parts. Graffand, not wishing to be surpassed in brutality 
by a rival gang leader, adopted Quatre as his trade mark. 
89 See p. 48 supra. 
90 F. Vidocq. , Memoires, de' V. , ancien 'chef 
de la Police de sürete 
(4 vols.,, -Paris, 1829), Vo1.4, p26S. 
91 Lauze de Peret. Causes et Precis , p. 10. 
92 A. N. F9049. Minister of interior to Jouques, 9 September, 
7 
F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p-23- 
94 A. D. Gard. F 6M 52. Sub prefect of Ntmes to Jouques, 
26'August 1815. 
66 
suppression of his band95. The obvious solution was to 
adopt the National Guard framework to absorb the irregulars, 
merely reshuffling them in the perfectly legal local defence 
force, yet which would be in practice what the Ultras wanted - 
a state subsidised private army. As such, It would fulfil 
one of the ambitions Froment and the counter revolutionaries 
had sought first in 179096, and had prescribed again in 181597 - 
the creation of a Catholic royalist militia under the command 
of local notables. 
The plan was fraught with difficulties, however, if it 
was to be achieved legitimately. Men like Graffand, Dupont 
and Carteras, who appeared to exercise a great amount of 
influence on the irregulars, were clearly anarchists and 
thugs at bottom. Their activities had been so scandalous 
that it would be impossible to incorporate them into a national 
and public force even if there were any guarantees that they 
would accept the discipline of that force. Furthermore, 
membership of the National Guard was based on tax evaluation., 
and most, if not all the royalist volunteers were penniless, 
from the lowest classes of society, and had exploited the un- 
rest to plunder98. The numbers of 'volunteers' had risen 
significantly because of the unemployment caused by the 
95 A. N. F79049. Minister of interior to Jo. uques, 9 September 
1815. 
96 See'pp. 12-13 supra. 
97 See pp. 34-35 supra 
98 E . Le Gallo, Les 
Cent Jours (Paris, 1924), p. 165. 
F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p. 23. 
E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, p. 82. 
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collapse of local industry and agriculture in the political 
upheavals of the Spring and Summer of 181599, an aspect of 
the troubles to which the incidence and extent of brigandage 
100 in the countryside testified 
The need to comply with the government in order to 
obtain the subsidies allocated to the National Guard gave 
the Gard authorities the pretext they needed to turn on the 
most disreputable of their 'soldiers'. Graffand had to be 
arrested, ordered Parisl9l and Dupont refused to be incorpo- 
rated into the National Guard because he would lose his rank 
of captain102. He was also on a list of terrorists to be 
10 
arrested 
3. Consequently, the National Guard could be 
organised without reference to these two men and their fol- 
lowers. In fact, a National Guard had been created as early 
as July 1815 by Charles de Vogue, who was given responsibility 
for the military command of the department by de Bernis. 
Jouques was required to regularise its structures and its 
104 hierarchy. This he proceeded to do, issuing instructions 
to the departmental command on 28 August to weed out of 
each company unsuitable and undesirable men who were to be 
105 disarmed and dismissed. At the same time, the commanding 
99 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Baron Rolland to minister of interior 
27_` July 1815. 
100 See p. 48 supra. 
101 A. N. F79049. Minister of interior to Jouques, 9 September, 181S 
102 F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux Royaliste, p. 23. 
103 E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, p. 117. 
104 AN. F7 9657. Jouques to minister of interior, 17 October, 
1815. 
105 A. N. F79657. Jouques to minister of interior, 28 
Kugust, 1815. 
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officers were confirmed in their rank; all were ultra royal- 
ists106. On 14 September, Jouques ordered the dissolution 
of the irregular companies, that is, those bands who had not 
been incorporated into, or had chosen not to join the National 
107 Guard. Jouques said that the result was a body from which 
nobody with the necessary qualification and good record was 
108 
excluded. What had really happened was a tightening of 
the control of the Ultras over their militia; the period 
between the order to purge the companies and that dissolving 
the irregular companies served to identify those bands, like 
Trestaillon's and Lavonde 
109 
s' which would not accept the dis- 
cipline of officers, and would be a source of embarrassment 
to the Ultras in the future. These could then be outlawed 
by the second decree with an easy conscience and their dis- 
solution used to placate Paris. Meanwhile, the reorganised 
Guard would ensure the existence of an armed, disciplined 
group of Catholic royalists on every point of the department. 
Jouque's claim that the purge had opened the guard to all 
sections of the community was refuted by Cavalier, the 
106 The departmental inspector was Charles de Vogüe; The 
Colonel of the Names company was de Surville, who had 
been proscribed by the comite revolutionnnaire in 1792 
(A. D. Gard L1198, operations du 2 Prairial, An II); 
Du Roure was colonel at Ales, and the Marquis de la Fare 
at Uzes. 
107 A. N. F7 9657. Jouques to minister of interior, 17 October, 181! 
108 D'Arbaud Jouques, 'Troubles et Agitations... 9'pp. 
40-41. 
109 Lavondýs was arrested in November for attacking the mayor 
of Nimes who had prohibited the men Lavondes 'commanded' 
from collecting money for uniforms. A. D. Gard 6M 28. 
Lavondes to Mayor, 28 October, 1815. 
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procureur-general who wrote that the Protestant community 
had been excluded from the Guard 
ll0, 
subsequent events were 
to reveal how accurate his evaluation of the position was. 
Even though the Ultras were under pressure to rid them- 
selves of the irregulars and self-styled royalist bands, they 
could not turn sharply on their former allies. This was in 
part because they did not want to alienate the populace of 
towns like Nimes and Ales, many of whom could not be fitted 
into the Guard structure, but who would provide a significant 
contribution in any unrest the Ultras might want to cause, 
but in part, too, because men like Trestaillons and Quatre- 
taillons were so unpredictable and rebellious that firm pur- 
suit of them might provoke accusations and indiscretions by 
them of a dangerous nature. It is noteworthy that Tres- 
taillons was not apprehended until 18 October and only then 
because of the action of an outsider 
ill. the new military 
commander of the department, General Lagarde, who would pay 
very soon for his spirited attempts to ensure that justice 
reigned in the Gard, and that notorious thugs like Carteras, 
Pocheville and Trufemi, who had been roaming about Nimes 
unimpeded by the authorities 
112, 
ceased to be a cause of 
scandal and fear. In Uzes, Quatretaillons was able to 
remain free for a month after the particularly revolting 
11 
murder of six peasants in public3. 
110 A. N. BB3 154-Cavalier to Minister of Justice, 23 October, 
1815. 
111 A. N. F7 9049. Vidal to Minister of Justice, 23 October, 181S 
112 F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p. 23. 
113 E. Daudet, Terreur blanche, pp. 114-115. 
A. D. Gard 6M 42. Gendarmerie de Bagnols sur C?: e to 
Jouaues, 28, September, 1815. 
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Indeed, normal judicial proceedings had been suspended 
since the White Terror. On 
. 
21 August, Vidal wrote to 
the Minister of Police, informing him that the two procureurs, 
Cavalier and Despuech, and their substitute, Vincens"Saint 
Laurent fils, had gone into hiding because they were pro- 
scribed by the royalists114. From hiding, Cavalier explained 
the situation to the Minister of Justice and declared that 
he was helpless in a place where crime was being instigated 
by the very authorities that should be repressing it 
115. He 
spoke in a tone of despair of cupidity and ambition masciuerad- 
ing as royalism, and of vice having become the only virtue 
16 
expected of magistrates 
1. Then, in a passage that pointed 
out the close relationship between Catholic notables and the 
'peuple' involved in the disorders, Cavalier revealed that 
he had been threatened by Vampere, whom he described as the 
secretary and 'creature' of Trinquelague, one of the recently 
elected ultra royalist deputies 
117. Vampere, whose anti- 
protestantism and extreme views had been well known since the 
beginning of the First Restoration, was aided in his intimi- 
dation by Prat, a bailif working for Boyer, who had been one 
114 A. N. F7 9049. Vidal to, minister of police, 21 August,, 1815. 
115 A. N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of, Justice, 1 September, 
1815. 
116 ibid. 
117 ibid. This particular incident may illustrate the way 
many people took advantage of the confusion to settle 
scores: Cavalier had been prosecutor in the court that 
fined Vampere for insulting a retired officer on the 
Fete Saint Louis in 1814. (A. D. Gard 6M 3. Prison register 
for 80 
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of the leaders of the Societe secre*te118. 
Jouques, in a letter to the Minister of the Interior, 
said that everything possible was being done to bring crimin- 
als to court, but the lack of respect for the magistrates, 
who were said to be Bonapartists, made the task difficult. 
At the same time, he advised the minister that he intended 
to bring to trial in the first place those people accused 
of crimes against Royalists, so going back to March and April 
119 1815. Thus, nothing immediate would be done to reassure 
the Protestants that at least when it was available, justice 
was not partisan. On the contrary, by proceeding to the 
trial and judgement of those designated as enemies of the 
local royalists, the authorities added to the impression 
that the restored monarchy's representatives in the Gard were 
bent on nothing less than vengeance and punishment. Indeed, 
this well founded impression was to be truly reinforced by 
the marked contrast of the execution, in September 1816, of 
five Protestants from Arpaillargues, found guilty of the 
murder of royalist volunteers in April 1815120, and the ac- 
quittal, for lack of evidence of Trestaillons and Quatre- 
taillons. Moreover, the Ultras were happily abetted in 
their attempts to upset justice by the series of special 
powers of July and October 1815, which allowed individuals 
118 A. N. BB31S4. Cavalier to jDinister of justice, ' September, 181l 
119 A. N. F7 9657, Jouques to minister of interior, 17 October , 181' 
120 A. N. F7 9053. Jouques to minister of police, 24 September, 1811ý 
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. 
accused of political crimes to be interned without trial121 
Cavalier's correspondence with the Minister of Justice 
reveals that as late as December 1815, the organisation of 
the N'mes courts was incomplete, and that justice was being 
l2 2, dispensed in a most unsatisfactory manner 
Meanwhile, the prefect had ordered the final steps to 
be taken to ensure Catholic royalist domination of the Gard: 
the disarming of the population and. the replacement of all 
administrators whose views were not known to the Ultras. 
The continual disturbances and the flood of refugees 
across the department had helped the authorities to per- 
petrate the rumour of an imminent revolt led by Bonapartists 
and Protestants, who, Jouques was to write later, were 
"Republicans in their social outlook, in their reasoning and 
in their hearts"123. The clash between an Austrian detach- 
ment and a large number of peasants near Ners124, had lent 
even more subs. tance to the rumours, and, with the presence 
of so many gangs of brigands in the Gard, the order to hand 
over all weapons seemed perfectly justified. Yet in the 
way it was applied, the order served to leave the royalists 
the only inhabitants with access to guns. An envoy of the 
121 Seepp. 46-47 supra. A. D. Gard 6M 41 indicates that 37 per- 
sons were detained between July 1815 and June 1816 under 
the t erms of the special laws for 'holding opinions hos- 
tile to the Bourbons'. It should, of course, be stated 
that the introduction of the special laws, which amounted 
to a 'legal' white terror, was very much the will of the 
Ultra royalist deputies who formed the bulk of the newly 
elect ed Chamber of deputies; their application to the 
Gard was, however, unforseen. 
122 A. N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of . justice, 1 December, 1815 
123 A. N. F1cIII Gard 13. Jouques to minister of the interior, 
10 February, 1816. 
124 See p. 49 su ra. 
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British Ambassador noted: 
"Whilst the order comprehended 
those of both persuasions, it 
had been but partially acted 
upon, and in many places, the 
Protestants alone were left . 25 without means of self defence 
Indeed, while some 15 000 weapons were taken, the number 
of weapons taken from the Arrondissements of Ales and Le Vigan - 
those with the largest Protestant communities - far exceeded 
the number taken from the Arrondissements of Nimes and Uzesl26. 
But not only did the disarming leave the Protestants at the 
mercy of the Catholics, it also produced statistics which 
could be used to point to the untrustworthiness of the Pro- 
1 testant community. 
In the course of an administrative purge carried out 
during the Autumn, some six hundred and fifty mayors, deputy 
mayors and municipal councillors were removed from office 
because of their political opinions 
127. Among the first to 
go was Baron Daunant, Mayor of Ntmes since July 1814; a Pro- 
testant, his presence was intolerable to the extreme royalists, 
125 Public Record Office, London. F. O. 27/130. Col. Ross 
to Sir Charles Stuart, 11 February, 1816. 
126 A. D. Gard 6M 42.1'Etat du desarmement effectue dans le 
c partement du Gard, mois de septembre1815. ` The numbers 
of weapons involved were: 
Arondissement of Nimes 867 weapons 
Uzes 2 580 
Ales 6 039 
Le Vigan 5 447 
127 A. N. FlbII Gard 4. "Etat nominatif des maires, 
conseillers et adjoints remplaces. " 
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who had already refused to accept Protestant officials in 
Nimes at the beginning of the First Restoration. 
Jouques explained Daunant's replacement by saying that 
Daunant had lost the respect of the people of Nimes because 
he had not resigned when Bonaparte's return led to the over- 
throw of the restored monarchy in March 1815. Worse still, 
Daunant had not been dismissed by Bonaparte during the Hundred 
128 Days. However, the fact that Darnand Vallabrix, at the 
moment Jouques was writing, was sub prefect of Uzes, in spite 
of his written offer to Gilly, the General who handed Nimes 
to Bonaparte behind the backs of the Royalists, leads one 
to conclude that the Ultras were quick to forgive 'mistakes' 
but objected to the presence of Protestants in the adminis- 
tration 129. 
Thanks to the connivance of the three sub prefects, 
Jougües was able to extend his purge to the personnel of the 
sub prefectures, to the tax officials and to the employees 
of the postal and transport services. Consequently, all 
130 
sections of the local administration that dealt with Paris 
and the movements of individuals were subjected to the scrutiny 
of Ultraroyalist agents. 
As a final gesture of humiliation, Jouques issued in- 
structions to the prosecutors to provide him with lists of 
128 A. N. Flb II Gard 15. Jouques to minister of interior, 
9 September, 1815. 
129 A. N. F7 9051. Savagnier (Police agent) to Decazes, 14 
March, 1817. 
130 A. D. Gard 6M 40. Dossier on the inquiry into the 
Political opinions of department officials. 
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those people charged with Bonapartist activities and who were 
in receipt of a state pension. The intention was to with- 
draw the pension from all those who were in any way connected 
with the Hundred Days regime131. 
By autumn 1815, the Ultra royalists of the Gard had 
achieved a degree of autonomy in their department that the 
other centres of royalism in the south had not succeeded in 
realising. In the words of Cavalier, the prosecutor in 
Nimes: 
The authors of the disorders belong 
to a faction which is perhaps peculiar 
to this department because of the 
division between Catholic and Prot- 
estant. The Catholics are Royalists, 
but only in this sense that they hoped 
the King would put affairs back in 
their old state, at least as far as 
the position of worship and entry to 
public office were concerned: that they 
would obtain rank and pre eminence, an 
exclusive domination. They came out 
against the Charter because it betrayed 
their hopes, and then against the King 
because he did not indulge them. 
Thereafter, the incidents of last year, 
their provocations, their rumours, their 
threats outbalanced any promises of 
fairness made by the king in the minds of 
the inhabitants of the Gard. The plans 
which these men are putting into effect 
now, were announced and discussed a year132 
ago in Nimes, Uzes and Pont Saint Esprit 
It seemed, then, that the Catholic population of the Gard 
had picked up once more the thread of continuity that had been 
broken by the events of the Revolution - continuity with a 
past that was more real than the emotional visions of a 
131 A. N. 
132 A. N. 
1 815. 
F79049. Jouques to minister of interior, 11 October, 1815. 
BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 23 October, 
r 
() 
harmonious, feudal France that many returned emigres held, 
and which one commentator has aptly called 'political roman- 
ticism'133. Indeed, there was very little romanticism in 
the precision of the measures employed by the Gard Ultras in 
the Summer and Autumn of 1815, and their demands in the future 
were to remain, until 1830 at least, very clearly defined. 
Superficially, the events that had taken place in the 
Gard after July 1815 reflected the dominant outlook of the 
Chamber of deputies - demands for revenge, protestations of 
loyalty bordering on loyalism, the belief that France should 
be purged by a minority of Frenchmen who were purer than the 
king, who knew better than the king. The composition of the 
famous Chambre introuvable, the utterances of many of its 
members in the Autumn of 1815 must certainly have given the 
Ultras in the Gard confidence that their achievements would 
be defended; Talleyrand and Fouche had been removed, and the 
new Prime Minister, the duc de Richelieu gave the Ultras 
reason to suppose that the Liberals and Constitutionals would 
not exert much influence on decisions, a supposition that 
events were to show as very misguided. Indeed, the ex- 
travagant demands of the Ultra delegation in the Chamber of 
deputies were to bring them into conflict with Richelieu 
134 
and his ministers in no time at all. Within a year, the 
achievements of the Gard royalists would be threatened by 
the unexpected rise to power of Elie Decazes whose ascendancy 
over Louis, coupled with the latter's determination not to 
133 R. Remond, La Droite en France. (2 vols. , Paris, 1968), I, p. 38. 
134 On repressive measures against collaborators, for example. 
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submit to the increasing popularity of Artois, led to the 
rejection of the Ultra party, and with it, the isolation of 
the Gard. 
78 
Chapter 3. 
While the situation in the Gard appeared to calm and to 
return to 'normality' in the Autumn of 1815, the Catholic 
Royalists announced the establishment of a new society, known 
as the Cercle Au gier after the house in which its initial 
meetings were held. The aim of the society was to contribute 
to the 'maintenance of union, peace and good order. 
1 The 
president of the Cercle was Henri de Bernis, brother of the 
deputy, and its secretary was Trinquelague. Among its founder 
members were: Rene de Bernis and Jules de Calviere; the newly 
appointed mayor of Nimes, de Vallongues; Boyer and Baron, two 
lawyers who had marked themselves out by their violent anti 
protestantism during the First Restoration, and a number of 
lesser officials in the newly constituted local administration.: 
Chazelles-Chusclan, senior 'conseiller' in the prefect's 
office, de Vässimon, colonel in the departmental Gendarmerie, 
Gibrat, a police official, a judge whose name is unknown, 
2 
and Fajon, styled a businessman, but, in fact a bankrupt. 
This society, successor to the Societe royale, was to be 
the centre of Catholic royalist activity in the Gard, and, in 
correspondence with similar societies in other major towns, 
would constitute the vehicle assuring the decentralised yet 
1 A. N. 7 9052. Prospectus of the Societe dite Cercle d'Augier. 
October 1815. 
2 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 8 December, 1811. 
The same report indicates that Hyacinthe Bernavon, another 
member is also bankrupt. Bernavon was present at the 
extremists' separate celebration of the Fete St. Louis of 
1814. See pp. 27-28supra. 
0 
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highly organised network that had enabled royalism to survive 
the Revolution and Empire. On the submission of its con- 
stitution and membership to the minister of police, the com- 
mittee of the cercle stated that its membership would not 
exceed two hundred3. The continuity between the old Societe 
royale and the Cercle d'Augier was clear: the new society even 
met in the room attached to the cafe Bolze after its pre- 
liminary meetings. But the men who directed the new society 
enjoyed power and influence on the political life of the Gard 
in a way that the societaires of 1814 could only dream of. 
Its prompt foundation, its membership, comprising the leading 
Gard notables and Catholic royalists indicate that it was 
part of the grand design of the White Terror, namely the 
creation of a "parallel" government in the Gard, an inner 
cabinet which would determine decisions made by the official 
a'dministration. One contemporary observer remarked that 
4 
"nobody could fill any post, however insignificant, without 
the approval of the society"S. The principal external links 
the society had were with Paris, through the deputies in the 
new Assembly, and with similar societies established through 
6 
the south, from Marseille to Bayonne. The government, 
without being able to take any action against the extreme 
royalists, viewed the network in the south with a certain 
3 A. D. Gard 6M 10. Minister of police to prefect, 18_Novemher, 1815 
4 In 1820, Madier de Montjau was to use the expression 
"gouvernement occulte" to describe the influence of the 
Ultra royalists in the Gard. Petition to the Chamber of 
Deputies, 25 April, 1820. 
5 Lauze de Peret, Causeset Precis, p. 392. 
6 P. R. O. F. O. 27/30. Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, 
8January, 1816. 
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amount of anxiety in the light of the suspicion that had 
surrounded the duc d'Angouleme and his lieutenants. In the 
7 
Autumn of 1815, it was still not clear that these were salon 
conspirators. However, circumstances in the Gard were to 
produce an increasingly inward looking brand of extreme 
royalism there, and for a number of years, the links with 
Paris were to be far more critical than those with other towns 
in the south. 
Because it was a secret society in fact if not on paper, 
there is no documentary information on the workings of the 
Societe de'Bolze. In 1817, an informer, Fajon, told the pre- 
fect that there were degrees of membership, and that the 
majority of the societaires did not attend meetings, but were 
contacted when their services were required. Information 
and instructions that came from Paris and other towns were 
passed on by word of mouth from the local notables who con- 
trolled the committee8. The organisation of the secret 
society reminds one of the Chevaliers de la Foi, the. Ultra 
royalist organisation established during the Empire by 
Ferdinand de Bertier and the Polignac brothers9. Indeed, 
there is evidence that the Gard royalist leaders were members 
of the Chevaliers de la Foi: Jules de Calviere, his relative, 
Jacques-Alexis de Calviere-Vezenobre, Rene de Bernis, de 
Vogue, the Vicomte de Rochemore and the duc de Crussol are 
7 A. D. Hte, Garonne 4M 35. Minister of police to Remusat, 
4 December, 1815. Also pp. 50-55 supra. 
8 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout (prefect) to minister of police, 
April, 1818. 
9 See Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand de Bertier, 
for a detailed study of the C evaliers. 
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listed among the Chevaliers in the National Assembly in 
1824.10 But there is no reference in reports on the Gard 
to the Chevaliers de la Foi or to the influence of the 
notorious Congregation, and it is doubtful that Catholic 
royalist policy in the department was influenced by the 
Chevaliers to a significant degree. It is clear from 
correspondence in 1830-31 relating to the possibility of 
an armed insurrection on behalf of the exiled Bourbons that 
the Midi in general and the Gard in particular was involved 
with' the conspiratorial network that Ferdinand de Bertier 
and de Montmorency, 'founder members', of the Chevaliers 
continued to direct) Also, the emphasis the Ultras gave 
to decentralisation and the revitalisation of the provinces 
coincided with the Gard royalists' desire for local autonomy; 
nevertheless, the impetus of Catholic royalism in the Gard 
derived from anti-Protestantism, from the desire humiliate 
and to weaken definitively the Protestant community. What- 
ever grand designs the Frondeur leaders may have entertained, 
the rank and file had specific demands that had to be met. 
12 
Moreover, the Gard was already in the hands of Ultras 
whose concern was to maintain that control, chiefly by 
ý. 
ensuring that the Paris government interfered as little as 
possible in local affairs. Militant action by the Ultra 
royalists could bring unwelcome publicty. 
The Gard notables saw clearly that their own position 
depended on the limited ambitions of the Catholic populace 
10 ibid., p. 3S6 
11 See Baron de Bordignes report on the southern departments in 
the correspondence with the duchesse -de Berry, 1831, 
in 
Etudes d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine, III, pp. 18-35. 
the "error" of accepting the royalism 
mhP 
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and had to remain sensitive to feeling in the department. 
consequences of disregarding grass roots opinion in favour 
of more sophisticated or self interested aims were apparent 
in 1818, when the former prefect, Jouques, lost the support 
The 
of the Societe de Bolze for publishing. an apologia of his term 
as prefect in the Gard 
13, 
so bringing the department into the 
public eye and, worse still, admitting that atrocities were 
committed by Catholic terroristsl4. Trinquelague, too, lost 
the support of his 'party' because he had begun to urge the 
ultras to obey the king's ministers for the moment. The 
15 
Catholic royalists appear to have been incapable of apprec- 
iating tactical volte-faces, and even Jules de Calvibre, who 
appears to have devoted more time to 'local affairs' than the 
16 other deputies, was to be seriously misunderstood. 
The extent of the Societe de Bolze's influence was dis- 
covered in the Spring of 1817 by an official of the ministry 
of Police, Eymard, who was in the Gard to assist the prefect 
who replaced Jouques that year. Eymard intercepted a number 
of letters to and from Paris and he managed to identify the 
correspondents and persons mentioned in the letters. The 
Ultra royalists most frequently mentioned and the most in- 
fluential as well were Jules de Calviere, Rene de Bernis, 
13 D'Arbaud Jouques, Troubles et Agitations dans le 
D6partement du Gard en 1815 Paris, 1818 . 
14 A. N. ' F790S1. Dargout, 'prefect, to Decazes, 20 April, 1818. 
15 A. N. F79051. Dargout to Decazes 31 May, 1817. Trinquelague 
was able to salvage some of his lost credit by his involve- 
ment in the attempt to have the Concordat of 1801 revised. 
16 see p. 136 infra. 
.l 
Charles dc Vogue and Jacques de Calviere-Vezenobre, as could 
be expected. But the letters referred also to a wide range 
of local officials, including de Vallongues, mayor of Nimes; 
de Surville, commander of the Nimes National Guard; du Roure, 
commander of the Ales National Guard and de Vassimon, a 
colonel in the Gendarmerie of the department. Moreover, 
there were references to the duc d'Angouleme and to Vitrolles17. 
The correspondence was directed from Paris, usually through 
the Gard's parliamentary representation 
18, but also under the 
seal of the Headquarters of the National Guards of France 
19 
Y 
to a number of points in the Gard. One of the principal re- 
cipients was the wife of Jacques-Alexis de Calviere-Vezenobre, 
Pulcherie, the daughter of the count Emmanuel de Saint Priest 
who was one of the duc d'Angouleme's gen. tlemen20. She was, 
it was claimed, a close friend of Vitrolles21. Some letters 
were sent in the official correspondence of the Ministry of 
the Interior to the prefecture, where Chazelles Chusclan or 
de Surville took receipt of/them 
22. The presence of so many 
agents in positions of authority enabled the "parallel" 
17 A. N. F7 9050. Mss. document, 'tCle d'. une Co rrespondance" , anon. 
18 A. N. F7 9051. Eymard to Decazes, 7 April, 1817. 
19 A. N. F7 90S1. Dargout to Decazes, 18 April, 1817. 
20 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 19 December, 1817. Also 
C ateau de Vezenobre. Mss. notebooks of Pulcherie-Cecile 
Uui gnar e Saint Priest, marquise de Calviere. Madame 
d'e Calvi ere recounts frequent visits to Paris with her 
husband, when they were received by the Comte d' Artois . 
21 A. N. F79050. "Cle dune correspondancet. 
22 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes 15 April, 1817. 
84 
government to receive and send its communications largely 
unnoticed, as well as giving it access to provileged infor- 
mation, not only in the prefecture, the clearing house for 
all official papers, but also in the police department, thanks 
to Vidal and Gibrat23, and in the official press which was 
published by Gaude and edited by Greleau, both agents of the 
24 
societe de Bolze 
The power of the Societe was known locally. An eminent 
Protestant lawyer, Henri Fornier de Clausonne wrote in the 
spring of 1816: 
"The town is quite tranquil, but 
confidence and warmth have vanished 
from educated circles, and the most 
cultivated feeling of hatred is the 
only one visible among the lower 
classes. The disturbances and vio- 
lence have been suspended rather than 
stopped, and I see no reason to think 
they will not start again, for I doubt 
the best intentioned authority could 
be strong enough to contain them. " 2S 
Yet another observer wrote shortly afterwards that the 
king's governement was trying to bring the department under 
the royal writ, but 'the same men are still in office, Monsieur 
D'arbaud Jouques was still prefect and the so called 'royal 
society' and its secret committee retained an authority quite 
26 beyond that of the law'. 
The influence of the royalist organisation can be seen in 
23 A. N. F79051. Eymard to Decazes 26 March 1817. 
24 A. N. F79051. Eymard to Decazes 28 March 1817. 
25 A. D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 123. H. Fornier de 
Clausonne to G. Fornier de Clausonne. 6 March, 1818. 
26 P. J. Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, p. 398 
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a number of ways. There was a concerted resistance to the 
government's attempts to abolish Vidal's post as commissaire 
de police. On 16 October, 'the minister of police, Decazes, 
decreed the suppression of the post following a series of 
letters accusing Vidal of abusing his powers, which were 
27 temporary in any case. The very night the decree had 
arrived in Nimes, rioting broke out in Nimes and lasted three 
days until it was ended by the energetic intervention of 
General Lagarde, the military commander. According to the 
prefect, the rioting was a reaction to his own decree dis- 
28 
solving the irregular militia bands on 14 September it 
seems most improbable that the reaction Jouques reported would 
have taken a month to make itself felt, particularly as the 
dissolution order appears to have had little effect on the 
leading terrorists - Trestaillons was reported to have made 
an "arrest" in the name of royalism as late as 20 September, 
in Nimes; his victim was charged with having broken a bust of 
the king "some time in the past"29. Moreover, the coincidence 
of the rioting and news of Vidal's imminent dismissal is 
remarkable. Whilst only 12 arrests were made30, Vidal, in 
his report, claimed that there were nearly three hundred rio- 
ters On the streets31. The incident may have been a reaction 
27 A. N. F7 9049. Minister of police to Jouques 16 October, 1815 
The government had sought Vidal's dismissal s early as 
August 1815, but Jouques had resisted. A. N. F 9050. Minister 
of interior to Jouques, 16 August, 1815. 
28 A. N. F9049. Jouques to minister of police, 18 October, 1815. 
7 
29 A. 'D. Gard 6M 77. Commissaire Paulin to Vidal, 20 September, 1815, 
30 A. N. F9049. Minister of war to. min. ister of police, 31 October, 
1815. 
31 A. N. F79049. Vidal to. minister of, police, 18. October, 1815. 
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to the dismissal of an "understanding" police official, or it 
may have been arranged to prove that Vidal was indispensable. 
Jouques' own attitude to the matter of Vidal's dismissal of- 
fers no evidence to the contrary. Even after Vidal's cor- 
ruption and partisan exercise of police powers had been in- 
vestigated by Lagarde at the request of Decazes32, Jouques 
continued to support a man whose reputation was no more than 
that of a criminal and a profiteer. After seeking four 
thousand Francs in payment for Vidal's service since July, 
Jouques requested an additional sum of twenty thousand Francs 
to enable Vidal to establish a secret police in the Depart- 
ment33. In his request, Jouques pointed out that Vidal had 
been a loyal servant of the monarchy, two of whose sons had 
been royal volunteers in March 181534. Seemingly unaware of 
the changing attitudes in the government, Jouques was ex- 
posing himself to the minister least favourably disposed to 
Ultra royalism in France. 
until his dismissal in 1817. 
It was a process that continued 
The rioting was quelled principally because of the de- 
cisive intervention of General Lagarde who arrested Tres- 
taillons and had him taken in chains to the military prison 
at Montpellier in the face of threats of violence35. Yet 
Lagarde's determination was to mark him out to the Ultra 
royalists as a threat, and he soon became the centre of an 
32 A. N. F7 9049, Lagarde to minister of police, 7 December, 1815 
33 A. N. F7 9049. Jouques to minister of police, 3 December, 1815, 
13-January, 1816. 
34 ibid. 
35 A. D. Gard 6M 26. Lagarde to minister of war, 18 October, 1815. 
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affair that 'illustrated more clearly than anonymous letters 
and suspicious behaviour that the Gard was ruled by men whose 
ambitions were sinister. 
Lagarde was an outsider appointed to the VIIth military 
division by Clarke, minister for War at the time. Unlike 
Jouques, Lagarde showed no sympathy for the Catholic royalist 
cause. His arrest of Trestaillons had identified him as an 
enemy of the royalists, as had some of his public statements. 
At the beginning of November 1815, the duc d'Angouleme made 
a visit to Names. During the visit, Louis Terme, one of 
the more notorious anti-Protestant agitators of the First 
Restoration, was recommended to the prince to be decorated 
for his services'to the royal cause. His testimonial was 
signed by Vallongues, Vidal, Carteras, a former self styled 
commander of Nimes, the sub prefect of Nimes and by Jouques 
himself. The same sponsors assured Angoulýme that rumours 
36 
circulating in Paris about trouble in the department were 
false, that "the enemies of the king were working quietly 
but with great astuteness" to discredit the local administ- 
tration37. Lagarde's was the only voice to express disquiet 
and dissatisfaction at the developments in the department38. 
On Sunday, 12 November, an attempt was made to murder him. 
The Protestant Grand temple had been closed since the 
36 A. D. Gard 6M 40, anon. -to duc d'Angouleme, 2 November, 1815. 
37 A. N. 239 AP 2. Duc d'Angouleme report, 13 November, 1815. 
38 PRO F. O. 27/130. Colonel Ross to Sir Charles Stuart, 
21 January, 1816. 
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summer because of the anti-Protestant feeling in the town. 
The first service was to be held on 12 November, and that 
morning a large, hostile crowd assembled outside the temple. 
The civil and military authorities were present, with a con- 
tingent of the National Guard to guarantee access to the 
temple for the Protestants. As the congregation began to 
arrive, elements of the crowd pressed closer and hurled abuse 
at the Protestants. Lagarde, on horseback, intervened 
characteristically. One demonstrator stood his ground and, 
when Lagarde attempted to push him back, drew a pistol and 
fired at the general. The man disappeared into the crowd 
and made his escape39. The incident provoked a sharp and 
rapid response from Paris. Angouleme, who had'only left 
Nimes, returned to the city and showed his disgust to the 
authorities by refusing a National Guard escort on the grounds 
4 
that the force was an insult to justice0. He immediately 
ordered Jouques to supervise a further purge of the Guard 
which had shown itself incapable - or unwilling to - discharge 
its duties. It soon became known that the would be assassin 
had been identified as Louis Boissin, a former Miguelet and 
currently a sergeant in the Guard company commanded by Vidal 
fils. The possibility of the crime having no sinister 
41 
motivation was diminished when a number of persons said they 
39 A. N. BB3 154. Procureur general to minister of justice,. 
1 December, 1815. 
40 E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, 
41 A. N. BB3 154. Procureur general 
1 December, 1815. 
p. 124. 
to minister of j tistice, 
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had seen Boissin leaving Vidal's house on the morning of the 
incident, accompanied by two men and armed with a pistol and 
42 4 sword. It took eight months to find Boissin3. 
The incident was utterly counter productive. Whilst 
the Catholic royalists had hoped to remove Lagarde, whom they 
saw - and quite correctly - as an obstacle to their designs, 
the crude assassination attempt merely focussed the attention 
of Paris on their presence even more. As a form of disgrace, 
the king ordered that the citizens of Nimes should pay an 
additional tax contribution of 15% for the year44, and Decazes, 
minister of police began to make inquiries into the quality 
and trustworthiness of the local administration. While many 
letters commenting on the departmental administrators were 
anonymous and couched in the classic phraseology of the man 
with a grudge, some sound reports indicated that things were 
far from normal. Thus, an envoy of the British embassy, 
Colonel Ross, commented in January 1816: 
"The provincial magistrates should be 
men of vigorous, enlightened and 
unprejudiced minds, possessing the 
confidence of all parties, which is 
far from being the case at present. " 45 
42 A. N. BB3 154. Procureur general to minister of justice, 
13 December, 1815. 
43 He was arrested near Arles (Bouches 
_du 
Rhöne) at the end of July 
1816. A. N. F7 9049. Commissaire de Police, 
_Nimes, 
to minister 
of police, 23 August, 1816-- 
44 PRO F. O. 27/130. Colonel Ross to Sir Charles Stuart, 
21 December, 1815. 
45 ibid., 21 January, 1816. While these_reports were made to the 
British embassy, there is every reason to believe that 
they were made available to the French ministry of police. 
The number of French provincial police reports filed 
regularly in -F. O. 27/130 testifies to a high degree of 
collaboration between the British, embassy and the French 
police ministry. 
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Lagarde, previously entrusted with the task of reporting 
on Vidal's activities, commented: 
"My opinion on the troubles in 
this region is that they are 
fomented by indefatigable 
agitators". 46. 
Again, Cavalier, procureur general, revealed that a confidential 
report, known only to himself and to Gibrat, a police official, 
had been handed to the Societe de Bolze - presumably by 
Gibrat47, and that the mayor, Valldngues, had been very sym- 
pathetic to the extreme royalists during the first restoration48 
As a result of these reports, Decazes instructed Jououes to 
prepare a report on the suitability of the men mentioned. 
49 
In an attempt to cover himself and the local administr- 
ation, Jouques wrote an epistle to the. minister of the interior, 
Vaublanc, a known supporter of the Ultra royalists. Jouques 
claimed that there were utterly unfounded rumours circulating 
in Paris because the Protestants of the Gard had a number of 
well placed advocates "totally dominated by a spirit of sec- 
tarianism and philosophisme (sic) " and whose leader was almost 
certainly Guizot. These men, having witnessed the failure 
of their sect in the elections, had determined to prepare the 
50 
next elections from within the government itself Guizot 
46 A. N. F7 9049. Lagarde to minister of police, 7 December, 181 
47 A. N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 13 December, l81 
48 ibid., 12 November, 1815. 
49 A. D. Gard 6M 11. Minister of police to Jouques, 10 January, 181 
50 At the time, Guizot was secretary to the minister for 
j'ustice. 
I 
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was endeavouring to win the support of the protestant com- 
munity of the Gard by engineering Jouques' destitution. More- 
over, the Gard was like no other department in France and 
should not, therefore, be administered like the others. The 
Protestants had always been opposed to the Bourbon Monarchs, 
said Jouques, claiming that his office was full of documents 
proclaiming the elation of the Protestant community at the 
return of Bonaparte. Only four Protestants had joined the 
volunteers raised by the duc d'Angouleme in March 1815 - was 
this not proof enough of their perfidy? On what grounds did 
they who 'had united to support tyranny' now demand a share 
in the administration of the legitimate government? No force, 
no authority could assuage the indignation of the people if 
the government, fooled or misguided, entrusted to the Pro- 
testant party, which the people regarded with so many good 
reasons to be the enemies of the beloved king, any of the major 
posts in the-department. It was true, Jouques continued, 
that the people of Nimes had mistakenly pillaged one Pro- 
testant house, that of Vincens Mourgue, whom they had confused 
with a notorious Bonapartist, Vincens Maigre, but on realising 
their error, they had stopped in the middle of the pillage. 
Apart from this isolated case, only known Bonapartists had 
suffered -a fact that contrasted starkly with the "Dremedi: - 
tated"murder of royalists during the Hundred Days 
In taking this stand, Jouques had reversed the role of 
the prefect; the instrument of central authority had become 
51 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Jouques to Vaublanc, 10 Febtuary, 
1816. 
A 
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the advocate of local interests. His unguarded justification 
of and support for policies of discrimination in the Card, 
his assertion that there was a Protestant plot ranked him 
unequivocally amont the Ultra royalists. 
In spite of Jouques' attitude and the numerous comments 
on the situation in the Gard, the government took no action 
beyond the inquiries requested by Decazes. It should be 
remembered that the Chambre introuvable was at the zenith of 
its influence and that, as yet, no coherent policy had been 
formulated by the king's ministers. If Decazes, the un and 
coming police director was arriving at the conclusion that 
Ultra royalism had to be destroyed, other ministers like 
Vaublanc and Clarke were flaunting their royalism. The prime 
minister, the duc de Richelieu, was preoccupied with the 
fundamental problems of balancing the budget and the cost of 
the allied occupation, and the. clear intention of the Ultra 
royalist dominated assembly to play an active part in political i 
decisions meant that the government had to be most careful 
not to alienate the majority if it wanted to discharge its 
duties. Action taken against royalist supported administrators 
at the time would almost certainly have led to charges of 
Bonapartism and treason. Nonetheless, Jouques, at least, 
had revealed himself and the existence of reports such as 
the one he had just written in the ministry's files could do 
nothing but harm to his career as an administrator when 
Decazes emerged as the leader of the government in the Autumn 
0 
of 1816. 
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But in the early part of 1816, a time of exaltation for 
the Catholic royalists of the Gard, disaster seemed too remote 
a possibility to consider. In TMay, at the end of the narl- 
iamentary session, the reception accorded to Jules de Calviere 
in his home town of Saint Gilles du Gard illustrated the rvvood 
of Catholic royalist triumphalism. The Journal du Card, it- 
self controlled by the royalists, reported a banquet held in 
his honour during which the following lines were sung: 
"0 D irbaud, Montauban ', Crenier, 
Vassimon, Calviere, Surville, 
How could we forget you? 
Your names stand out among thousands! 
These names that make the miserable 
regicide quake with fear 
will always serve as a guide to 
us in the pursuit of honour. " S2. 
The newspaper was filled with odes which reflected the same 
delirious adulation, and the editor of the Journal du Gard 
remarked that "the true friends of the king feel the irrest- 
ible desire to seek each other out and to remain together 
S3,, 
The Journal du Gard took great care never to miss an 
occasion that served to underline the dominance of Catholic 
royalism and to give an impression of a society united behind 
love of the monarch. Thus, when the Nimes National Guard 
company entertained the Tarn departmental company, the news- 
paper proclaimed that 'hundreds of loyal toasts and oaths 
were offered" that royalist songs were sung and that the 
gathering declared repeatedly that they would "die rather 
than suffer the least sleight against the royal family". 
52 Journal du Gard, 13 July, 1816. 
53 Ibid. 
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The reporter assured his readers that "such unions of strength 
would make us all the more daunting in the eyes of intriguers, 
more terrible to the of illegitimate Sý partisans government" 
Catholic royalist solidarity was increased that year 
in another way. The deteriorating economic situation had 
increased unemployment and the price of bread55. The 
Catholic notables were thus able to increase the allegiance 
of the working; poor by alleviating the hardship with food 
and money distributions, thereby reaffirming the quasi feudal 
relationship that characterised the Catholic community in the 
GardS6, 
54. ibid., 10 August, 1816. 
55. The price of wheat rose to a peak in June 1816, just 
before the harvest, and then, from November, 1816 
to May 1d17 high prices were sustained. E. Labrousse, 
G. Romano , F. Dreyfus, '. op. cit. 
Ross reported from Nimes that food prices were high and 
the commercial crisis was contributing to the hardship. 
P. R. O. F027/154 to Sir Charles Stuart, 22 January, 1816. 
Evidence of the hardship of that winter in the Gard is 
offered, too, by crime reports. Brigandage occurred 
on an unusually large scale. Thus, the procureur's 
report deals with many incidents like the robbery of a 
charretier on the road between Nimes and Beaucaire by 
seven men who took 39 Louis d'or (14 December); the 
robbery of 1200 francs from a man between Sommleres and 
Le Vigan on 17 December, the holding up of the Mont- 
pellier mail coach and theft of 1600 francs from it by 
seven brigands. In most cases, the weapons used were 
knives and fusils de chasse. The brigands must have been 
. 
Local ten 
from the references to their idiom and accent. 
. (A. N. F7 9050) 
56. A police report passed on to the British embassy described 
the Catholic working class of Nimes as "a considerable 
mass of ;. relings, capable of anything without the tight 
control of their leaders". P. R. O. FO 27/155 police report, 
3 March, 1 L., 17 . 
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The supremacy of Catholic royalism was reflected in 
the outcome of two trials concerning the recent troubles and 
which were held in 1816. 
At the court of Assises of Riom, in the Puy de Dome, 
three of the leading royalist terrorists, Jacques Dupont, 
alias Trestaillons, Jean Graffand, alias Quatretaillons, and 
their henchman, Pocheville, were released without a trial. 
They had been arrested at various times - Graffand in 
September 1815, Dupont and Pocheville by Lagarde in October - 
and were accused of murder and pillage. The charges had to be dis- 
miss-ed'because it proved impossible to obtain witnesses for 
the prosecution or even sworn statements from them for fear 
57 
of reprisals. Thus, at the beginning of August 1816, the 
three former Miauelets returned to Nimes in triumph, where 
their presence was a source of scandal to the Protestant 
community, deprived even of justice: "these atrocious faces, 
remarked here and there in the streets or on the boulevards 
spread a sadness tinged with indignation "58. The release 
of these men, whose freedom had been assured by more crime, 
contrasted sharply with the sentence of death passed on eight 
Protestants found guilty of having murdered royalist volunteers 
at Arpaillargues during the Hundred Days. When the Minister 
of Justice remarked to Jouques on the obvious contrast between 
the two cases, and on the effect the imminent execution of 
the Protestants was likely to produce, Jouques replied in a 
fashion that revealed once more the extent to which he was 
57. A. N. BB3 154. Memorandum of Ministry of Justice, 31 May, 
1816. 
58. Lauze de Peret, Causes et Precis, p. 398. 
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the Catholic royalists' representative and not the government's. 
Jouques felt obliged to defend Graffand (Quatretaillons) 
saying: "It was only after his arrest that the voice of the 
local magistrates was raised against him". He went on to 
say that Quatretaillons had had no part in the principal crime 
of which he had been accused, namely the murder of six "prison- 
ers" taken by his band near Uzes in August 1815. On the con- 
trary, he had gone to seek out the authorities in order to 
have the rebels arrested. In contrast, the crimes of the 
59 
"assassins of Arpaillargues" as he called them, were incon- 
testable and incontested. "Never have the freedom, inde- 
pendence and impartiality of the judges and jurors been so 
evident than in this trial and condemnation"... "if the accused 
escaped the sword of the law, a complete subversion of public 
spirit would hit this unhappy department,, 
60. 
The Protestants did not "escape the sword of the law'": 
they were executed on 24 September in the course of an event 
that Jouques described as "this great act of the most impartial 
justice" which "produced the most salutary effect on the 
public "61. A later assessment of the trial and execution 
notes that it elicited a wave of anonymous letters accusing 
the Gard courts of being in the pay of the "brigands of 
59. A. N. F796S7. Jouques to minister of justice, 2 September, 
1816. 
Just over a year later, Jouques was to write of the three 
terrorists: "If they were acquitted by the-courts it was 
only because of the cowardly silence of those who know 
only how to accuse in odious pamphlets and whose mouths 
close before the august tribunal of the laws". Troubles 
et agitations, p. 50. 
60. A. N. F79657. Jouques to minister of justice, 2 September, 
1816. 
61. A. N. F79053. Jouques to minister of interior, 24 September, 
1816. 
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. Even if the accused were guilty, it was gro- 
tesque that such a politically sensitive trial should have 
been allowed in Nimes so soon after the acquittal of the three 
terrorists, whose own trial had been set in a distant town 
to avoid agitation. 
The elation of Catholic royalist sentiment was not 
troubled unduly by the surprising news that the Chamber of 
deputies was to be dissolved during the recess. Decazes 
had come to the conclusion that effective government would 
remain impossible as long as the extreme right dominated in 
the chamber, and he persuaded the King to dissolve the chamber 
and to hold fresh elections. Decazes devoted himself to 
managing the elections in an attempt to reduce the number of 
ultras elected. In the south, liberal opinion rejoiced at 
the dissolution63, while the Ultras saw the move, quite cor- 
rectly, as an attempt to produce a parliamentary majority 
docile to the ministers64. With hindsight, it has been said 
that the constitutional coup d'etat organised by Decazes with 
the support of the allied governments was a rejection of the 
principle of a democratically elected assembly, and so com- 
promised the future growth of parliamentary government during 
this critical first half of the century, when so many conflicts 
exposed or created by the Revolution still had to be resolved6S. 
62. A. N. F790S0. Commissaire de police, September, 1817. 
63. Durand, Marseille, Nimes et ses Environs, pp. i, vii. 
64. A. N. F7 4349. Froment to Misspoulet, 12 October, 1816. 
65. Eertier'de Sauvigny, La Restauration, p. 138 
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This point of view is, of course, founded on the assumption 
that the extreme right would constitute a responsible majority, 
something that was not evident at the time. Indeed, it 
appeared that the Ultra royalists were 'constitutionals' only 
as long as they were the majority. In reality, the dis- 
solution that took place in September 1816 was the outcome 
of a conflict about the interpretation of the Charter, not 
simply a measure taken for political convenience. 
,` 
The elections took place in October. The total number 
of deputies had been reduced to 262 to conform to the Charter. 
The Gard's representation was also reduced - to three. Like 
many of the southern departments;, the Gard, whose electorate 
not changed since the previous elections, returned three 
members of the Chambre introuvable: Charles de Vogue, Jules 
de Calviere and Trinquelague66. Rene de Bernis had been 
elected in the neighbouring Lozere, where he was commander of 
the National Guard67. The only apparent effect of the dissolutioi 
and the government's propaganda before the elections68 was a 
schism in the ranks of the royalists. One observer said that 
a minority had expressed demands for a monarchy "as they 
imagine it existed forty years ago", while the majority had 
expressed their preference for a constitutional monarchy. The 
split had only affected the leisured and educated classes 
66 A. N. Flc III Gard 4. Elections of 4 October, 1816. 
67. A. N. _F79051. 
Dargout to Decazes, 19 December, 1817. 
0 
68 Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp. 139-140. 
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who tended to follow politics in the newspapers; popular 
attitudes remained crude-and extreme. 
69 
The extreme royalists 
were vaunting Chäteaubriand's Monarchie selon la Charte which 
had just been banned by the government. The ban, they pro- 
claimed, was part of the constitutionals' plot to mislead the 
king 70. 
Indeed, the events in Paris appeared to have very little 
effect on affairs in the Gard, which remained calm. Even the 
acute substistences shortage and high prices failed to provoke 
the disturbances that occurred in many parts of France in the 
7 
cruel winter of 1816-171. Yet, the apparent security of 
Ultra royalist rule in the Gard was about to be shaken. The 
dissolution of the Chambre introuvable marked the beginning 
of the period generally referred to as the "liberal" phase 
of the Restoration which lasted until the murder of the duc 
de Berry in February 1820, swung political opinion firmly to 
the Right. The chief architect of the liberal government was 
Decazes who remained minister of police, but whose ascendancy 
over the king gave him unquestioned primacy in the government. 
Moreover, shortly before the dissolution, Decazes had obtained 
the replacement of Vaublanc at the department of the Interior, "1 
by a moderate, Laine. Thus, the key departments concerned 
with internal security, Police and Interior, were in the hands 
of liberals by the autumn of 1816; two more, War (responsible 
69 A. N. F7 9050. Commis!; -adre 
de police to minister of police, 
9 October, 181 6. 
70. ibid. 
71 See R. Marjolin, "Troubles provoques par la disette 
de 1816,1817 ", Revue d'Histoire moderne, vol. 8 (1933), Pp. 423-46+ 
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for the national Gendarmerie) and Justice would be given to 
Gouvion -Saint Cyr, Marshal of France, and to Pasquier, last 
Prefect of Police of Napoleon, respectively. 
The event that brought the Catholic royalists of the 
Gard into conflict with the government was the trial of Louis 
Boissin, the man accused of attempting to murder General 
Lagarde, the former military commander in Nimes. Boissin 
was captured in the summer of 1816 near Arles and transferred 
to Nimes in September72 while evidence was assembled for his 
trial which was to take place in January 1817. As early as 
Boissin's arrest, Decazes had written to Jouques, stressing 
his personal interest in the case and instructing the prefect 
to report regularly and in detail on the organisation of the 
trial. For some reason, Jouques had not notified the 
73 
government of the arrest of this man whose crime was of a 
most serious nature74, Jouques' subsequent handling of the 
trial reflects both the gulf that separated the thinking of 
the Catholic royalists and that of the government and Jouques' 
own blindness to the mounting pressures that were being put 
on him. With Guizot in the department of Justice, middle 
class Protestant attitudes to the Jouques administration could 
not have gone unnoticed. These attitudes may be summarized 
by the following appraisal: "It is impossible for peace and 
72 A. N. F79050. Police report to minister of police 16 Sept- 
ember, 1816. 
73. A. D. Gard 6M 11. Minister of police to Jouques, 3 August, 
1816. 
74. ibid. 
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calm to be restored as long as M. Arhaud Jouques, the sub 
prefect of Uzes (Da rnand Vallabrix) and the mayor of Nimes 
have any say in the administration 
75 ". In spite of the 
mass of unfavourable comment on his biased administration, 
Jouques continued to isolate himself from the government. 
The trial was due to begin on 3 February, 1817, and 
a few days beforehand, Jouques wrote to Laine informing him 
arrangements had been made to have strong military reinforce- 
ments in Nimes during the trial as a precaution. He hastened 
to add that rumours of Catholic royalist support for Boissin 
were unfounded. The trial would take place in scrupulously 
honest circumstances, for Jouques had personally drawn up the 
76 list of jurors. According to a retired general who was 
in residence in Nimes at the time, Boissin did, in fact, enjoy 
the support of the local royalist organisation, the Societe 
de Bolze. Shortly after Boissin was brought to Nimes, 
Greleau, owner of the Journal du Gard and member of the 
Societe, took charge of 
77 
the matter. Then, the leaders 
of the societe set about hiring 'witnesses' who were given 
statements to learn at the home of Gaussin, a cloth dyer78. 
It was true, however, that Jouques had chosen the members of 
the jury himself. It was composed of seven landowners, two 
retired colonels - one of whom, Despouches, was shortly to be 
dismissed from command of a National Guard company for his 
75. A. N. F 19 10358, anon., Notes on a conversation with Chabaud Latour 
and Delaville, December 1816. 
76. A. N. F7 9657. Jouques to Laine, 31 January, 1817. 
77. A. D. GardChartrier de Clausonne. 331. Notes of General 
Former d'Albe. n. d. 
78. ibid. 
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extreme views79 -, two mayors and Gaude the printer80. 
d'Albe noted that "the list (of jurors) was prepared by 
Fornier 
Monsieur d'Arbaud Jouques, prefect in office, entirely to the 
satisfaction of Boissin and his friends "81. Then, after the 
hearings, a lawyer was heard to tell Gaude that it was clear 
that the evidence against Boissin was overwhelming. Gaude, 
a member of the Jury retorted that Boissin would be acquitted 
82 
without the slightest difficulty" 
The circumstances in which the trial took place recalled 
the elections of 1790 and August 1815. A Catholic lawyer, 
a liberal nonetheless, described the scene in the courtroom: 
"All around the building, cries of 
Vive le Roi! could be heard during 
the proceedings and deliberations 
of the Jury. A farandole* was 
danced on the Esplanade, and Planchet, 
one of the judges was mocked. Amidst 
all that, the other marquis, de Vall- 
ongues, was enthroned in the court 
flourishing his hat. and saluting the 
people" 83. 
*A Provencal version of the 'conga' which had become a 
manifestation of Ultra royalist triumphalism in the Midi. 
79. See p. 115 infra. 
80. A. D. Gard 6U 2 191. 
81. A. D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 331. Mss, notes of General 
Fornier d'Albe. 
82. ibid. 
83. P. R. O. F. O. 27/154. Copy of a letter written by Madier 
e Montjau, 8 February, 1817. Madier de Montjau (1785- 
1865) was to become notorious for his denunciation, in 
April 1820, of the "gouvernement occulte" of the Ultras. 
lUJ 
The proceedings were designed to provide the Catholic 
royalist supporters with further proof of the victory of their 
cause. Small wonder, then, that a Protestant lawyer, Horace 
Fornier de Clausonne, could write to his brother on the eve 
of the verdict that in spite of the vigorous and exhaustive 
case brought by the public prosecutor, in spite of the courage- 
ous sworn statements made by the witnesses for the prosecution, 
there was no doubt that Boissin would be acquitted. Indeed, 
84 
the jury found Boissin not guilty of attempted murder on the 
grounds that he acted out of self defence. Not only had 
85 
he been acquitted, Lagarde had been depicted as the aggressor. 
That night, 8 February, Louis Boissin was guest of honour 
at a dinner given by Gaude. A sum amounting to 300 Francs, 
collected by Madame de Surville, wife of the commander of 
the Nimes National Guard, was given to him with a passport 
valid for Spain. 
86 
But in. the changed circumstances in Paris, this clear 
violation of justice did not go unremarked. The Prime 
Minister, Richelieu, was scandalised87, and the Departments 
of Justice and Interior began an immediate inquiry88, the 
result of which was the annullment of the verdict "in the 
89 interest of justice" 
84. A. D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 124. H. Fornier to 
G. Fornier 7 February, 1817. 
85. A. N. F7 9049. Report to minister of police, 9 February, 1817 
86. A. D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 331. Mss. notes of General 
Fornier d' Albe . 
87. Marquise de Montcalm, Mon Journal. (Paris 1936), p. 238. 
88. A. N. BB3 154. Correspondance between the Procureur general 
and-Minister of justice, February - March, 1817. 
89. A. N. F79049 Report from Cour de Cassation, 13 March, , 
1817. 
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The first effect of the government's action was felt 
when Jouques was dismissed. The decision to remove him was 
taken as soon as the outcome of the trial was known in Paris90. 
Jouques was inextricably linked with the trial either through 
his weakness or his complicity, and this most recent example 
of his failure to discharge his duty overshadowed the suc- 
cession of earlier ones. Nonetheless, news of his dismissal 
was received with shock by the Catholic population of Nimes91, 
who had evidently failed t. o appraise the shift in goveninent 
policy since the dissolution the previous September. A year' 
later, in an apologia for his term of office in the Gard, 
Jouques wrote: 
"I am completely unaware of the reasons 
for my. destitution. I would tend to 
believe, as many of the principal 
leaders of a long intrigue have not 
feared to boast, that the government 
finally tired of rebutting the perpet- 
ual manoeuvers of a number of agitators 
in the Gard whom I did not cease 
to indicate to the government, 
and whom I believed were no longer 
a threat to anyone but myself, 
and not for the department as a 
whole, whose peace and tranquillity 
was the fruit of my labours, my 
honour and most cherished attention" 92. 
Still Jouques stressed, for the public, at least, the 
theme of a Protestant plot, and in doing so, underlined once 
again the peculiarly local preoccupations of the Gard Ultra 
90. P. R. O. F. O. 27/154. Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, 
17 February, 1817. 
91. A. N. F79050. Police report to minister of police; 2 March, 
1817. 
92. Darbaud Jouques, Troubles et Agitations pp, vi-vii. 
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royalists. The former prefect of the Gard remained without 
public office until 1823, when he was appointed prefect of 
the Cöte d'Or by the Villcle government which reflected Ultra 
royalist attitudes more clearly than any previous Restoration 
93 
government. 
The dismissal of Jouques, and the appointment of 
Emmanuel Dargout in his place marked the end of an era in the 
Gard. In common with Ultra royalism throughout France, 
Catholic royalism in the Gard was to exist in the wilderness 
for the next three years, as the government of France displayed 
more marked intentions of liberalism. Unable to function as 
a responsible opposition party, the Ultras resorted to cloak 
and dagger activities like the "Conspiration du Bord del'Eau", 
allegedly an attempt to kidnap the king in order to impose 
on him a 'right thinking' government in 1818; the Lyon affair 
of 1817, apparently a Republican insurrection, but in which 
the Prefect and local military-commander were implicated, men 
who were sympathetic to Ultra royalism94. A more sinister 
attempt to undermine the liberal government was made in the 
Summer of 1818, when it was revealed that a memorandum known 
as the Note secrete had been sent to the representatives of 
the Allied powers in Paris by Vitrolles. The memorandum 
"represented France as a volcano of revolution, threatening 
to consume Europe" and urged the allies to put an end to the 
government of Decazes5. These schemes, however real a threat 
9 
93. A. N. Flb 155-6. Personnel of the ministry of the interior. 
94. Canuel, the military commander, was involved in the con- 
spiration du bord de 1'eau as well. 
s 
95. Pasquier, Memoires (6 vols., Paris, 1893-5), 4, p. 2S1. 
10 O 
they may have been96, provided the government with propaganda 
and came to nothing. Meanwhile, the government proceeded 
to introduce a number of bills that seemed to assure respect 
for the Charter and more freedom and participation for French- 
men, to the chagrin of the Ultras, who saw the laws on army 
recruitment (1817), on the extension of the franchise (1817) 
and on the press (1817 and 1819)- as evidence of a renascent 
Jacobinism. In fact, the extension of the franchise did 
accelerate the progress of the "Left". From some twelve 
deputies in 1816, the Left won twenty seats in 1818 and then 
took thirty five of the fifty five seats contested in 1819, 
the year the notorious ex conventionnel Gregoire was elected 
at Grenoble7. The existence of irreconcilables like the 
9 
Right and Left undoubtedly weakened the government, which had 
not forseen a threat from the Left, but at the same time, 
there can be no doubt that the intransigence of the Ultra 
royalists and their unwillingness to oppose constructively 
contributed to the collapse of the attempt to evolve the con- 
stitutional monarchy that a number of Frenchmen had aspired 
to in 1814. Ultimately, the failure of parliamentary dem- 
ocracy during the Bourbon restoration was due to a lack of 
consensus among the political class. The same lack of con- 
sensus existed in the Gard, but there, the lines of division 
96. Characteristically, Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, 
pp. 148-150 minimises the importance of these affairs and 
suggests that Decazes exaggerated them to discredit the 
party of the Comte d'Artois. 
97. A. Jardin and A. Tudesq, La France des Notables 
(2 -vols. , Paris, 
1973)} vol. 1, p. 45. 
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remained confessional. 
The new prefect of the Gard was a in-an whose background 
reflected the qualities of the liberals. His career in the 
administration had begun in 1806, and by 1814 he was director 
of the Rhine navigation authority. As an officer of the 
Paris National Guard, he took part in the last defence of the 
city before the allied armies entered. The first Restoration 
appointed him prefect of the Basses Pyrenees, and he remained 
in office after the usurpation in March 1815. In 1819, 
Decazes elevated Dargout to the peerage, and made him con- 
seiller d'Etat -a rank of which he was deprived in 1824 
when Charles X became king. Dargout did not emerge as a public 
figure again until after the July Revolution, when Louis 
Philippe appointed him as Minister of the Marine. As Min- 
ister of the Interior between 1832 and 1834, he acquired 
notoriety among the politicians of the Left for his ruthless 
suppression of the Lyon revolt of 1834. His public career 
led him ultimately to the governorship of the Bank of France98. 
A man whose loyalites were to France rather than to a dynasty - 
although his successor in the Gard accused him of possessing 
"an extreme flexibility of opinions" and of destituting even 
the lowest garde champtre in the Basses Pyrenees because 
their royalism was not as fervent as his own, just as later 
in the Gard he destituted "hundreds of mayors because their 
liberalism was not striking enough"99 - Dargout could not have 
98. A. N. FlbI 155-156. Personnel of the ministry of the 
interior. 
99. Baron d'Haussez, Memoires (2 vols., Paris, 1896-7), 
1, p. 264. 
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anything in common with the Ultras, but, on the contrary, 
depended on the government and the state for his advancement. 
Dargout was sent to the-Gard to reconcile the-two 
'parties', to win their allegiance to the constitutional 
monarchy. After he had left for Nimes, Decazes wrote to him 
explaining that it was his task to "royaliser la nation et 
nationaliser le roil'. In this task, Dargout was told to "Count 
on Monsieur Decazes as well as on the King's minister, just 
as I count on Monsieur Dargout as well as on the prefect"100_ 
Immediately after his arrival in Nimes, Dargout met 
the military, civil and judicial authorities of the department 
and then reviewed the National*Guard. The Guard's commander, 
de Surville, gave a dinner in his honour, during which the 
prefect was the object of much praise 
1010 Quite clearly, the 
notables were scrutinising him and endeavouring to impress 
him with their sincerity, perhaps in the hope that he would 
prove amenable, for as Dargout commented: 
"It would have been more natural 
that those who admired Monsieur 
Darbaud Jouques, who referred to 
his humane and moral qualities, 
should"have displayed more reserve 
and coldness towards me" 102. 
Dargout concluded that they were afraid that the dismissal 
of Jouques might only be the first in a series of destitutions 
100. A. N. F7 9051. Decazes to'Dargout, 8 March, 1817. 
Decazes also informed Dargout that he could depend on 
General de Briche, a new military commander for the 
department, and Eymard, the official of the fhiinistry of 
the interior who was already familiar with the Gard. ibid. 
101. A. N. F7 9050. Dargout to Decazes, 3 March, 181'. 
4 
102. ibid. 
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to make way for the Protestants 103. If this was the assumption 
of the Catholic Royalists, they were wrong. Dargout had not 
been sent to carry out a witch hunt, and was to show a great 
deal of patience in his endeavours to bring the administration 
of the department within the principles of justice and 
democracy. 
While the authorities were behaving courteously, the 
Societe de Bolze was assessing the changed situation. As 
soon as Dargout's appointment had been made public, Baron, 
son in law of the deputy Trinqelague and one of the founder 
members of the societe, travelled to Nimes, where he met the 
other leaders of the societe in their committee room above 
the Cafe de Bolze. After the meeting, Vampere, Trinquelague's 
'secretary' was one of a number of couriers seen in the 
villages around Nimes delivering messages 
1014 
On 13 March, 
, 
the court of appeal annulled the verdict 
on Louis Boissin105, Immediately, there was a marked change 
in the attitude of the Catholics: 
"Quite suddenly, the Catholic 
notables have kept away from 
de Briche and myself. Many 
subordinate officials have 
passed from the warmest cord- 
iality to the most noticeable 
coldness. Absolutely no reason 
for this change has been ind- 
icated to us. " 106. 
103 ibid. 
104 A. D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 331. Mss. notes of 
General Fornier d'Albe. 
105. A. N. F7 9049. Decision of the Cour de Cassation, 13 March, 
x$17. " 
106. A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Dargout to Laine, 18 March, 
1817. 
.. 
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The sudden volte face was not limited to the Catholic 
notables. In a manner that emphasised the cohesion of the 
Catholic party, the Catholic working class quarters, notably 
the Bourgades, to the north east of the city, began to respond 
to the instructions of Catholic notables who were known for 
their extreme views and unusual gatherings and groups were 
107 
seen on the streets. 
War had been declared by the Catholic royalist organis- 
ation on the representative of Decazes, since 1816, the Bete 
noire of the Ultras, and now the man held responsible for 
reversing the verdict on Boissin. The most sinister aspect 
of the Catholic royalists' manoeuver was the illicit mobil- 
isation of the National Guard. Acting on information given 
to him anonymously, de Briche had a number of houses searched 
and the home of one guardsman contained 220 home made cart- 
ridges, a pistol, a hunting gun and a military musket108. De 
Briche learnt that the Guard had been put on an alert and 
109 instructed to make cartridges by its company commanders. 
Thus, the Catholics made the first hostile move, and in doing 
so revealed to Dargout beyond all doubt that there was a chain 
of command that co-ordinated all social classes in the Catholic 
community and even controlled the department's armed militia. 
Apart from the overruling of the Boissin verdict, there 
were, in the first weeks of Dargout's administration, other 
107. ibid. Also F7 9051, Dargout to Laine, 24 March . Dargout 
refers to the daughters of the Vicomte de Rochemore 
"whose exaltation is well known" and to the sister of 
Jules de Calviere, Madame de Bonnafoux "an audacious and 
scheming woman'". 
108 A. N. F1cI11 Gard 13. Dargout to Laine, 18 March, 1817. 
109 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Laine, 24 March, 1817. 
A 
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events that must have humiliated and worried the royalists. 
A number of reports from most parts of the department in- 
dicated anti royalist demonstrations taking place as news 
of the change of prefect spread. Farandoles, seditious 
cries - most often "Vive l'Empereur: " - seditious slogans 
scrawled in public place, tricolours and threats against 
110 officials proliferated, One police report attributed 
the outbursts to the popular belief that the change of pre- 
fect would lead to change of policylll. Thus, a town hall 
official at Martignargues proclaimed that Jouques had been 
11 dismissed for arming 'brigands and thugs'2. Other ob- 
servers believed that the disturbances had been organised by 
the Catholic royalists in order to discredit the Protestants 
in the eyes of the new prefect 
113. 
It is almost cetainly true that some of the demon- 
strations were spontaneous but that others were staged114. 
110 A. D. Gard 6M 66. Commander of the departmental 
Gendarmerie to minister of war, 13 March, 1817. The 
report mentions Caveirac, Clarensac, Vergeze, Saint 
Cosme, Codogan and Bernis in particular. 
111 A. N. F79050. Commissaire de Police, Nimes, to ministry 
ofpolice, 14 March, 1817. 
112 A. D. Gard 6M 47. Sub prefect of Ales to Dargout, 
4 March, 1817. 
113 P. R. O. F. O. 27/155. Bulletin de Police dated 
NNImes, 7 March, 1817. This might be from Eymard. 
114 The demonstration that took place at Vezenobre, 
arrondissement of Alas was provoked by the National 
Guard of Ales, commanded by Du Roure. A. D. Gard 
Chartrier de Clausonne 331. Mss. notes of general 
Fornier d'Albe. 
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Dargout's arrival was also met by a flood of petitions, 
allegations and denunciations concerning Jouques' adminis- 
tration of the department115. 
Convinced of the concerted hostility of the Catholic 
party, Dargout began to probe into the nature and extent of 
the influence of the Societe de Bolze. He was assisted by 
Eymard, Thiers and Savagnier, three officials of the Ministry 
of Police whom Decazes had sent to. the south to support 
116 Dargout. These men soon revealed the degree of control 
the societe exercised. In the dismay that followed the 
reversal of the acquittal of Boissin, Eymard was able to 
learn from the indiscretion of de Surville at a dinner that 
Boissin's acquittal had been determined by the societe to 
avoid humiliation in the eyes of the Protestants as well as 
to ensure that Boissin did not turn state evidence in order 
to minimise his sentence. Indeed, had he not been acquitted, 
it had been decided to poison him before he could reveal the 
ll 
motivation behind the crime7. 
The National Guard of Nimes had revealed how unreliable 
it was already. ' Further investigations showed that, in 
spite of the 'reförms'Jouques had reported: 
"The National Guard of Nimes is 
composed of four thousand men, 
of whom only one fifth pay the 
taxes required for eligibility. 
115 A. D. Gard 6M 67 contains over 100 documents imputing 
unjust and arbitrary actions to Jouques and his sub- 
ordinates. 
116 A. N. F79051. Decazes to Dargout, 20 and 31 March 1817. 
ýI 
11 
A 
117 A. N. F79051. Dargout to Decazes, 24 March, 1817. 
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Four fifths are hirelings - 
porters and veterans of civil 
strife (... ) dressed in the 
uniforms they took from the 
Protestants* in-July, August 
and September 1815. Their 
officers are, broadly speaking, 
men of hatred and violent 
passions. " 118 
Far from being a guarantee of peace, the National Guard 
was a constant threat to it. 
The discovery of the secret correspond nce linking 
Nimes with the Pavillon de Marsan and other provincial 
cities 
119 
placed the organisation of Catholic royalism in 
a national context and revealed the extend of its links. 
Catholic royalism was, then, an apparently formidable 
force, and certainly one that had no intention of renouncing 
its claim on the control of the department when Dargout 
arrived. Indeed, the two years of Catholic ascendancy since 
the White terror had hardened the divisions between the com- 
munities. A visitor to Mmes noted in 1818 that "Pro- 
testant businesses only employ Protestant workers, and the 
Catholics have long made it their practice to employ only 
Catholics"120. Protestant and Catholic areas of Nimes 
were clearly segregated 
121 
and burnt out houses were a constant 
*From the members of the Garde Urhaine of the hundred days. 
118 A. N. F 790SO-Savagnier to Decazes, 2 March, 1817. 
119 See pp. 82-84 supra. 
120 La Minerve francaise, 1818. p. 324 
121 J. D. Roque, "Postitions et tendances politiques des Pro- 
testants Nimois au 19e siecle". In Droite et Gauche de 
1789 ä nos lours. (Montpellier, 1975v 
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reminder of the presence of two irreconcilable foes122. 
Dargout's task of integrating both communities into 
a harmonious society appeared impossible to achieve by re- 
lying on the good will and reason of the local population 
Some form of leadership had to be given by the government 
to the mass of the middle classes whom, Dargout believed, 
l could be brought together24 But the Protestants were 
profoundly suspicious of the Catholics and would have to be 
reassured. 
Dargout's first move to modify the relationship be- 
tween the two communities and the local administration was 
the dismissal of a small number of notorious Catholic royal- 
ists who occupied positions in the administrration that 
could impede the prefect's endeavours. Thus, he secured 
the dismissal of the secretary at the prefecture, Flotte- 
Montauban; the National Guard-commander at Uzes, de Panay; 
the commander of the Guard at Sommieres, Despouches -a 
member of the jury that had acquitted Boissin - and Gibrat, 
the police official who had been accused by the procureur 
of passing confidential reports to the societe secrete. A 
further gesture to the Protestant community was the 
122 La Minerve fran ýaise, annee 1818, p p. 405-406. 
123 A. N. F79051. Decazes to Dargout n. d. The Protestants 
should share the benefits of the community more or less 
in proportion to their numbers. It is possible to 
choose excellent people from among them, and there are, 
of course, communes where a Protestant mayor is more 
appropriate". 
124 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes. 1 August 1817. 
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withdrawal from the printer Gaude of the right to publish 
125 
. the Journal du Gard. In Dargout's own words, the dis- 
missals "produced a sensation", throwing the societe de 
Bolze into disarray and uncertainty126. Fearing a purge 
by this 'Jacobin from Paris' 127, the leaders of the societe 
de Bolze, under the guidance of Jules de Calviere, who 
journeyed to the Gard shortly after Dargout's arrival 
128, 
renewed the exaggerated cordiality they had shown the prefect 
on his arrival, trying to impress him with their reasonableness 
and good will in order to limit the extent of further desti- 
tutions which they saw as inevitable129. But the effect of 
this new volte face was more confusion in the ranks of the 
Catholic royalists. Dargout esteemed that Jules de Calviere 
125 
. 
A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 10 April 1817. 
Gäule was a staunch supporter of Catholic royalism in 
the Gard, and had recently distinguished himself by 
his ostentatious defence of Boissin as a jury member. 
Thiers, one of the agents sent to support Dargout had 
formed the opinion that a moderate, constitutional 
newspaper would help rally liberal Catholics and Pro- 
testants and present a viewpoint that had hitherto 
had no outlet (A. D. Gard 6M 44,. Thiers to Dargout, 
9 March, -1817). Consequently, the right to print the 
newspaper was given to Guibert, while Theirs was to 
write the editorials. Unfortunately, there is a lack 
of copies of the Journal du Gard for this period in 
Nimes and in Paris. 
It could be supposed that the dismissal of the strat- 
egically placed royalists would not only be seen as a 
gesture of liberalism by the Protestants, but that it 
would frighten the royalists into co-operating to some 
extent. 
126 A. N. 124 AP 2. Dargout to Eymard, 23 April, 1817. 
127 A. N. F790S1. Dargout to Decazes, 3 May, 1817. 
128 A. N. F1C III Gard 13. Dargout to Laine, 10 April, 1817. 
129 ibid. 
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was outstanding by his intelligence, skill and sang froid130, 
but these qualities were lost on the rank and file supporters. 
Accustomed to crude and unmitigated anti Protestantism, 
they failed to comprehend the overtures made by their leaders 
to a man who was perceived as a threat to Catholic supremacy 
131. 
At the same time as he worked to weaken the grip of 
the Ultra royalists, Dargout endeavoured, without much 
success, to encourage the emergence of a new leadership in 
local afaairs, based on "men who, having little or no contact 
with Paris, cannot be part of vast intrigues but instead 
use their energy and influence in the King's cause"132. Among 
such potential leaders, Dargout mentioned Esperandieu, "a 
rich manufacturer "133. The prefect also used as much in- 
fluence as he could to draw supporters away from the Societe 
de Bolze, notably the mayor of Nimes, de Vallongues, and the 
Commander of the National Guard, de Surville, both of whom 
134 Dargout considered to be misguided rather than hostile 
Indeed, Dargout even declined the offer made by Decazes to 
dismiss de Surville, because he was sure that de Surville 
could be used to moderate the attitude of the National Guard135. 
f 
130 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 10 April, 1817. 
131 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 3 June, 1817. 
132 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 1 August 1817. 
133 ibid. 
134 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 24 March 1817. Also 
A. N. F7 9050. "C1e dune Correspondance. 
135 A. N. F7 9051 Dargout to Decazes, 3 May, 24 July, 1817. 
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This attempt to impose a moderate policy in the de- 
partment and which marked the greater part of the first year 
of Dargout's administration was not rewarded with any sig- 
nificant results. Certainly, Dargout was able to provoke 
confusion and a measure of fear among the Catholic royalists, 
but he was not achieving a response from the moderates he 
pinned his hopes on. In the late Spring, Dargout commented 
in a very frank note to Eymard: 
The department is as calm as a lake. 
It is not that hatred has been ex- 
tinguisehd, but simply compressed. 
They (the N1Imois) are all frightened 
and are keeping quiet. On the other 
hand, they all detest me in the most 
polite manner possible, Protestants 
and Catholics alike. The former think 
that I have not done enough for them; 
the latter believe that I am a Jacobin. 
Anyway, it is impossible to displease 
the extremists of both camps more 
courteously. " 136 
The Catholic royalists may have been "compressed" by 
fear of further destitutions, but the societe de Bolze re- 
mained the determining factor in Catholic political attitudes 
and behaviour. Throughout the Summer of 1817, its leaders 
met regularly a t the Chateau de Vezenobres, nea r Ales, home 
of the Marquis Jacques-Alexis de Calviere, whos e wife, the 
daughter of the Count Emmanuel d e Saint Priest, member of the 
personal entour age of the duc d' Angouleme, was in touch with 
Ultra royalist circles in Paris using the code name Les 
r'' 
ýr 
ýr 
136 A. N. 124 AP 2. Dargout to Eymard, 24 May, 1817. 
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BeauxYeux 137 The Chateau was informed of the Lyon 
insurrection and had been assured that similar revolts were 
to take place in other provincial towns8. Known ex- 
13 
tremists were seen in the Gard, evidently on missions on 
behalf of the Societe de Bolze 
139 
, and ex-police official 
Gibrat, now in the service of Jules de Calviere, was steadily 
pulling Vallongues into the sphere of extreme royalism 
140, 
to the point where Vallongues was publicly hostile to Dargout141, 
Moreover, the deteriorating economic situation gave the 
leaders an opportunity to strengthen their popular support by 
alleviating the hardship of the working population of the 
14 
towns 20 
In November, Dargout was obliged to admit that although 
the extremists were fewer in number, "they are less subdued 
!Y' 
137 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 18 June, 1817. Also 
A. N. F7 9050. "Cle dune corre pondance" 
138 This uprising, ostensibly inspired by Bonapartists, 
involved General Canuel and the Prefect of the Rhöne, 
Chabrol, both known Ultra royalist sympathisers. See 
de Sauvigny, La Restauration, p p. 148-149. 
139 Carteras, Magnier, Lavondes and Boissin were observed on 
-several occasions between Nimes and 
Marseille in July and 
August. A. N. F7 9051. Dargout reports 24 July, 8 August, 
J81 7, 
140 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 6 August, 1817. 
141 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes , 27 October, 1817. 
142 A bankrupt draper, Fajon, who had joined the societe 
de Bolze in 1815 was often seen cashing bank drafts on 
Jules de Calviere and Rene de Bernis. He distributed 
the money among the poorer Nationa Guards and the people 
of the Catholic Bourgades. A. N. F 9051. Dargout to 
Decazes, 19 December, 1917. 
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than I had imagined "143. Moreover, the parliamentary session 
of 1817 had stimulated political polemic once more. For 
144 
their part, the Protestant middle classes were no more con- 
vinced of the success of Dargout's policy. As 1817 drew to 
a close, a Protestant lawyer, Fornier de Clausonne, noted: 
"Monsieur le prefet is full of good 
intentions, but he is surrounded by 
men who have great interest in hiding 
the truth from him. Some are in the 
higher ranks of the National Guard, 
others are in the administration, still 
others in the courts. All these men 
belong to the Societe de Bolze, which 
is supported by the National Guards, 
among whom there are some three hundred 
porters, shoe shines and road sweepers. " 145. 
The lack of success was all the more disappointing 
against the perspective of legislative elections due to be 
held in the Gard in the Autumn of 1818. 
In February 1817, the government had won a majority 
for its bill modifying the electoral system. Henceforth, 
there would be only one electoral assembly in each department 
and one fifth of the Chamber of Deputies would be renewed 
each year. The first measure increased the prefect's 
ability'to 'monitor' the proceedings, and, according to 
some commentators, facilitated the attendance of the urban 
bourgeoisie - the shopkeepers and professional classes 
143 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 27 October, 1817. 
144 Ibid. 
145 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 331. H. Fornier 
de Clausonne to Fornier d'Albe, n. d. 
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who were more likely to be liberals146, The second feature 
ensured that , -, here could be no durable and obstructive group 
in the Chamber, but that there would be a continual renewal 
of membership. The first partial renewal had taken place 
in September 1-817 and the Right had lost a dozen seats to 
the government's candidates. The Gard was one of the 
departments affected by the second partial renewal, and it 
was clear that victory or defeat would have great significance 
for the Constitutionalists and for extreme royalists. At 
the close of 1817, Dargout realised that he would not be 
able to temper the political antagonisms in the department, 
but, on the contrary, he would have to contest the election 
against the Ultra royalist party and wrest the departmental 
representation from its clutch in order to bring moderates 
into public office. In November 1817, Dargout wrote: 
"There are 1 200 electors, of whom 
some 400 will do what the gov- 
ernment wishes. The trick will 
lie in creaming off from the 
remaining 700 enough people to 
achieve a majority. " 147 
146 The electoral proceedings could last several days 
because of the need to elect the committee, swear the 
required oath and receive the president's communications. 
This fact, in addition to the distances involved in 
travelling to the chef lieu of the department on bad 
roads, allegedly thinned out the supporters of the 
extreme right, who were chiefly from a rural background. 
c. f. R. Remond, La Vie politicue en France 1789 - 1848 
(vol. 1, Paris, 1.965), pp. 2lI-5. 
Also: Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, p 144. 
147 A. N. 124 AP 2. Dargout to Eymard, 15 Novew! -, er, 1817. 
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He saw clearly the need to have a reliable administration, 
and so planned to make a number of changes 
148. Above all, 
he had to destroy the influence of the Secret Society, and 
had to do so by reducing its most powerful weapon, the 
14 National Guard 9. 
The prefect's attention had been drawn to the question 
of the National Guard shortly after he arrived in Nimes in 
February 1817, and he was aware of its importance to the 
Secret Society. Indeed, Decazes, the minister of Police, 
had given Dargout a file on the Guard, composed by agents 
of the Police ministry operating incognito in the Gard 
and neighbouring departments in 1816150 as a result of the 
prolonged unrest in the area, and the prefect had instructions 
to investigate the matter in depth. 
Since the Summer of 1815, the National Guard of the 
department had been nothing less than the military arm of 
the Societe de Bolze. In spite of the reorganisations and 
148 A. N. F7 9041. Dargout to minister of police, 26 Nov- 
emh'er, 1817: "1 shall not omit anything in order to 
realise the will of the government (... ) and I shall 
operate all the changes necessary to exert my influence 
on the electorate". 
149 A. N. 124 AP 2. Dargout to Eymard, 15 November, 1817. 
' major obstacle is the national guard leader- 
ship which disposes of the votes of all the electors 
in it". 
150 A. N. F7 9050. Dargout to Decazes, 8 April, 1817. 
ýý 
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purges Darbaud Jouques claimed to have operatedl5l because 
Ü 
of the manifest inability or unwillingness to discharge its 
duties impartially, the Guard continued to be composed largely 
of elements drawn from the Miquelet battalions, having lost 
only the more notorious criminals like Carteras, Lavondes 
and Quatretaillons152. That its own conception of its role as 
a partisan militia had not changed is clear from its internal 
correspondence and from the reports of the three Police 
officials, Eymard, Savagnier and Thiers. 
In the Arrondissement of Le Vigan, where there was a 
majority of Protestants everywhere except in the town of Le 
Vigan itself 153, there was never a full strength National 
Guard contingent because the Etat major refused to enrol 
151 The 'reorganisations' took place between September 1815 
and December 1815. In September, the Mi uelet 
companies who formed a large part of the Armee royale 
de Beaucaire were given the choice of seeking integration 
into the regular structure of the National Guard or of 
dispersing. In December, a further reorganisation was 
thrust upon Jouques by the government and the duc 
d'Angouleme after the riot that accompanied the reopening 
of the Protestant church in Nimes and the attempt on 
the life of General Lagarde. 
152 
153 
In January 1816, Jouques reported the 'excellent views' 
of the Guard, its 'perfect discipline'. He stressed 
that it was not the sectarian body reports had made it 
seem. A. N. F7 9052. to the minister of interior, 16 
January, 1$16. 
A. N. F7 9050. Savagnier to minister of police, 2' 
March, 1817. 
D. Robert, op. cit., p. 149 
., ý- -- - 
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Protestantsl54. Applications for commissions in the Guard 
reveal the qualities required of the officers by the Etat 
major: Victor Arnal, captain of the Guard detachment drawn 
from the communes of La Nuejols, Saint Sauveur and Revens, 
attached to the 4th Alzon company, had emigrated to Spain 
in 1791 and had fought in the Armee de Conde and Armee des 
15 Princes until 1796 before returning to France in 18015. 
Jean Louis Sauzet, in his application for a commission in the 
company formed at Saint Andre de Majencoules, stressed that 
he had been among the first to volunteer with the duc 
d' Angouleme in March 1815156. 
Such ardent royalism was marked by a high degree of 
militancy. Almost immediately after the reorganisation of 
the Guard in December 1815, de Vogüe addressed a memorandum 
to the arrondissement commanders, requesting a list of men 
who could be mobilised, if required, for three months. He 
emphasised that it was a precaution, and one that had to be 
treated with the utmost secrecy, going no further than the 
154 A. D. Gard. IE 966. Charles de Vogüe, inspector of 
the national guard of the Gard, to the Marquis Jean 
Charles d'Assas, Commander of the national guard of 
Le Vigan, 17 January,, 1817 (n. b. this is after the 
report referred to in footnote 151). De Vog e states 
that Le Vigan is an arrondissement in which "half the 
inhabitants could not be considered for service because 
of their political opinions". 
There are other examples of discrimination. Aigues 
Vives, a Protestant town of 1637 inhabitants had only 
9 guards, while Redessan, a7Catholic village of 792 
inhabitants had 99. A. N. F 9051, Dargout to minister 
of police, May, 1818. 
155 A. D. Gard IE 966. "Etat des services du Sr. Victor Arna1'. 
156 A. D. Gard IE 966. J-L Sauzet to Ch. de Vogiie, 18 June, 1816. 
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ears of chefs de bataillon157. In Nimcs itself, the Guard 
permanently manned two cannons in the square in front of the 
city hall, and some of its members affixed slogans like: 
'Les Bourbon ou la Mort' above their doorslsg. The presence 
of 16 000 armed men 
159 
of that disposition was far from 
offering guarantees of peace and order. Indeed, Savagnier 
noted that the Royalists of Nimes were using the methods of 
160 1793 in order to undo the results of 1793. 
In Uzes and Ales, the character of the Guard was no 
better. The Uzes Guard was composed exclusively of Catholics, 
some of whom had been publicly associated with Quatretaillons. 
None of the 46 000 Protestants in the arrondissement appeared 
l6 to belong to the Guard l. In Ales, many of the guardsmen 
were unemployed ex Miquelets who were being subsidised from 
contributions levied on the Protestant community which was 
162- 
not represented in the Guard. 
Shortly after Dargout's arrival, and while seconding 
the prefect in his inquiries, Eymard was able to establish 
the links between the National Guard, its commanders and the 
Societe de Bolze. The undercover correspondence between the 
society's committee and the Ultra royalist committees in 
157 A. D. Lozere 3F 600. Du Roure, Colonel of the Ales Legion 
to baron de Gras, commander of the 4th bat. 31 January, 
1816. 
158 A. N. F7 9054. Savagnier to the minister of police, 2 
March, 1817. 
159 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, May, 1818. 
160 A. N. F7 9054. Savagnier to minister of. police, 2 March, 1817. 
161 A. N. F7 9050. Eymard to minister of police, 3 May, 1817. 
162 Ibid. 
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Paris revealed that the National Guard was being kept in 
readiness by the local royalists, and that its overwhelming 
l6 Catholic membership was far from accidental 
3. De Vog'üe 
and the commanders at Nimes and Ales, de Surville and du 
Roure were members of the secret society. The Guards were 
referred to 'Les chiens de Michel et d'Ales' while the 
Catholic population was called 'les Romarins'164. At the 
same time, Dargout discovered that the company based on the 
Saint Gilles area had been falsifying its rolls in order to 
obtain more funds from the municipality165. 
Faced with this disturbing picture, Dargout and his 
aides gave serious consideration to dissolving the National 
166 Guard , but Dargout believed that the 
sudden and complete 
dissolution of the guard so soon after the appointment of a new 
prefect would destroy his chances of negotiating with the 
ultras, would raise the expectations of the Protestants to a 
dangerous level, and could provoke the Catholics into starting 
a civil war7. It was known that the Guards had gone on 
16 
an alert when the change of prefect was known, and that they 
l6 
had, in some places, demonstrated against the change8. 
163 A. N. F7 9051. Eymard to minister of police, 4 April, 1817. 
164 A. N. F7 9050., it Cle du ne correspondance! Michel (les chiens 
de Michel et .d 
'Ales) was the code name used by de Vogue. 
165 A. D. Gard 6M 33. Dar gout tomininster of police, 3 April, 1817 
166 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of interior, 8 April, 1817, 
167 A. N. Flc III G ard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 
8 -ril, 1817. 
I 
168. See pp. 132-133 supra. 
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Dargout, therefore, decided to pursue the same policy with 
regard to the National Guard that he pursued in other areas 
of public administration, namely, a combination of persuasion 
and threat, designed to woo as many people as possible from 
the influence of the Societe de Bolze, and to dismiss those 
who totally rejected co-operation and moderation. Such a 
policy, Dargout thought, was more likely to heal divisions 
than a thorough purge of suspected-Ultra royalists would. 
In this spirit, Dargout assiduously wooed de Surville, the 
commander of the largest contingent, that of Nimes, whom he 
felt was attached to the Societe out of weakness rather than 
conviction169 and who was, in the Prefect's view, a stabilising 
force in the otherwise highly volatile Guard and so worth 
keeping at its head in the short term170. He did not hesitate 
however, to obtain the dismissal of two other local commanders, 
de Pancay of Uzes and Despouches of Sommieres, when he felt 
171 
that they were resisting his policies. 
169 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 24 March, 1817., H 
"It is in his interest to follow the wishes of the king, 
but he isýembarassed by the links he contracted with the 
most extreme Catholics'". 
170 ibid. "He is, of all the Nimois, the one most concerned 
that the National Guard should behave correctly". 
171 Both men were dismissed in accordance with Dargout's 
powers over the provisionally organised Guard. De Pan; ay 
had openly rejected Dargout's suspension of four Guards- 
men for breach of discipline; Despouches was president of 
another National Guard disciplinary committee which, 
according to Dargout, took a light view of breaches of 
discipline. Despouches had also voted the acquittal"of 
Boissin. A. N. F1 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 
25 April, 1817. 
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The prefect and his aides considered that their strong- 
est weapon was the continued temporary status of the Nat- 
ional Guard in the department. Because of the history of 
disturbances involving the corps, and the repeated attempts 
to reorganise i to permanent status and the corresponding 
degree of autonomy had been witheld. Such important areas 
as finance and internal discipline had been entrusted 
to the prefect, and Dargout believed he could use these 
extraordinary powers to weed out the undesirable elements 
in the Guard, and to broaden its membership to include 
the Protestant middle classes. 
172 However, the Guard's 
Etat major was aware of its vulnerability, and made det- 
ermined efforts to minimise Dargout's interference in its 
internal business. At the same time, the commanders 
pressed for the permanent status that would free them from the 
172. A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police (decazes), 
8 April , 1817. 
A. N. F1CIII Gard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 
8 April, 1817. 
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prefect's scrutiny. 173 At the end of the year, Dargout 
was still unable to report any improvement in the National 
Guard's outlook, and he had to admit, too, that he had 
achieved less than he hoped in his efforts to win some 
"reasonable" Nimois away from the secret society. 
174 Indeed, 
the dismissal of two company commanders, and the close 
scrutiny of the Guard's budget and accounts had augment- 
ed the hostility of the corps to the prefect, and had 
strengthened the resolve of the royalists to consolidate 
the Guard. As soon as Dargout questioned the Guard's 
173 Dargout reported: "They did all in their power to 
hide from me details of their accounts and expend- 
iture". A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 
May, 1818. 
Both sides were clearly aware of the importance of this 
special powr Dargout enjoyed. In another letter, he 
wrote: "If this power (dismissal) is denied me, the 
Guard would be free to function as if it were per- 
manently organised and, using its inviolability, would 
be impossible to control". A. N. Flc III Gard 13. 
To minister of interior, 8 April, 1817. Dargout 
emphasised that the Etat-Major had not refused Jouques 
the very same powers A. N. F7 9051. Letter to minister 
of police, _8 
April, 1817. 
To counter Dargout's efforts, the Etat-Major produced 
letters, allegedly written by Kentzinger, Chief of 
Staff, promising that the organisation would be sanc- 
tioned soon at the request of the Comte d'Artois himself. 
The Guards were told that Insignia and colours were 
to be offered by the Duchesse d'Angouleme in honour 
of the brave Miquelets of Nimes. A. N. F7 9051. Dargout 
to minister of Police, 18 April, 1817. 
The letters were effective, for Dargout noted that 
in one day, the work of the previous month had been 
undone. A. N. 124 AP 1. Dargout to Eymard, 21 April, 
1817. 
174 A. N. F1cIII Gard 7. Dargout to minister of interior, 
January, 1818. 
129 
expenditure, de Vogüe instructed his arrondissement commanders 
to use their personal influence and "that of any other person 
devoted to the royal cause" to overcome any possible ob- 
jections from the finance committeesF5 
The obstacle that a unified and buoyant National Guard 
would put in the way of Dargout's election arrangements was 
clear. Apart from controlling the way the Catholic electors, 
nearly all of whom were in the Guard, would cast their vote, 
the Guard offered the Secret Society the perfect means of 
making their own electoral-arrangements in the countryside 
by providing a 'parallel' administration to thwart the en- 
deavours of the prefect. As the 'campaign' gathered mo- 
mentum, Dargout felt certain that, unless the Ultra royalists 
were sure of a clear majority, the Guard would be used to 
intimidate Protestant electors176 as it had done in 1790 and 
in August 1815. 
The recalcitrant attitude of the Catholic royalists and 
the pressure of time forced Dargout to. adopt the harsh 
measures he had rejected initially - destitution of officials 
who were not committeed to the government, and the disbanding 
of the National Guard. 
In a detailed memorandum to the ministers of Police and 
Interior, Dargout made his proposalsl77 The dissolution 
would have to take place before the election in October so 
i 
ýp 
1. 
175 A. D. Gard IE 966. De Vogue to Marquis d'Assas, 11 October,, 
1818. 
176 A. N. F7 9051. Memorandum on the organisation and political 
character of the National Guard, written by Dargout and 
addressed to the ministers of police (Decazes) and Interior 
(Laine), May, 1818. 
177 ibid . 
130 
that the threat would be gone and the Societaires dis- 
concerted; it would also need to be carried out when there 
would be the least possibility of trouble. August was pro- 
posed as a time when the political class in the department 
would have dispersed to its country residences after the 
Beaucaire fair which was scheduled to take place during 
the last week of July. The reasons given for the dis- 
solution should not be the unreliability of the Guard or its 
sectarian composition and outlook. Such a statement would 
be considered as a Protestant victory and would lead to civil 
strife. The dissolution could be justified amply by the 
evidence of fraud Dargout had gathered17g A strong con- 
tingent of regular troops should be present - the Beaucaire 
fair would justify their presence in the department, and a 
list of moderate officers should be drwan up so that they 
could be decorated for their services and exert a pacifying 
influence at the time of dissolution. 
The ordinance dissolving the department's National Guard 
was issued on 26 July. Its contents were known throughout 
the department early on Sunday 1 August, a day Dargout 
179 had chosen as most people would be resting or absent. 
Detailed instructions were sent to the sub prefects, whom 
Dargout had changed the previous Christmas, concerning the 
178 Besides the inflation of budgets and the falsification 
of rolls, Dargout had discovered that the Etat major 
had been actively involved in the extortion of contributions 
from certain communes in 1815. Baragnon, an eminent 
lawyer who defended Boissin, had signed letters demanding 
2000 francs in July 1815. A. N. FiCIII Gard 13. Dargout 
to minister of police, 9 September, 1817. 
179 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 
3 August, 1818. 
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collection of powder and weapons, which was Dargout's greatest 
180 
concern 
Other than one minor riot in the town of Ales, involving 
a recalcitrant artillery company and resulting in eighteen 
arrests 
181, 
there were no serious reactions to the ordinance, 
and the disarming was carried out smoothly. The Etat 
182 
major did try to counter the allegations of corruption, 
however. De Vogue instructed his commanders to present 
"a single figure" representing the sums paid to the National 
Guard out of the municipal budgets183 and wrote to baron 
Kentzinger to protest. But it was a rearguard action and 
184 
one that came to nothing, for the National Guards knew that 
the prefect enjoyed the support of the government and of the 
king. Indeed, the smooth dissolution of such an apparently 
bellicose and committed organisation must be seen against 
the background of national affairs if one is to comprehend 
it. 
The affaire of the Note secrete 
185 had just resulted in 
the dismissal of the Ultra royalist minister Vitrolles and 
had allowed the government to discredit the group of Ultras 
who advised the Comte d'Artois. Shortly afterwards, the 
180 A. D. Gard 6M 34. Dargout to minister of police, 3 August, 1818 
181 P. R. O. F. O. 27/85. Bulletin de Police, Nimes, 5 August, 
- 1818. 
182 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, '17 August, 1818. 
183 A. D. Gard Ie 966. De Vogue to Marquis d'Assas, 3 August, 1818. 
184 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 
14 September, 1818. 
1&5 See p. 105 supra. 
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Conspiration du bord de 1'eau, a rumoured plot to kidnap 
the king, implicated the ultras once more and provoked a 
serious rupture between the king and his brother, who was 
also commander in chief of the National Guards of France. 
In such circumstances, there was little chance that the 
Catholic royalists of the Gard would be treated sympathetic- 
ally by a government that was depicting their Paris leaders 
as a threat to democracy. On the contrary, the dissolution 
of the National Guard heralded strong measures to be taken 
against the whole National Guard structure in France. In 
September, an ordinance was issued which removed the force 
from the authority of the Comte d'Artois and his Etat-major 
and decentralised it, placing the guards in the control of 
the departmental authorities. Mayors and prefects were 
invited to recompose their local guards as they saw fit. 
Paradoxically, this measure which was intended to remove from 
the control of the Pavillon de Marsan a centrally commanded 
and disciplined armed force, would, in the near future, ad- 
mirably suit the theoretical and tactical predilections of 
the Ultra royalists for decentralisation. In 1816, the duc 
d'Angouleme, writing from Nimes, criticised the idea of a 
National Guard as a Jacobin concept, "the blind instrument of 
the first man who brandishes the slogans Liberty and Equality 
that is, Disorder and Pillage". Instead, he proposed the 
creation of local companies, picked and commanded by local 
133 
gentlemen186. In the years after the 1820 reaction, the 
formation of such companies was facilitated by the nomination 
of Ultra royalist mayors and prefects. Indeed, the Gard 
contingent was a prototype of this kind of local militia 
taking orders from the local gentry. Even though it had 
been officially disbanded and disarmed in 1818, its organis- 
atiop was maintained, and its officers met regularly187, 
making it possible for a Catholic, Carlist militia to take 
to the streets in 1830 after the July Revolution, still 
188 largely under the orders of the leaders of 1817 
186 A. N. 239 AP (Papiers Vaublanc). Angouleme to Vaublanc, 
January,, 1816. 
187 A. N. FIcIII Gard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 
14 September, 1818. 
On 25 August, the Fete St. Louis, the Ntmesofficers 
-attended mass in a group, according to tradition, but 
in civilian clothes. A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister 
of police, 26 August, 1818. 
A batal l ion commander from St. Andre, arrondissement of Le Vigan, 
wrote that his batallion of 354 men would be always 
ready to rally if the interest of the throne was at 
stake. A. D. Gard 1E 966. Chabbat, chef de bataillon, 
St. Andre to Marquis d'Assas, '17 September, 18 18. 
188 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Montalivet, director of Police, to 
Chapert, prefect of the Gard, 20 January, 1831. Re- 
ferring to the troubles in Nimes at the time of the July 
revolution, Montalivet said: "de Surville, ex-colonel of 
the National Guard, offered to put two thousand armed men 
at the disposal of the (Bourbon) prefect within twenty 
four hours". 
Mouzet fils, writing in December 1830, assured the 
Minister for War that the Marquis de Valfons was storing 
three hundred muskets that used to belong to the National 
Guard. A. D. Gard 6M 103. 
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In the"short term, however, the dissolution was con- 
sidered to have been a major factor in Dargout's electoral 
preparation, obviating the possibility of intimidation by 
the Societe de Bolze at election time, and demoralising 
many Ultra royalist supporters at a time when great cohesion 
and determination were required. 
189 
The election of 1818 was the first one in which the 
Catholic royalists were facing an organised and powerful 
opponent. After two years of unchallenged supremacy they 
were being forced to adopt a defensive stand in what was to 
be a 'modern' election, in which both contestants committed 
themselves uncompromisingly to the task of winning at all 
costs the three seats the department held in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
In some ways, the struggle was more straightforward 
for the extreme royalists than it was for the prefect, whose 
ambition to create a non sectarian moderate party entailed 
not only the elimination of the Secret society's influence 
on the Catholic population, but also the manoeuvering of the 
still skeptical Protestant community into a partnership with 
the liberal Catholics. When the initial deliberations 
190 
were held by the political class in the Gard, three distinct 
electoral lists emerged. 
present the former prefect, 
The Ultra royalists intended to 
the Marquis D'Arbaud Jouques, 
189 A. D. Gard 6M 36. Sainte Colombe, sub prefect of Ales, 
to Dargout, 8 September, 1818. The letter mentions 
that some Ultra royalists are so depressed that they see 
no purpose in going to Nimes to vote. 
190 AN. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 20 Mlarch, 1818 
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General Donnadieu and Jules de Calviere191. 
Dargout hoped to present on behalf of the government 
the Marquis d'Aramon, a liberal Catholic landowner, Chabaud 
Latour, a Protestant, ex-Girondin and imperial baron, and 
baron Reynaud Lascours, prefect of the Gers 
2. To the 
19 
Left, however, the Independents had produced a list of their 
own: Baron d'Alphonse, the bonapartist commissaire extra- 
ordinaire in the Gard during the Hundred Days, and two Pro- 
testant Generals from the department who had gained fame 
during the wars of the Empire, Fornier d'Albe and Vignolles193. 
This third list was, in effect that of the Protestants, and 
Dargout would have to persuade them to abandon it if he 
wanted to secure the election of his own candidates. 
Conscious of the task that faced him, the prefect 'opened' 
the campaign by securing the dismissal of the sub prefects 
of Ales and Uzes and the mayor of Nimes 
19 The men he 
chose to replace them were trustworthy and acceptable to the 
Protestants 195. The measure produced a sharp reaction from 
191 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 26 December, 1817 
Donnadieu was born in Nimes and was the hero of the Ultras 
at the time. Both Trinquelague and de VogU had lost 
favour with the local organisation because they had seemed 
to put personal interests before those of the 'cause'. (A. N 
F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 20 April, 1818). 
192 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 26 December, 
1817. 
193 Ibid. 
194 All three men, Narbonne Lara (Uzes), Darnand Vallabrix 
(Ales) and Vallongues (N4mes) were associated with the 
secret society and were in a position to supply 
it with 
confidential information. 
195 A. N. Flb II Gard 15. Dargout to minister of police, Decembe 181; ' 
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the Catholic royalists. In Ales, the National Guard was 
involved in demonstrations designed to embarrass the Pro- 
testants196 and in Nimes, Vallongues attempted to provoke 
the resignation of the staff of the city hall197. Dargout 
capitalised on the effect of-these unexpected dismissals198 
to pressure as many members as possible to break their ties 
with the Secret Society, and so to weaken it further9. 
19 
The Society began to experience other setbacks, too. 
Since Dargout had cut back the budget for the National Guard, 
there was no longer a surplus which could be used by the 
Society to buy the services of the Catholic working classes 
as there had been in previous years. The sudden loss of 
funds, on which many of the unemployed and poorly paid Nimois 
depended, loosened some useful popular support for the Society 
and even led to criticism of the Royalist leaders for not 
making any personal financial sacrifices for the cause 
200. 
Moreover, one of the Society's election candidates, 
Darb and Jouques, had published an account of his term as 
196 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, Decazes, 5 December, 1817. 
197 Ibid. 
198 A. N. Flb II Gard 15. Dargout report ed that the Ultras were 
consternated. (5 December, 1817, tä Decazes). 
199 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 4 February, 1818 
Dargout noted that he was wooing de Surville as his 
defection to the government's caus e would be of great 
value. 
200 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 20 April, 1818. The 
prefect learned this from Fajon, a member of the Society 
who had agreed to collaborate with the prefect. De Bernis, 
de Vogue, and J-A de Calviere were under attack. 
4 
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prefect of the Gard from August 1815 to February 181; 201. 
According to the new mayor of Nimes, Laboissiere, the pam- 
phlet had been sponsored by the Society in order to revive 
the passions of 1815 and to remind the Catholics of the per- 
fidy and treachery of the Protestants with whom the present 
prefect was encouraging union202. However, Jouques, in his 
endeavours to justify his actions and to portray himself as 
the victim of a plot, had admitted that over-zealous Royalists 
had indeed committed criminal and unworthy deeds during the 
period that had been called the White Terror. This ad- 
mission incurred the anger of members of the Society, and 
Jouques lost his support in the election, leaving the Catholics 
without a clear list around which to rally their dwindling 
support3. The shortage of money, the defection and wavering 
20 
of many former sympathisers who had never before been offered 
a reasonable alternative to Catholic royalism, and the ap- 
parent disloyalty of the leaders204 provoked a rift between 
the leadership and its following. Dargout, who followed 
the developments within the party closely, noted: 
201 Darbaud Jouques, Troubles et ' Agitations " 
202 A. D. Gard 6M S. Laboissiere to Dargout, lS April, 1818. 
203 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 20 April, 
1818. 
204 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 22 June, 
1818. There were now doubts about Trinquelague, Jouques 
and de Vogue. 
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"Fajon (the informer) said something 
I had often noted myself: the aristo- 
crats are not loved by the Ultras. The 
party has no desire to be exploited for the benefit of the nobility alone. 
Its members hope to win some personal 
advantage from their resistance to 
the King's will. The spirit of 
Republicanism is present-even here, 
in the midst of those who would 
destroy the Charterin order to restore 
the old system" 205. 
Indeed, in those circumstances, some members of the Catholic 
royalist party were prepared to adopt a stratagem that would 
be used by the Legitimists many years later - an alliance 
with the Independents to block the Constitutionalists and 
6, 20 
ensure at least some representation at Paris 
In contrast to the increasing difficulties of the 
Catholic royalists, Dargout's own electoral endeavours were 
crowned with success. Assured by Fajon of the success his 
measures against the Secret Society were achieving, the 
prefect gave his attention to the question of rallying the 
Protestants. This he managed by seeking the co-operation 
of the Protestant clergy through the synods207 and by 
arranging soirees attended by people of the two confessions 
whom; he hoped to coalesce In both endeavours, Dargout 
208 
a 
was able to point to his success in weakening the Secret 
Society as a token of his sincerity. 
205 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 20 April, 1818. 
206 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 22 June, 1818. 
207 A. N. F1CIII Gard 7. Note sur la situation dans le 
partement, l818. 
208 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 
30 January, 1818 
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Shortly before the elections, Dargout dealt his most 
crippling blows when he dissolved the National Guard and so 
deprived the Ultra royalists of the chance of obstructing the 
elections, and when he dismissed some forty-four mayors as a 
precautions in case the royalists attempted subversion after 
the election209. Indeed, Dargout was so zealous that his 
activities caused some amazement even on the part of Liberals210 
so ill accustomed was society to the blatant canvassing of 
electors211 and the pressuring of public officials that was 
to become such a regular occurrence in French political life. 
Dargout even went to the trouble of printing a pamphlet 
that parodied a leaflet distributed by the Secret Society 'in 
2 
order to turn M. de Calvi6re's efforts to ridicule'12. 
Deprived of resources, access to electors and effective 
promises, the Catholic royalists were reduced to anger and 
frustration. As a last resort, they spread rumours that the 
209 A. N. F1bI Gard 4. Dargout memorandum to minister of 
police, June 1818. 
210 "The prefect is working for the election, and in a 
manner that is quite scandalous. He does not try 
to conceal that he is doing all he can to achieve his 
goal. He is the director of this election". A. D. 
Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317. H. Fornier de 
Clausonne to. general Fornier d'Albe, 8 September, 
1818. 
211 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 16 June, 1818. 
Tie prefect recounted that he had taken advantage of a 
number of performances in Nimes of Talma, the actress, 
to speak to the electors who attended the theatre. He 
claimed he had "cathechised" over 
forty. 
212 A. N. 124 AP2. Dargout to Eymard, 17 October, 1818. 
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government was on the point of collapse213, threatened to 
prevent the elections from taking place and to 'punish' any 
voters who dared to attend 
214 
and attempted to intimidate 
the Protestant population of Nimes, where the middle classes 
215 had been most influenced by Dargout's policy. 
In spite of the threats, the list proposed and supported 
216 by Dargout was elected in its entirety. The result was 
nothing less than a disaster for the Catholics, and their 
reaction to this confirmation of their loss of power was as 
characteristic as it was pathetic. On the one hand, novenas 
were made, praying that God would come to the aid of religion 
and the throne217; on the other, physical and verbal assaults 
on Protestants took place, resulting in the'knifing of 
three Protestants 
218. 
214 A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 9 September 181A. 
215 A. N. F7 9050. A Police report for September 1818 records 
bands of men and women roaming the streets shouting 
aggressive and insulting slogans. 
216 A. N. F1C III Gard 4. Election of 26 October, 1818. 
Of 1565 eligible voters, 1385 attended. The results 
were: 
Saint Aulaire* 963 
Chabaud Latour 949 
Reynaud Lascours 937 
*Stood instead of the Marquis d'Aramon. 
The Ultras, finally put up Trinquelague 398 
J. de Calviere 410 
Ch. de Vogue 433 
217 A. N. F7 9050. Bulletin de Police, October, 1818. 
218 Ibid. 
A 
ýh 
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Chapter 4. 
Complete electoral defeat left the Catholic royalists 
without even the representation an opposition party might 
hope for. But their tradition and policies, based on sec- 
tarianism, made them particularly ill-suited and ill-inclined 
to accept the role of an opposition party within the frame- 
work of a constitutional monarchy. As in 1790, the Catholic 
party had experienced defeat because of the cens, which 
denied the vote to their lower class co-religionists and 
enhanced the political strength of the Protestants. After 
the defeat of 1790, the Catholics had taken up arms in an 
endeavour to redress the balance; in 1818, such a course of 
action was out of the question. All over the country, the 
party of the counter revolution was being eclipsed, largely 
because of the effects of the 1817 electoral law which had 
extended the vote to a record number of citizens - 110 000 
in all - and favoured the more liberal middle classes'. 
Decazes, whose influence on the king was notorious, and who 
had sought to establish the ministry on the support of the 
'centre left' since the dissolution of the Chambre introuvable 
i 
1 The size of the electorate during the Bourbon 
Restoration was: 
1815 1817 1820 1824 1827 
70 000 110 000 105 000 99 000 89 000 
R. Remond, La Vie politi gue, I, p. 296. 
," 
A list of electors in the Gard in 1817 shows that 251 
were commercants and fabricants; a further 796 had 
"other professions" and only 237 came from the magistrature, 
church and legal professions. 
A. D. Gard 2M 10. Classification des electeurs. 
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in an attempt to end the antagonism between the 'two Frances', 
had emerged as the chief architect of policy in the cabinet 
after the resignation in December 1818 of the duc de Richelieu. 
Whilst the rather unimpressive Dessolles held the title of 
president of the council, Decazes accumulated control of the 
ministries of the Interior and Police, so acquiring the 
greatest possible control over internal security. Relations 
between the King and Artois, always strained, were exceedingly 
bad since the Note secrete and the Bord de l'Eau, and Monsieur 
had been stripped of his command of the National Guard because 
so many of the rather romanesque conspiracies of the Ultra 
royalists led back to his own entourage in the Pavillon de 
Marsan2. The Catholic royalists of the Gard were particularly 
handicapped by the disarming of their own armed force, the 
National Guard, and by the fact that one of the new deputies, 
Saint Aulaire, was Decazes' father in law. 
With national and local events against them, the 
Catholic royalists adopted the tactics they had used in 1814, 
when the First Restoration had disappointed them. Sectarian 
antagonism was kept alive and fostered by the Ultras to 
prevent any lasting union growing from the liberal electoral 
alliance Dargout had forged. The men of 1815 were seen 
again in the countryside on mysterious and disquieting errands; 
meetings were organised to generate fear that a new White 
2 P. Reboul, in Chäteaubriand et le Conservateur 
(Paris, 1973), glves a survey of Ultra royalist intrigues 
and of Artois' involvement in Chapters II and III. 
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Terror was being planned3. 
Besides maintaining constant and unsettling pressure 
on the community, the Ultras seized every opportunity to 
make their intentions known, to provoke unrest that might 
lead to open conflict. Thus, the Mardi Gras festivities 
were exploited for the purpose of disturbing the peace, and, 
in March 1819, the visit to Nimes of Huet, an actor known 
for his Ultra-royalist sympathies, led to serious rioting 
that followed an all too familiar pattern. The performance 
given on 7 March, 1819 was attended by a group of men, de- 
scribed variously as porters4 and "_proletaires"S, led by one 
known as sac ä merde. They were all wearing white cocades 
in their hats, and throughout-the performance, they profered 
royalist slogans of the kind that had "heralded the murders 
of 1815". After the performance, the group repaired to a 
cafe opposite the theatre, where a crowd of some two hundred 
3. A. N. - 124 AP2. Eymard to Decazes, 2 February 1819. 
Magnier, Carteras and a Marseillais called Battaglia 
were particularly active. On 22 January, a meeting 
was held and was attended by some six hundred persons 
"of the class that, in the events of 1815 distinguished 
themselves by their cruelty". 
In an effort to flaunt the prefect's attempts to foster 
more understanding between the communities, the Ultras 
organised rival soirees attended by such staunch anti 
Protestants as Souchon, Vampere and Aurillon. A. D. Gard 
Chartrier de Clausonne 317. H. Fornier d'albe to general 
Fornier d'Albe, 16 February, 1819. 
4 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317. H. Fornier de 
Clausonne to Fornier d'Albe family, 15 March, 1819. 
5 E. Masse Les Protestants de Nismes et leurs persecuteurs, 
oü relation circonstanciee des dernler5troubles de cette 
yille. (Paris 1819). p. 14. 
6 Ibid. 
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gathered quickly. Sporadic cries of 'Vive Charles X: ' were 
heard7, and the efforts of the police to disperse the crowd 
failed8. The situation became precarious when a crowd of 
Protestants formed on the other side of the Boulevard de 
la Comedie. 9 
Similar scenes took place the next evening, and Nimes 
was on the brink of open conflict. After the recent po- 
litical changes in the department and in the country as a 
whole, the Protestants, far from being intimidated by the 
Catholics, retaliated from a newly acquired position of 
strength. Fornier de Clausonne noted: 
"This time the Protestants will 
have no thoughts of hiding. 
They proclaim loudly that they will 
not let themselves be slaughtered 
as they did in 1815: " 10 
Indeed, by the second night of the distrubances, Cevenol 
Protestants were arriving in Nimes in considerable numbers 
to defend their brethren, repeating the events that had led, 
in 1790, to the bagarre that took some three hundred lives" . 
A curfew was imposed on the city on 12 March, but it did 
not prevent two deaths on the fourteenth, when-a Catholic mob 
7 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317. H. Fornier 
de Clausonne to Fornier d'Albe family, 15 March 1819. 
8 Masse. loc cit. 
9 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317. H. Fornier de 
Clausonne to Fornier d'Albe family, 20 March 1819. 
10. A. D. Gard. Chartier de Clausonne 317. H. Former de 
Clausonne to general Fornier d' Albe, 10 March, 1819. 
11. ibid. 
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attacked a cafe frequented by the city's Demi-soides12. 
The upsurge of violence weighed on Nimes for ten days 
and showed just how fragile peace and order were. The re- 
moval of the Catholic royalists from power had done very 
little to resolve the basic tension that poisoned political 
life in the department. Indeed, the changes that had taken 
place since Dargout had arrived as prefect had embittered 
the Catholics and had spawned a militant faction in the Pro- 
testant community, too. In short, in the Spring of 1819, 
a transfer of power to the Protestant community had taken 
place and it gave more cohesion to the Catholic royalist 
opposition13. The near riots revealed, too, the weakness 
of the local administration. At the time of the outbreak, 
Dargout was preparing to leave the Gard, having been included 
12 A. N. FlbIGard 4. Dargout to Decazes, 14 March, 1819. 
Also: PRO F. O. 27/203. Sir Charles Stuart to Lord 
Castlereagh, 29 March, 1819. 
The Demi soldes, of whom there were some 198 in the Gard 
(Vidalenc, Les Demi soldesCParis 19553, p. 216), were 
generally ill-disposed to the Bourbons, whose restoration 
had led to the retirement on half pay of many imperial. 
officers. The Nimes Demi soldes were held responsible 
for stabbing the Royalists in the back in 1815 when they 
conspired with General Gilly to recognise Bonaparte while 
the Royalist volunteers were attempting to cut him off 
in the Drome. 
13 Dargout's successor, Baron d'Haussez, remarked: "The 
Protestant party was all powerful because of the pro- 
tection it enjoyed from M. Guizot, senior counsellor 
in the Department of the. Interior; from Saint Aulaire, 
father in law of M. Decazes, and from M. Chabaud Latour, 
both deputies of the Gard; from Boissy d'Anglas and Pelet 
de la Lozere, zealous Protestants and peers... " 
Memoires, vol. I, p. 260 
Moreover, the reorganisation of the courts Dargout had 
recommended after the 1818 elections had placed the senior 
positions in the hands of the Protestants - Cassagnolles, 
Fornier de Clausonne and Cavalier. Almanach royale, 1820. 
0 
a 
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by Decazes in his celebrated Fournee of peers whose pro- 
motion was intended to give the government a majority in 
the upper House. 
Until the new prefect arrived, responsibility for the 
department rested with the senior counsellor at the Pre- 
fecture, Chazelles de Chusclan, and the mayor of Nimes, 
Laboissiere. Both men were criticised by Dargout and by 
the Gendarmerie for their lack of initiative, and Dargout's 
last administrative act in the Gard was a request to have 
both men dismissed14. 
The disturbances ceased when the new prefect, the baron 
d'Haussez, arived15. Nonetheless, the Gard remained tense 
and divided. Like most Nimois, Haussez was acutely con- 
scious of the precarious character of local political 
stability: 
"The existence of an organ- 
isation in both camps is 
certain, just as it is certain 
that they are both armed. The 
Catholics have always possessed weapons, 
14 A. N. Flb I Gard 4.7 Dargout to Decazes, _14. 
March, 
1819. Also A. N. F 9050. Colonel of gendarmerie, 9 
March, 1819. 
Both men were dismissed when Haussez arrived, and they 
were replaced by Protestants, Cavalier and E. de Pelet. 
A. N. F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 21 March, 1819. 
15 Lemercher d'Haussez, born in 1778, was mayor of his 
home town, Neufchatel (Seine inferieure). From 1813, 
he had organised support for the Bourbon cause, and 
was elected deputy for the Seine inferieure in 1815. 
His administrative career was to take him as prefect 
to Dax (1817 to March 1819), Nimes (until January 1820), 
Grenoble (to April 1824) and Bordeaux, until 1829, when 
he was appointed minister of Marine. 
A. N. Flb I 166, dossier 25. Personnel of the ministry of 
he -interior. 
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and the Protestants have managed 
to procure them. On both sides 
there is hostility. A single shot, 
a sign from Nimes and the whole 
department would be in flames': 16 
The Catholics refused to co-operate with the new T ro- 
testant' administration. Thus, in Le Vigan, the Catholic 
adjoints resigned when the Catholic mayor was replaced by 
a Protestant, and it proved impossible to find Catholics 
willing to serve under the new mayor17. Even social con- 
tacts were rejected. In Uz6s, the distance between the 
Liberals and the Royalists was so great that the educated 
devotees of the two parties consciously avoided each other 
for fear of causing an indicentlg. 
In Nimes itself, Haussez experienced the same hostility 
as he tried to continue the policy of socialisation begun 
by Dargout: 
My soirees were well attended 
and popular, but they served 
only to show more clearly the 
hatred that people bore each 
other. By a kind of tacit 
agreement, people never attended 
two consecutive weeks, so that 
one evening would be'exclusively 
Catholic, the next exclusively 
Protestant. " 
, 
19. a 
1I 
ýo 
16 A. N. F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 20 March, 1819. 
17 FRO.. - F. O. 27/204. Police report, Nimes, 8 April, 
1819. The report observed. that one of the reasons why 
the Catholics refused to co-operate was that "things 
would be different in a while" implying that Protestant 
supremacy was to be a fleeting phase. 
18 PRO. F. O. 27/204. 
1819. 
Police report, Nimes, 14 April, 
0 
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Fornier de Clausonne summed up the atmosphere in the 
department as one of armed neutrality, in which the Liberals, 
as he called the Protestant party, dominated 
2 0. 
The more sinister aspects of this armed neutrality 
were soon discovered by the rew Procureur, Pataille, who 
came to Nimes as a result of Dargout's reorganisation of 
the courts. Pataille's first task was to conduct an enquiry 
into the disturbances that took place early in March. The 
inquiry satisfied him that the ex National Guard was still 
active and organised. Its only concession to the dis- 
solution appeared to have been the removal of the notice 
2 l. board from the building in which it continued to meet 
Pataille's assistant, Guillet, interrogated, a man about 
illegal arms, and found that the whole Guard would turn 
out on the Esplanade on a given signal from the captains22. 
Thus, the sporadic and apparently popular outbursts of 
anti-Protestantism 
23 
, carefully fed 
by rumours that the 
King was about to abdicate in favour of Monsieur, could be 
transformed into an organised onslaught on 'Jacobinism' and 
its supporters at the appropriate time. Ultra royalism 
A 
20 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317. G. Fornier de 
Clausonne to general Fornier d'Albe. 21 April, 1819. 
21 A. N. BB181048. Procureur Pataille to minister of 
justice, 19 and 28 March, 1819 . 
22 A. N. BB181048. Guillet to minister of justice, 18 March, 
1819. 
23 On 28 April, ' youths wearing cocardes hurled abuse and 
stones at Protestants near the Place de la Bouquerie, (A. N. 
F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 28 April, 1819). 
On 18 May, groups of youths paraded up and down the Cours, 
on the edge of a. -Protestant quarter of Nimes shouting "Les 
Bourbon ou la Mort! " Police were required to break them up. 
A. D. Card 6M 85. Cavalier to Haussez, 18 May, 1819. 
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was becoming impatient. Excluded from parliamentary power, 
its network became more active in the country. In Avignon, 
Jules de Calviere was involved in the local committee and 
24 
with the circulation of an Ultra paper, either the Moniteur 
royaliste or the Conservateur, in which he had shares. 
25 
Such was the intrigue of the Catholic royalists that the 
arrest of Trufemy and Servent, two of the untried terrorists 
of 1815, provided the party with an occasion for publicity 
and rallying support instead of demoralising members. 
26 
Servent and Trufemy were sentenced to--death by a court at 
Riom in December 1819 but the secret society had given both 
men maitre Baragnon, Boissin's defence counsel and former 
officer of the National Guard, and, in the course of 
regular and frequent visits to the two while they were 
24 A. N. F79050. Haussez to Decazes, 21 May, 1819. 
25 Cabanis, Charles X, p. 222. 
26 Decazes had instructed the authorities to pursue 
alleged criminals. The policy was opposed by Haussez and 
by Pataille who were convinced that instead of in- 
timidating the Ultras, successful convictions of 
Catholic royalists and, worse still, executions, would 
c5eate martyrs and raise the spectre of 1815. (A. N*18 
F 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 6 April, 1819; A. N. BB 1048. 
Pataille to minister of justice, 16 April, 1819. ) 
Trufemy was accused of murdering a retired Napoleonic 
officer, Bourillon, on the Esplanade in Nimes. during 
the White Terror, and of shooting a man named Lichaire 
during the rioting of 16-17 October, 1815. In both 
cases, the charges were brought by the widows. 
(A. N. BB 18 1048. Pataille to minister of justice, 
2 November, 1819). Trufemy and Servent appealed against 
the death sentence, but the appeal committee included 
Dargout and Guizot who upheld the sentence. Servent 
went to the guillotine protesting his innocence. 
Haussez, Memoires, vol. I, pp. 291-4. 
i so 
in N4mes, the Royalists had made them into heroes27. 
Haussez remained in the Gard only until January 1820. 
While he attributed his transfer to Grenoble to his 
''assiduites pres de c{uel ues femmes de la societe''28, there 
is evidence that he was, in fact, the victim of local pol- 
itical manoeuvers. Never liked by the Protestants, who 
regarded his policy of reconciliation as futile29, he had 
also failed to take the hard line against the royalists that 
a number of highly placed Liberal spokesmen demanded30. 
Haussez's reluctant successor, Villiers du Terrage, in an 
attempt to avoid being sent to the "most disgusting 
27 A. N. F7 6740. Commissaire de police, Nimes, to chef 
de la 5e division, 21 December, 1819. 
Also a report in the newspaper La Renommee, Saturday, 23 
October, 1819. 
28 Haussez, Memoires, vol. I. p. 296. 
29 Fornier de Clausonne noted that most Protestants were 
suspicious of his "grande oeuvre de fusion ou recon- 
ciliation". He remarked, too, that the prefect enjoyed 
little respect in the department. A. D. Gard. Chartrier 
de Clausonne 317, to Fornier d'AlbeTS pri1 & 23 July, 1819 
30- Haussez had criticised the purge on suspected terrorists 
ordered by Decazes. He had also sought a reprieve for 
Trufemy and Servent, and was over-ruled by Dargout and 
Guizot (Memoires, vol . I, pp. 291-294) . In contrast to the 
proceedings Decazes favoured, Haussez preferred to 
encourage the terrorists to leave the department quietly. (A. N. F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 2 April 1819. ). Decazes 
and Haussez had been in conflict over the matter of the 
ex-National Guard, as well. Decazes accused Haussez of 
neglecting to report on aspects of its existence which 
had been made known to him (Decazes) by the minister of 
Justice, who had received the details from Pataille. 
Again, the disagreement reflected a difference of style. 
Haussez remarked that there were no proofs that the 
Guardsmen were active - it was all rumour (A. N. F7 9050. 
flaussez to Decazes, 27 April, 1819 ). 
It is not surprising that. a man who was to be appointed 
minister in the Polignac cabinet should disagree with 
the views and methods of Decazes. 
I 51 
administration in the kingdom" asked: "the intrigues to 
which Monsieur d'Haussez fell victim, are they not still 
present, ready to devour me as well? " 
31 
Haussez' failure in the face of local political man- 
oeuvers coincided with the failure on the national level 
of Decaze's 'liberal phase'. After the elections of Sep- 
tember 1819, in the course of which the Conventionnel and 
constitutional bishop Gregoire who had approved of the ex- 
ecution of Louis XVI, was elected in Grenoble, it was clear 
that liberalism had not effaced the antagonism between the 
two Frances, but that it had simply favoured the rapid and 
frigtening growth of the Left. Against the wishes of certain 
ministers, Decazes proposed to abandon the centre Left, and 
to seek support from moderate conversatives. To this end, 
he proposed to change the electoral laws yet again, in order 
to reduce the number of electors favourable to the Indepen- 
dents, as the Left called itself, and he entered into talks 
with the extreme Right using Richelieu and Vitrolles as 
intermediaries. The Ultras, however, held back, preferring 
Decazes to operate the shift to the Right alone, and so 
to cut himself off from his former allies. But all Decazes' 
plans were wrecked when, on 14 February, 1820, the duc 
de Berry died after he had been stabbed. 
The murder of the only Bourbon with a chance of providing 
heirs to the throne of France released the Ultra royalists 
4 
31 A. N. Flb I 176, doss. 14, du Terrage to minister of interior 
1 March, 1820. 
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from the distasteful task of negotiating with a cabinet 
that contained Decazes. The many accusations that were 
made against Decazes are well known, and in spite of the 
king's protection, the architect of the liberal policy that 
had determined the course 'of France for four years was 
obliged to resign. 
Unlike some 'national' disasters, the death of the duc 
de Berry, while it produced a movement of sympathy among 
the people, did not produce any sense of unity among the 
politicians. On the contrary, it seemed to justify the 
predictions of the Ultras and strengthened their deter- 
urination to eradicate the influence of the Revolution, which 
they saw spreading around them once more. In 1819, Kot- 
zbühe had been murdered by a German student who believed the 
writerto be an agent of the Tsar. In January 1820, the 
Cadiz insurrection had obliged-Ferdinand VII of Spain to 
accept a liberal constitution, and the same constitution 
was imposed on Ferdinand of Naples in July of the same year. 
In France itself, there was an upsurge of conspiracies such 
as the 'Bazar francais, and Epingle noir (bonapartist con- 
spiracies conceived by soldiers and named after the cafes 
in which the conspirators met), and the Charbonnerie was 
becoming active32. 
The new cabinet, presided by the duc the Richelieu 
once more, tried to steer a course that would reassure 
32 These conspiratorial activities are examined in D. Porch, 
Army and Revolution in France 1815-1848( London, 1974 
and A. Sperr, Old Hatreds and Young Hopes, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1971 ) 
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moderate conservatives without playing into the hands of 
the Ultras. In doing so, it pleased nobody. The Liberals 
found that its legislation was repressive - habeas corpus 
suspended, the introduction of censorship before pub- 
lication and the new electoral law, which gave a second 
vote to the richest quarter of the electorate in each 
department. The Ultras, realising that they were in a 
position to exploit the divisions in the assembly, gave only 
half hearted support, and that until December 1821. Aware 
of the king's diminishing interest in politics and of his 
fascination with madame du Cayla, the last of the favourites, 
the Pavillon de Marsan had its own cabinet ready and obtained 
the king's consent, having made Richelieu's position un- 
tenable. 
After 1822, the trend to the Right was more marked; with 
the exception of the Martignac cabinet, from January 1828 
to August 1829, the cabinets were dominated by men who had been 
waiting nearly ten years for the opportunity to implement 
the counter revolution. The reaction took place under the 
leadership of Villele, the former mayor of Toulouse, pro- 
vincial gentleman par excellence, and chevalier de la foi, 
who had been chosen by Artois himself. The succession of 
Charles X marks a turning point. The character of his cor- 
onation in May 1825, intended to stress the continuity of 
the Bourbon monarchy and its role as defender of the Catholic 
faith, indicated the orientation of his reign as clearly as 
ýo 
the laws compensating those who had forfeited their property 
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by fleeing from France during the Revolution and reviving 
sacrilege as a crime punishable in a particularly brutal 
and medieval way. 
Nonetheless, the Ultras, who believed that their hour 
had finally come, engineered by their narrowness their own 
downfall. If in 1824 the monarchy had never been so popular 
after the successful intervention in Spain, by 1827, the 
government was being defeated on issues like censorship and 
the bourgeois National Guard was dissolved because of its 
hostility to the king's government. When revolt finally 
broke out in 1830, the regime had very few defencers. Having 
finally obtained what they coveted and conspired for, the 
Ultras showed themselves incapable of reading the signs of 
the times and proved themselves to be as inept as their 
political opponents believed them to be in the matter of 
governing a people whom they distrusted and which had changed 
beyond their recognition. From united opposition, the 
Ultras, on gaining power, were transformed into a variety of 
nuances which weakened their strength in parliament. As 
early as 1824, Chateaubriand broke with Vill`ele and led the 
Journal des Debats into a systematic critique of the gov- 
ernment that strengthened the Liberal opposition. A "purer 
than pure" faction, led by La Bourdonnaye emerged on the 
Right, and yet another group, guided by men like Montlosier 
and Dumesnil, criticised strongly the increasingly clerical 
nature of the regime. 
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In spite of their overwhelming majority in the 1824 
Chambre retrouvee, the Ultras refused to re-establish par- 
liament in the role of supremacy they had demanded in 1815. 
Under Charles X, decisions were the result of consultation 
between the king and his ministers only, another aspect of 
the reign that alienated the affection of parliamentarians. 
Moreover, in spite of their avowed hostility to the central- 
ised state, the Ultras did nothing to change it, finding on 
the contrary, that the degree of centralisation was as val- 
uable for their own electoral preparation as it had been for 
the Liberals. While there was a very definite reaction in 
France after 1822, there were no profound changes in the 
political and administrative structures of the country, thus 
giving a widespread impression that France was being governed 
for the benefit of a small and disliked minority of Frenchmen. 
The shift to the right after the murder of the duc de 
Berry, the 'ultracisatioin' of French society and its con- 
sequent provocation of an opposition mood and the fragmen- 
tation of the erstwhile united ultras can be traced in the 
Gard from 1820 to the July Revolution. Rene Remond comments: 
"The accession of the Comte 
d'Artois (September 1824) 
will remove its (Ultra royalism's) 
raison d'etre. From the day 
that Monsieur is on the throne, 
there is no longer, in the real 
senseof the term, an ultra royalist 
party for the sentiments of the 
faction correspond to those of the 
soverign. " 33 
33 R. Remond, La Droite en France, 1, p. 29. 
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In 1827, the secretary at the prefecture of the Gard, 
writing in the absence of the prefect, assured the minister 
of the Interior that 1'Esprit public in the department was 
good, displaying as it had in 1815 loyalty and devotion to 
the king, "only now, royalism is calm and satified, having 
lost the effervescence that had led to some trouble in its 
early period of triumph 034 Another feature of Adminis- 
tration of the Gard after 1820 is the sympathy of the pre- 
fects with the Catholic royalists, or, at least their rel- 
uctance to become involved in local grievances which might 
well rebound on their careers. Lavallette, prefect from 1824 
to 1828, was a deputy for the Isere at the same time, and 
spent most of the year in Paris, leaving the administration 
of the department to the secretary at the prefecture, de 
Brigand. 35 
The death of the duc de Berry provoked an outbreak of. 
verbal violence directed, as usual, against the Protestants 
of NImes36, and by the Headquarters of the former National 
Guard which had become known as the Cercle Triaire37. Al- 
though the Catholic royalists were reiterating the views of 
34 A. N. F7 6769. Secretaire general Nimes to minister of the interior, 
e la prefecture de 
5 March, 1827. 
35 A. N. Fib I 170, dossier 17. Personnel of the ministry 
of the interior. 
36 PRO. F. O. 27/225. Bulletin de police, Nimes, 25 February, 
1820. 
37 A. N. F7 6696. Etat fesant sic) connaitre le caractere 
öl ti ue des cercles ou cabinets literaires (slic) dans 
le ephrtement u Gard juillet 1820. 
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Clausel de Coussergues38 and it was rumoured that the Cevenol 
and Vaunage Protestants were armed and ready to march on 
Nimes if the threat to the Protestants there became im- 
mediate39, the Protestant bourgeoisie did not appear to be 
very concerned and expressed their confidence in the ability 
of the local authorities, still largely in their own hands 
and free to react to any danger in the absence of Haussez' 
4® 
replacement. The military commanders were known to be 
sound as well - the Ultras had endeavoured to have them 
transferred the previous year1. 
4 
Gradually, signs of change came. When the new prefect, 
Villiers du Terrage, arrived in March, he filled two vacant 
posts with Catholic royalists without consulting the local 
administrators and notables. In August it was learnt 
42 
that the royal ordinance-- re -confirming Cavalier as mayor for 
another term had been held up in the prefecture until the 
Ultras had made certain that one of their men, the Marquis 
4 d'Urre was promoted from third adjoint to first adjoint3. 
38 A. N. F7 6745. Police report, 24 February, 1820. 
39 A. N. F7 6745. Police report, 23 February, 1820. 
V 
40 Ä. D. ' Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 318. G. Fornier de 
Clausonne to General Fornier d'A1be, 24 February, 1820. 
41 ibid. 
42 One post, that of Commissaire de police in Anduze was 
filled by i policeman who had been dismissed from Nimes 
by Decazes. The other, assistant medical officer at the 
N4mes hospice was given to one of the Froments of 1790 
fame. As a result "the Protestants will not go there any 
more for fear of being poisoned". A. D. Gard Chartrier 
de Clausonne 1315. H. Fornier de Clausonne to G. Fornier 
de Clausonne, 14 April, 1820. 
43 A. D. Gard. Chartri-er de Clausonne 135. G. Fornier de 
Clausonne to H. Fornier de Clausonne, 20 August, 1820. 
I J0 
The most striking evidence of the growing influence of 
Ultra royalism is to be seen in the elections that were held 
in November 1820 according to the terms of the new law, passed 
in June 1820, and which provided for a restricted college 
of the richest men in each department to complement the 
arrondissement colleges that already favoured the Right in 
most rural departments. There was talk of a new Chambre 
introuvable and, -in the Gard, a new White Terror. In April, 
Madier de Montjau had laid a pamphlet before the Chamber of 
deputies in which he asserted that he had evidence of a 
gouvernement occulte in the South of France, operating 
under the instructions of the Pavillon de Marsan44, and in 
doing so, he had made the N4mes Liberals feel very exposed 
without producing any results. Tension rose as the new 
45 
electoral law was being debated, and du Terrage decided to 
put a prohibition on the holding of Missions in the depart- 
ment, as they would undoubtedly rekindle old passions and 
44 The petition, presented on 25) April, 1820, referred 
to Ultra circulars sent to Nimes. Number 35 included: 
"A while ago we asked you to assert yourselves. Now we 
advise calm, the greatest calm. We have won a decisive 
victory in having Decazes removed. The new cabinet 
can render us great services and it is vital not. to be 
hostile towards it. We repeat, calm, great calm'. 
45 A. D. Gard 6M 81. Police report dated 8 May, 1820, 
notes that the liberals were embarrassed and worried 
by the affair, and felt sure it would be held against 
them by the Right. 
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tensions46. 
Both the Liberals and Ultras worked hard for the elections 
which were to take place within the restricted colleges only 
and so add two deputies to the present number from each de- 
partment. Jules de Calviere, apparently the organiser for 
the Gard Ultras, wrote: 
The consequences of the 
coming elections are of such 
importance for our future 
destinies that no one can 
pretend that it would be 
hard to compromise our 
honour, our fortunes and our 
very existence through sheer 
negligence. " 47. 
In the autumn, shortly before the election, du Terrage 
remarked that the different factions had shown no regard 
46 Since 1819, the Societe des Missions de France, directed 
by the Abbe Rauzan, had been spreading their activities 
into the provinces of France, preaching repentance, Hell 
fire and the Throne'and Altar. The Recueil de Cantiques 
ä l'usage des Missions de France (Rusand, Librairie 
imprimeur du Roi et du clerge, Lyon) contains hymns 
with refrains such as: 
RVive la France 
Vive le Roi 
Toujours en France 
Les Bourbon et la Foi! " 
The missions, lampooned by Stendhal in his novel, 
Lamiel, lasted from a week to a month and involved-10 
sermons, processions, ceremonies of repentance and 
general communion. At the end of the mission, a 
large cross was planted in a public square of the 
town to commerate the mission. Mission de Montpellier 
par G-M B., chez Auguste Seguin, 1ibrairie, Place neuve. n. d. 
The mission crosses that Nimes had 'collected' were to 
be the occasion of rioting after the July Revolution. 
47 A. D. Gard 1E 974. Jules de Calviere to Marquis d'Assas 
30 July 1820. 
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for civility, and individuals on both sides had exposed 
themselves to indignities and accusations that would not 
4 
normally be tolerated8. But in the bitter struggle, the 
Catholic royalists knew they had the prefect's support. 
He informed the Minister of the Interior that he had not 
failed to impress upon the royalists that the moment had 
come for the party to revive the honour of the country. It 
was up to them, he said, to show that the 'horrible excesses' 
committed in the past were attributable only to the 'un- 
fortunate times, the flight of the population and the absence 
49 
of authority'. 
The prefect commented, too, that there had been dis- 
agreement in the-Royalist ranks. While the candidature 
of Charles de Vogue was certain, there was a split on the 
second candidate. Some thought it should be de Ricard, 
while others wanted Jules de Calviere. The Liberals were 
going to offer de Boisse, mayor of Pont Saint Esprit, 
General Gilly, who deserted to Bonaparte in 1815, and 
General Fornier d'Albes0. Nonetheless, du Terrage predicted 
that the Left would obtain 130 votes for each of its can- 
'didates and that the Parti royaliste pur would get 160 
48 A. N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to director of police, 
20 October, 1820. 
49 A. N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to minister of the 
interior, 
7: November, 1820. 
50 A. N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to director of police, 2 November, 
1820. 
If 
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votes 
sl. 
Du Terrage's forecast was very close, as one 
might expect. On 23 November, I)e Vogi6 and de 
Calviere each obtained 157 votes, some 58% of the total 
votes 
S2. By a slender margin, the Catholic royalists had 
acquired a foothold in the Chamber of deputies again. 
The result produced no dramatic effect in the Gard. 
There were, after all, still three liberal deputies. But 
the country was one step nearer a chamber, therefore a 
government dominated by the Ultras. Notables like Madier 
de Montjau were in constant touch with the Nimois of Paris, 
always trying to foresee the next move of their adversaries53. 
After Monsieur withdrew his support for Richelieu's moderate 
royalist cabinet and imposed his own men on the country, 
Madier de Montjau commented bitterly: 
We continue to enjoy 
perfect tranquillity here, 
tranquillity that is 
guaranteed by the paternal 
goodness of the White cocarde, 
the impartiality of the gov- 
ernment and the clemency of 
51 A. N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to director of police, 
7 November, 1820. 
52 A. N. F1c III Gard S. Election du 23 November, 1820. Out 
of307 eligible citizens, 272 voted. 
53 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 316. Madier de Montjau 
to general Fornier d'Albe, 27 September, 1821. "Better 
placed than we are, the Nimois of Paris will see more 
easily the views of our 'new masters, the ferocity of 
those we will have in six months.. " 
1 (i 2 
'['restaillons. Oh miracle! 
A fortnight ago, a curate 
in the Ardeche demanded the 
immediate revival of the 
tithe (disme)... " S4 
About the same time, Pataille, the procureur appointed 
by Decazes, was dismissed, and Fornier de Clausonne, at the 
time a juge d'Instruction, commented that the Ultras in the 
Courts were speculating on future electoral success quite 
55 
shamelessly For the Gard was preparing for its third 
election in six years. The law of June 1820 had maintained 
the principle of partial renewals of the Chamber, and, as 
usual, the Gard came in the second 'batch' of departments. 
Once again, collusion between the prefect and the 
royalist party was evident. In the first place, the con- 
stituencies of the department, based traditionally on the 
arrondissements of Ales and Le Vigan were merged into one 
electoral constituency. In both arrondissements, the Pro- 
testants, the principal Liberal electors, were numerous and 
could conceivably obtain a majority for their candidates in 
the two arrondissement colleges56. 
54 ibid., 29 March, 1822. 
55 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 318. G. Fornier de 
Clausonne to Gal. Fornier d'Albe 22 May, 1822. 
56 The combined population of the arrondissements of Le 
Vigan and Ales was 129 000 in 1820 (A. N. Flc III Gard S. 
Statistigue electorale 1820). 
The protestant population of the same area was about 
70 000. (D. Robert, Les Eglises Reformees, p. 149). 
A survey made in 1835 of the religious and political ten- 
dencies of the department's cantons showed that four of 
the nine Ales cantons were predominantly Protestant, while 
the town of Ales was mixed. Six of the ten cantons in 
the arondissement of Le Vigan were Protestant. 
The survey, designed to evaluate support for the July 
Monarchy, equated Protestantism with Liberalism or Orleanisn 
(A. D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 25 March 
1835) 
IO 
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Yet, while there was no significant difference in the 
populations of the three 'rural' cantons in the Gard, both 
Ales and Le Vigan had roughly half the number of electors 
57 that Uzes had While unequal distribution was possible 
in a censitary regime, the disproportion seems great in 
view of the commercial wealth of the Protestant communities. 
It is difficult to believe that so few would qualify for 
the 300 F cens of the arrondissement colleges58. Thus, by 
merging Ales and Le Vigan an electorate similar to that of 
Uzes was obtained, but the Protestants or Liberals were 
deprived of the possibility of winning two seats in the 
Chamber of deputies. 
Jules de C alviere was 'election manager' for the Ultras 
once more, and was also appointed president of the electoral 
college of Nimes, the most important of the arrondissement 
colleges with some 650 electors, and president of the re- 
stricted departmental college. Two months before the 
elections, de Calviere wrote to the Minister of Justice 
predicting that four of the five seats would go to the 
Royalists, and that the fifth, Ales -Le Vigan would be left 
57 Nimes had 659 electors and 119 300 inhabitants. 
Uzes 317 74 300 
Ales 146 68 200 
Le Vigan 167 60 300 
The figures are those drawn up by du Terrage/for the 
year 1820. A. N. Flc III Gard S. Statistigue electorale, 1820. 
58 Thus, Robert, Eglises refornees, p. 149, comments that the 
Protestants in the arrondisssements of Ales and Le Vigan 
were "often landowners but also small industrialists". 
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to the Liberals. It is clear that the Royalists had little 
interest in the new constituency, for while de Calviere 
notified the Minister of the presidents of the colleges - 
de Vogue was to preside at Uzes - he commented that the 
college of Ales - Le Vigan was being left to organise itself. 
Jouques referred to the prefect's approval of the electoral 
arrangements59 De Calviere's forecast was, of course, 
accurate. The arrondissement colleges of Nimes and Uzes 
returned Ultra royalists - FranSois de Ricard, avocat 
general at Montpellier, and Charles de Vogue respectively, 
while the Ales-Le Vigan college re-elected Saint Aulaire, 
Decazes' father in law, and then with only some 60% of the 
votes cast60. A week later, the restricted college 
61 
elected Jules de Calviere and Jacques Alexis de Calviere- 
Vezenobre who had been deprived of his army command in 1818 
62 
on account of his extreme views . 
The new White Terror expected by many Liberals did not 
come, nor did any sweeping purge of the local administration. 
Just as some Catholic royalists had survived the Decazes 
period - de Surville was the most striking example - so many 
59 A. N. BB5 357. Jules de Calviere to minister of justice, 
19 September, 1822. 
60 A. N. Flc III Gard 5. Compte rendu des elections du 13 
et 20 Novembre 1822. 
61 ibid. 
62 Archives du Chateau de Vezenobres (Gard). Mss. cahiers 
of Pulcherie - Cecile lu gnar, MarquiSe- 
de Calviere - 
Vezenobre., nee Saint Priest. 
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moderates or non Ultras remained in office after 1820. 
The changes of personnel were gradual, taking place usually 
when a post fell vacant. Indeed, the pattern of ap- 
pointments tends to reflect a desire to reward loyal 
service to the Catholic royalist cause and to reinstate 
men who had suffered for it rather than a desire to ensure 
that every branch of the local administration was in their 
hands. Thus, in 1823, the government requested a list 
of communes in the department that took the pro-government 
Journal des Maires "vivement recommande par le gouvernement". 
Only 123 communes took the journal, out of a total of 345, 
but there is no evidence that the non subscribing mayors 
6 
were victimised or even proselytised3. On the other hand, 
in 1821, Ferrand Demissol, who volunteered with the duc 
d'Angouleme and refused the öath of allegiance to Bonaparte 
in 1815, was appointed to the Assises in Nimes64. Jean 
Baptiste Veau Lanouvelle, imprisoned in 1792, then removed 
from his position as procureur at Ales by Dargout in 1818, 
was appointed to the court at Privas in the Ardeche in 
18223. In 1823 Jules de Calviere was elevated to the 
6 
prefecture of the Vaucluse, an appointment which permitted 
him to remain in contact with his native Gard66. 
63 A. D. Gard 6M 249. n. d. (Filed under 1823). 
64 A. D. Gard 4U 5/200 (Parquet). 
65 ibid. 
66 A. N. Flb I 157, doss. 3. Personnel of the ministry of 
the interior. 
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1824 brought a more marked change in personnel. The 
successful outcome of the Spanish campaign had encouraged 
Villele to dissolve the Chamber at the end of 1823 and to 
seek a greater majority for the government. The elections 
held in the Spring of 1824 produced a parliament that was 
christened by the King the Chambre retrouvee. The Gard 
elected a deputation that repeated the tendencies of 1822; 
Ales/Le Vigan alone elected a Liberal to a Chamber dominated 
67 by Ultras. Like other notables in the Chamber who had 
connections with the Gard, de Calviere and de Crussol, two 
of the Ultra deputies, were members of the secret organisation 
known as the Chevaliers de la Foi68. 
After this election, which marked the zenith of Ultra 
royalism, Cavalier, the Protestant mayor of Nimes since 
"69 1820, was dismissed because of "his liberal opinions . 
So too was Bleynie, a police official who had been in Nimes 
70 
since 1816. Two outstanding ultras, dismissed by 
Dargout, were reinstated in the public administration: 
67 The Ultras elected were: de Ricard (Nimes), de Crussol 
(Uzes), Jules de Calviere and Jacques-Alexis de 
Calviere Vezenobre (both by the restricted college). 
The Liberal was General Vignolles, whose death in 
1825 led to the election of Chabaud Latour for Albs/ 
Le Vigan. A. N. Flc III Gard S. Elections of 25 February 
and 6 March, 1824; Election of 23 January, 1825. 
68 Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand de Bertier, 
p. 356. 
Among the Chevaliers in the Chamber in 1824 were: Rene 
de Bernis (Lozere), Charles de Voge (Ardeche) and the 
new prefect of the Gard, P, lannelli de Lavallette who was 
deputy for the Isere. 
69 A. N. Flb II Gard 15. Secretary of the prefecture to 
minister of interior, 26 July 1824. 
70 A. N. F7 9849. Police report, 21 July, 1824. 
I 
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Vallongues, mayor from 1815 to 1817, and removed by Dargout, 
was reappointed to the Nimes city hall to replace Cavalier 
Chazelles de Chusclan, removed from the prefecture for col- 
lusion with the Ultras at the time of the March 1819 riots, 
was made president of the Conseil general of the depart- 
ment 
72. At the beginning of 1825, the sub prefect of Ales, 
appointed in 1818 by Dargout, died. His position was given 
to du Roure, the former commander of the National Guard of 
Ales, the man who organised demonstrations to oppose Dar- 
gout's arrival in the department. 
73 
Yet, when Vallongues died. in office in 1825, Chastellier, 
a moderate who would be elected deputy for Ntmes in 1831 and 
1834, was appointed to replace him74. 
One case, that of Narbonne Lara, former sub prefect 
of Ales, illustrates clearly the patronage aspect of many 
appointments. Lara was transferred from Ales in 1817 to 
the sub prefecture of Florac in the Lozere, a neighbouring 
department. From 1824, Rene de Bernis, who had appointed 
Narbonne Lara to Ales in July 1815, was Prefect and deputy 
of the Lozere, as well as being Inspector of its National 
Guard. In 1828, Narbonne Lara sought the influence of de 
Bernis to obtain a re-transfer to Ales. De Bernis made an 
71 Journal du Gard, 1 September, 1824. 
72 ibid., 28 August, 1824 
73 ibid., 19 March, 1825 
74 A. N. Flb II Gard 15. Royal Ordinance, 19 January, 1825. 
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unsuccessful request to Martignac, observing that Narbonne- 
Lara had been transferred to a post "beaucoup moms agreable" 
than Ales, and that a move back to Ales "would compensate 
for the injustice '7S. A later report on Narbonne Lara 
by an official of the July Monarchy remarked he was a member 
of the brazen circle of Congreganistes who met in the 
Chateau de Salgas, the home of Monsieur de Bernisý76. 
The shift of political influence in the department was 
revealed, too, in the attitude of the authorities to par- 
tisans of the Catholic royalist cause. In 1823, Souchon, 
one of the principal royalist agitators of 1814, died. 
His obituary in the Journal du Gard spoke of the perse- 
cution he endured from the enemies of the monarchy, cul- 
minating in his destitution in 1819. The notice ended: 
"The King has lost a faithful servant 177 . 
The same newspaper feted the reappointment of Vall- 
ongues as mayor, declaring of the man who had held office 
through the White Terror that "the firmness and wisdom of 
his term in tempestuous circumstances will always be a 
tribute. to his zeal and to his love for the Bourbons"78. 
75 A. N. Fib I 168, doss. 
2 December, 1828. 
76 A. N. Flb I 168, doss . 
30 November, 1830. 
I. De Bernis to Vicomte Martignac, 
I. 'Note to minister of interior, 
77 Journal du Gard, 1 February, 1823. 
a 
78 ibid., 1 September, 1824. 
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Indulgence was not restricted to newsprint. In 1820, 
Pataille had established a list of eight capital offences 
committed by Jean Graffand, alias Quatretaillons. How- 79 
ever, Quatretaillons remained free in the Gard, and in 
1825, Guillet, the new procureur, observed that "the passage 
of time seems to dictate that Graffand should not be pursured 
80 for crimes committed under the banner of Royalism". Quatre- 
taillons lived on to take part, in 'a terrorist capacity, in 
the reaction to the Revolution of July 1830. 
The increasingly clerical character of the reign of 
Charles X gave a good deal of scope to the triumphalist 
tendencies of the Catholic people of the Gard. There was 
no question, after 1824, of prohibiting the Missions as du 
Terrage had done in 1820. In December 1825, fifteen mis- 
sionary fathers arrived in Nimes and conducted a mission 
that lasted until Ash Wednesday 1826. The mission raised 
81 
popular passions to high pitch, and Chabaud-Latour, the 
Protestant deputy, wrote to the Minister of Justice com- 
plaining of the ordeal the Protestants suffered: 
"It (the mission) was a great trial. 
The effervescence and enthusiasm 
of those whose beliefs led them 
to the mission reached a peak 
79 AN. BB 18 1048. Memorandum to Procureur, Riom, 
22 July, 1820. 
80 A. N. BB18 1048. Procureur general of Nimes to minister 
ofjustice, 17 August 1825. 
81 A. N. F7 6769. Prefect to minister of interior, 12 
December, 1825. 
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an unavoidable feature of the 
people in a country so prone 
to emotions and to extremism" 82. 
During the mission, the sacraments had been refused-to 
Catholics married to Protestants, and such public humili- 
ation, said the deputy, served to provoke antagonism83. 
Shortly after the Mission, an ugly scene took place outside 
the Protestant Temple when a Catholic girl marrying a Pro- 
testant went to the Temple, where the Pastor was to bless 
the union. The crowd that gathered to insult the wedding 
party was so violent that the police had to disperse it4. 
8 
The procureur attributed the. demonstration to religious 
fervour caused by the mission, for "marriages between 
Catholics and Protestants, particularly among the working 
classes, are so frequent that they never cause an eyelid 
to be raised"85. 
In 1828, the Corpus Christi procession through Nimes 
was the occasion of a brawl between Catholics and some Pro- 
testants who were in the cafe de 1'Ile d'Elbe. The 
Catholics charged the Protestants with failing to show re- 
spect förthe sacrament86. 
82 A. N. BB18 1136. Chaubaud Latour to minister of justice, 
23 March, 1826. 
83 ibid. 
84 A. N. BB18 1137. Procureur general to minister of justice, 
24 April, 1826. 
85 ibid. 
86 A. N. F7 6769. Prefect to minister of interior, 15 
July, 1828. 
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Such occasions of violence were infrequent, but the 
mutual suspicion between the two communities remained. More- 
over, it was not confined to the lower classes. In March 
1829, the prefect just appointed by Martignac87, issued 
four hundred invitations to a ball to notables of both 
persuasions. But he found that a number of Catholics 'who 
use religion to keep a monopoly of power', realising that 
the prefect was not going to look to them alone for support, 
set about dissuading many of their co-religionists from 
accepting. Indeed, many invitations were never delivered 
to their destination 88 
The prefect noted, too, that Protestant allegations 
that they were often discriminated against in local public 
appointments was. well founded. Some communes, he said, re- 
sorted to the lowest classes of Catholic society rather than 
appointing a respectable Protestant to a vacant position89. 
But such instances of blatant anti-Protestantism in 
the late 1820's appear to have been based on a suspicious 
attitude to the Protestant community as a whole, or on some 
local jealousy, for, quite on the contrary, there was evidence 
that, having gained power both in the department and in the 
87 Herman's dossier contains a memorandum stating that 
an essential part of his task was working towards a 
rapprochement between the two communities. A. N. Flbl 
162, dossier S. Personnel of ministry of interior. 
88 A. N. F7 6769. Prefect to minister of interior, 20 March, 
1829. 
89 A. N. F7 6769. Prefect to minister of interior, n. d. 1829. 
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Country as a whole, the Catholic royalists were more tolerant 
of the Protestants in political life if the latter's demands 
were modest. Thus, the royalists raised no objection to 
the appointment of a Protestant opposition deputy, Achille 
Daunant to the Conseil general to fill a vacancy left by the 
death of another Protestant, Boileau Castelnau90. Neither 
did the royalists exploit the worsening economic situation 
in the department as they had done'in the past - and would 
do in the future - when seeking more power1. 
9 
Probably the most striking aspect of Catholic royalism 
in the Gard in the last years of the Restoration was its 
extraordinary transformation from a highly disciplined move- 
ment to a weak, fragmented one. Only three years after 
the Chambre retrouvee, Fornier de Clausonne, voicing the 
liberal bourgeoisie, could write: 
"Success is complete... 
The yoke that weighed on 
the department is broken". 92 
90 A. N. Flb II Gard S. Prefect to m. inister of interior, 
29, June, 1829; Royal ordinance, 21 July, 1829. 
91 The price of wheat had risen to 30F a , hectolitre in 
February 1828, the highest since February 1817. La- 
brousse, Romano, Dreyfus. Le prix du Froment en France, 
1726 - 1913, p. 102. 
In October 1828, the prefect wrote that unemployment 
was widespread as the crisis affected Nimes industries. 
16 October, 1828. A. N. F7 6769. Report of 
92 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 319. Familie Fornier 
de Clausonne to Gal. Fornier d'Albe, 19 November, 1827. 
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lie was referring to the result of the election called 
by Villble at the end of 1827 as a sort of plebiscite for 
the government's policy. Only one traditional Catholic 
royalist, the duc de Crussol, was elected. The college of 
Ales - Le Vigan elected a liberal, Reynaud Lascours, and 
the Nimes college, which had elected Francois de Ricard as 
an Ultra in 1824, now elected the Liberal Protestant Achille 
93 Daunant. 
A week later, the restricted departmental college con- 
firmed the swing by electing De Ricard and the moderate 
mayor of Nimes, Chastellier, in preference to Rene de Bernis 
and Jules de Calviere94. The results were obtained under 
the administration of an Ultra royalist prefect95, and without 
intimidation. 
The unexpected results were caused by a split in the 
hitherto compact royalist ranks. As in many other parts 
of France, an anti ministerial faction, led in Nimes by de 
Ricard and largely inspired by Chateaubriand's concept of 
Royalism96, had voted with the opposition, instead of for 
the ministers7. 
9 
S. 
93 A. N. F1C III Gard S. Elections des 17 et 24 Novembre, 1827. 
94 ibid. 
95 Plannelli de Lavallette stood as an Ultra against 
Gregoire in 1819; he was a Chevalier de la Foi and 
deputy for the Isere. (Bertier e auvigny, e Comte 
Ferdinand.,, p. 278. ). Fornier de Clausonne said of him in 
1827: our prefect is like all prefects of this honourable 
epoch, that is to say, an evil man. 
(A. D. Gard. Chartrier 
de Clausonne 126. n. d.. (fragment)) 
96 Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp. 390-2. 
97 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 319. Familie Fornier 
d Clausonne to general Fornier d'Albe, 19 November, 1827; 
Baragnon, _ 
Abrege de l'histoire de Nimes de Menard, 
r1 _4_ o. 391. 
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The 'defection' as it was called, dated hack to 1824, 
when Chateaubriand abandoned Villele. It was compounded by 
differing views on the alliance between Throne and Altar, and 
it was a division from which the Ultra royalist movement would 
not recover, having lost the cohesion it displayed in op- 
position up to 1821. When in 1830, Charles X dissolved the 
Chamber rather than part with his unpopular ministers and 
decided to gamble his future on fresh elections, the Royalists, 
without unified leadership and unable to recognise the gravity 
of the political impasse, split their vote again. In the 
Gard, the 'defection' and the Liberals planned the election - 
for which they had only one month's notice - together. But 
the Liberals were the most committed, exploiting the division 
and loss of morale in the royalist ranks to the full as their 
unwitting allies guaranteed them the votes they needed98. 
Consequently, the deputation of 1827 was re-elected99. 
When the Chamber met, the various opposition factions 
could muster 274 deputies against 143 who supported the 
government. Unwilling to submit, Charles X and his ministers 
embarked on a course that was blocked only by revolution 
w 
and the fall of the monarchy. Too late to act, the royalists 
98 A. N. F76778. Report of-commander of the Card company, 
15th Gendarmerie Legion, 8 June, 1830. 
99 A. N. F1'III Gard S. Elections des 12 et 19 juillet 
1830. In Paris and 19 other departments including 
the Gard, the elections were delayed for two weeks 
because the results in those departments would certainly 
be hostile to the government and could have an arti- 
ficially demoralising effect. 
De Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp. 431-2. 
1i ý) 
otbsOrvcd the CoilsccIucnces of the ir c] ivis lows and I ooked on 
as the regime they had struggled for so long was swept ati%ay 
before their eyesloo. 
100 Baragnon, o . cit. , vol.. 4, p. 391 . 
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Chapter S. 
The divergence of opinions that weakened the Ultra 
royalist organisation in the Gard after 1827 and encouraged 
the emergence of a centre party which drew support from 
both Catholic and Protestant moderates was dramatically af- 
fected by the July revolution. The Gard was singular in that 
the collapse of the Bourbons reanimated antagonisms dating 
from the Revolution instead of confirming the principles of 
17891. The very delicate modus vivendi that permitted a 
small number of public offices to go to the Protestants 
and which depended on unchallanged Catholic royalist supremacy 
did not survive the immediate response of militant Catholic 
royalist leaders who saw in the downfall of the Bourbons 
the reversal of their own political fortunes and the inevit- 
able triumph of the liberal Protestant bourgeoisie. Mount- 
ing political antagonism, leading predictably to a sectarian 
conflict would forge a new unity in the Catholic camp. 
News of the ordinances of 25 July and of the political 
G. Weill, "La Revolution de juillet dans les departements. 
Aoüt - septembre 1830" Revue d'Histoire moderne, vol. 
6,1931, pp. 289-294. 
Also D. Pinkney, The French Revolution of 1830 
(Princeton 1972). "Almost everywhere, Frenchmen 
accepted the Parisian revolution and generally accepted 
it". (p. 198). 
R. Price, "Legitimist opposition to the revolution of 
1830 in the French provinces", The Historical Journal, 
vol. XVII, number 4,1974, pp. 755-778, only mentions the 
conflict in the Gard in passing (p. 773). 
0 
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agitation in the capital reached Nimes on the twenty-ninth2. 
The prefect, Herman, requested an additional regiment for 
Nimes, and the political class of the city resigned itself 
to waiting for further reports from Paris 3. In the atmos- 
phere of tolerance that prevailed in bourgeois circles 
Liberal and Royalist members met separately, then consulted 
each other in order to maintain public order. Delegates 
were sent through the city to keep the inhabitants calm and 
informed of events in the capital and in Nimes4. 
There were, however, indications that the efforts of 
the elites to maintain order were bound to fail. Already 
the Catholic suburbs to the East of the city were excited, 
and Bourbon flags and cries of "Vive Charles X" were evident5. 
Moreover, when a deputation of fifty notables went to the 
city hall to offer their support to the local administration, 
2 Baragnon, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 412 
Baragnon, a Legitimist lawyer who had been an officer 
in the 1815 National Guard is obviously less critical 
of the Catholic part in the events of 1830 than is 
Pastor E. Frossard, Evenements de Nimes depuis le 27 
juillet j usqu' au 2 septembre 1830, (Nimes, 1830). 
The July revolution in the Gard is studied by two recent 
authors. The most detailed examination is S. Posener, 
"La Revolution de juillet dans le depart. ement. du Gard", 
Mercure de France. no. 221,1930, pp. 607-636. The article 
is based on the reports of the Orleanist procureur Viger 
and on national newspaper reports. 
The other account in Pinkney, (op. cit. )., is drawn almost 
entirely from Posener. 
3 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 320 G. Fornier de 
Clausonne to General Fornier d'Albe, 1 August, 1830. 
4 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clnusonne 320. G. Fornier de 
Clausonne to General Fornier d'Albe, 3 August, 1830. Also 
A. D. Gard. 6M 130 Prefect to minister of interior, 3 
August, 1830. 
5 A. D. Gard 6M 130. Prefect to minister of interior, 3 
August, 1830. 
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Fornier de Clausonne, one of the Protestants in the depu- 
tation, commented that de Surville was opposed to proposals 
for a non-sectarian alliance . to maintain order in the city, 
and accepted them with great reluctance6. 
On 5 August, some of the notables were in the prefecture 
at five a. m. to witness the opening of the latest dispatches 
from Paris, and to discuss their implications. The prefect 
was instructed to fly the tricolour. over the town, but the 
local military commanders would not recognise the validity 
of unsigned dispatches and so opposed the instruction7. A 
number of Liberals present tried to obtain the support of 
de Surville, believing that his agreement would sway the 
soldiers. But de Surville refused to be involved in the 
attempts to raise the tricolour. Fornier de Clausonne 
accused him quite correctly of seeking a pretext to turn the 
Gard into a centre of resistance to the Revolution by pro- 
voking a civil war there8. Indeed, there were signs of 
another outbreak of violence between the Catholic royalist 
population and the Liberals. Besides the shouts of Vive 
Charles A and the flag waving that had taken place, relations 
between the two parties bordered on violence on the fourth: 
6 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne, 320. Gustave Fornier 
de Clausonne to General Fornier d'Albe, 3 August, 1830. 
7 The Nimes Garrison, manned by a Swiss regiment, was 
pro Bourbon. 
8 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 320. Gustave Fornier 
de Clausonne to General Fornier d'Albe, S August, 1830. 
1 71) 
This day has been very difficult. 
The two parties were face to face 
all. day, and on twenty occasions 
we thought they would be at each 
other's throat. This did not 
happen, largely because of the 
efforts of the notables of the 
two communities. There were 
still some fist fights. " 9 
The ominous tone of this report by the prefect contrasts 
sharply with the optimism of the Orleanist lawyer Viger, 
soon to be appointed Procureur general. His reports stress 
the excellent state of affairs in the department during the 
first fortnight of August, and are probably examples of his 
. wishful thinking than they are realistic observations 
10 
The uneasy truce was maintained until 15 August, the 
day on which the new regime was officially and publicly pro- 
claimed in Nimes. That day, the feast of the Assumption, 
could hardly have been less fortunate a choice for the solemn 
proclamation of a regime that replaced the Bourbons. 
The flag and the Charter were paraded round the three 
principal boulevards of Nimes that form a triangle bounded 
on two sides by Catholic working class quarters. As the 
officials of the new regime processed, they were jeered by 
the Catholics who lined the boulevards off which their homes 
9 A. D. Gard 6M130. Prefect to minister of interior, 4 
August, 1830. 
10 Thus, on 8 August, Viger wrote: "the parti vaingueur 
has been admirable. This will be a glorious page 
in our history and will prove on which side truth and 
justice are to be found". A. D. Gard lE 107. 
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layll. Still, nothing happened until the evening, when 
groups of Catholics, or Carlists as they were already called, 
assembled at two cafes on the edge of the Catholic Bourgade, 
the cafe de Riche and the cafe de la Garnison. From these 
points, they unleashed a torrent of abuse and the occasional 
physical assault on people recognised as Liberals or Pro- 
testants. The partisan views of the Swiss regiment, lodged 
in the barracks next to the cafe de la Garnison, rendered 
its presence useless to the new authorities13. 
The outbursts of violence continued sporadically through 
the sixteenth, leaving three dead and nine badly wounded. 
Only three of the victims were Catholics, whose attackers 
were unknown. The rest were Protestants, whc-se injuries 
wer-e attributed to 'Royalists'. Viger, clearly disheart- 
14 
ened by the violent opposition to the July Monarchy, op- 
position he would have to admit in his reports, gained some 
satisfaction from his conclusions that the middle classes 
had not been involvedly. 
11 A. N. BB181315. Viger to minister of justice, 17 August, 
1830. 
12 ibid. 
13 A. N. BB 181315, dossier 3998 A7. V iger report, n. d. 
The procureur reported that five Liberals were 
knifed: Gideon Avon, cordonnier; Etienne Honor6; 
Etienne Telle, ouvrier menuisier ; Auguste Rouviere, 
bonlanger; Pie rre Crouzat. Honor 6's assailant 
shouted: 'Voil a pour toi, chien d'un Liberal: as he 
knifed him. 
14 A. N. BB181315. Tableau moral des evenements des 15-17 
ao Vt 18 30 . 
15 A. N. BB181315. Viger to minister of justice, 17 August, 
1830. 
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Nonetheless, the coalition of notables was disin- 
tegrating, and Herman, dismissed by an ordinance of 6 August, 
had left the departmental administration in the hands of 
the former liberal deputy, Chabaud-Latour. But Latour was 
ill, and had no support from the Catholic staff at the pre- 
fecture who had left their duties when Herman was removed. 
Latour urged the new military commander, Bachelin, to col- 
laborate with Viger in the prompt formation of a National 
Guard to restore order. When it was eventually constituted, 
16 
the new guard heralded the character of the July monarchy 
in the department. Viger, chief architect of the Orleanist 
tendency, commenting later on the conditions in which the 
Guard was recruited, said: 
"The Guard is composed entirely 
of Patriots who, with very few 
exceptions, are Protestants. 
It is contending with an 
emibttered and vicious Catholic 
population that looks to the 
moment it will be able to 
free itself from a condition 
it believes to be oppressive, 
tyrannical and hostile to 
its privileges. " 17. 
An Orleanist prefect, Lacoste, arrived on 15 August, 
but the department was without a proper administration as 
late as the twenty-sixth, principally because of the ob- 
structionist tactics of the royalists, who had withdrawn in 
16 A. N. F9512. Lieutenant-general Bachelin to minister 
of-war, 10 August, 1830. 
17 A. D. Gard lE 1071. Viger to minister of justice, n. d. 
ffiled under 1830 reports). 
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in circumstances that precluded the usual introduction of 
the new incumbent 
19 
In Nimes, hostilities subsided after the seventeenth, 
but the atmosphere in the town remained tense and inflamm- 
able. Violence, never far below the surface, erupted again 
at the end of the month. This time, it was occasioned by 
the departure of the pro-Bourbon Swiss regiment. On the 
morning of the twenty-ninth, the regiment marched out of the 
barracks and off towards the road to Beaucaire. It was 
accompanied to the outskirts of the city by a crowd of 
Catholics who sang seditious songs and gave the traditional 
shouts of 'Vive Charles X'. Then, the crowd made its way 
back to the north eastern suburbs of the city, where they 
congregated between the church of St. Charles, on the cours, 
and the Caserne, near the Beaucaire and Avignon roads, on 
the edge of the Catholic Bourgade. Among cries and shouts, 
including one of "Charles X ou la Mort: ", a shot was fired. 
It hit nobody, but the word spread around Nimes that an 
attempt had been made by Carlists on the life of the military 
commander20. 
Insensed by the rumour, and by the persistent agitation 
of the Catholic population, some of whose troublemakers had 
just been freed from detention because of the lack of evidence 
19 Thus, d'Anglas (Beaucaire) , Narbonne 
Lara (And uze) , and 
de Rivie're (St. Gilles) had left their towns without . 
administration and the "important and difficult town of 
Uzes was still without administrators". ibid. 
20 A. N. BB18 1315, Dossier 3998 A7. A detailed report by 
Viger dated 8 October, 1830. 
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of their part in the disorders of 15 August, supporters of 
the new regime marched to the prefecture and demanded to be 
armed so that they could defend the regime. The prefect 
refused, so the Orleanists broke into a gunsmith's shop, 
taking arms, powder and shot. In the absence of an effective 
and equipped National Guard, they organised vigilante patrols 
and established checkpoints around the town, including one 
at the Porte d'Alýs, overlooking one end of the Bourgade21. 
The next morning, the thirtieth, a crowd of Catholics 
marched up to the post and commenced abusing the Orleanists 
manning it. By three in the afternoon, shots were being 
exchanged, and the two regimes in the form of the Protestant 
and Catholic communities were dug in and firing continuously. 
By the time the army intervened between the two sides, five 
Orleanists and two Carlists were dead, seven Orleanists and 
two Carlists were wounded. In his report of the battle, 
2 2. Viger said the Carlists had fired first 
Meanwhile, the effects of the battle had reached alarming 
proportions. The demands made by the Liberals for weapons 
the previous day had incited a number of Carlists to visit 
the Catholic villages of Redessan, Manduel, Bouillargues, 
Narguerittes and Garons, to the east and south of Nimes. 
these villages, the Ntmois told stories of an onslaught on 
the Catholics by the Protestants who were now in control of 
21 ibid. 
In 
22 ibid. 
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the town, and of the systematic pillaging of Catholic horses 
and monuments - notably the mission crosses, erected in the 
1820's to commemorate missions held in the city 
23. An 
army of Catholic peasants was raised on the thirtieth and 
that night, some two thousand Catholics, armed with hunting 
guns, old sabres and pitchforks, assembled outside the city, 
on the Beaucaire side. On seeing the army of peasants out- 
side the city, the Protestants sent for the help of their 
co-religionists in the Vaunage, to the North of Nimes. Con- 
sequently, on the thirty first of August, Nimes offered the 
spectacle of a besieged city, with hundreds of Protestants 
camped out on the Esplanade and erecting barricades around 
the city. A full scale battle, reminiscent of the Bagarre 
of 1790 seemed inevitable until the cure of St. Charles, 
Bonhomme, went out and persuaded the assembled Catholics that 
the Catholics of Nimes were in-no danger, and that the Pro- 
testants who had flooded into Nimes - and whom Viger, in his 
report, called National Guards - were not an occupying force, 
but were as afraid of the Catholics as the latter were of the Prc 
testants. The two sides remained face to face until 1 Sept- 
ember when a cavalry squadron was sent from the city to dis- 
perse the villagers. Eighty arrests were made, and martial 
law was imposed on Names. Characteristically, Viger observed 
that the 'Carlist army' fled at the sight of the troops. In 
contrast, he praised the patriotism and discipline of the 
23 ibid. 
18S 
Vaunage militia contingents24. 
Such violence had taken place nowhere else in France, 
and it was so serious that an official inquiry was insti- 
gated. The inquiry recorded thirteen deaths by violence 
in the second fortnight of August. A Pastor, Tachard, 
25 
was instructed to draw up a list of victims and their de- 
pendents in accordance with the conditions of the Commission 
des recompenses nationales, a body created to compensate 
' les Heros de j uillet ! Tachard's report brought the final 
official figures to forty-four dead and maimed, all from the 
lower social classes26. The government granted annual pensions of 
50O F to the widows of five Orleanist supporters, pensions of 
250: F to five orphans, payment of 500 F to two maimed victims 
of the Catholic royalists and payments of 300 to 1500 Francs 
and short term pensions of one to ten years to nine other 
27 
victims. The inquiry also requested a royal amnesty for 
all involved. This, said Viger, would avoid the long, costly 
and dangerous procedure of apportioning guilt in the courts. 
2 
The amnesty was granted by royal ordinance on 9 October8. 
24 ibid. 
2S ibid., "Desordres politiaues a N'imes, aout 1830". 
% 26 A. N. F1dIII. Bilan des desordres politigues a Nimes, 
aoo t 1830. 
Tachard lists 4 travailleurs de terre, 2 taffetassiers, 
2 menuisiers, 2 poortefaix, 2 faiseurs de bas, 2 Tailleurs 
de pierre among the victims. 
27 ibid. 
28 A. N. BB1ß1315, dssr. 3998 A% Dupont de 1'Eure, minister 
of justice, to Louis Philippe, king of the French, 
October, 1830. 
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The threat of civil war and of a full scale confron- 
tation like that of 1790 between Catholics and Protestants, 
counter revolutionaries and patriots, had been avoided. Un- 
like that of 1790, the patriot victory of 1830 was not clear 
cut. The counter revolutionaries were not demoralised and 
would continue to harbour an unshaking belief in the efficacy 
of military action against the new regime for almost three 
more years. Reports from communes throughout the department 
reflected the fragility of peace that autumn in their fre- 
quent references to unpredictable outbursts of violence and 
provocation directed against officials of the Orleanist 
regime29. In N4mes itself, Viger observed that peace was 
maintained only because of the presence of a strong contingent 
of regular troops and the strict imposition of a curfew30. 
In the same report, Viger remarked: 
We would be closing our eyes to 
the truth if we doubted the odious 
plans of our enemies to create a 
Vendee in the south, with Nimes as its 
headquarters. To the east of our city 
there are many villages in which agit- 
ators have sought to incite people in 
the name of religion, recruiting under 
the banner of the cross. " 31. 
Shortly afterwards, Viger reported that attitudes to the 
July Monarchy were almost wholly determined by the traditional 
29 A. D. Gard 6M 103 contains many reports dealing with 
incitement and violence. E. g., Sub prefect of Ales to 
prefect, 6 September 1830: In St. Ambroix, it is exactly 
the same individuals who have been provoking trouble for 
the past month - all of them Carlists. 
30 A. N. BB181315. Viger to minister of justice, 8 September, 
18 30. 
31 ibid. 
tui 
religious rivalry in NImes32. This appraisal was confirmed 
afterwards by the prefect who noted that the Catholic clergy 
was, generally, unwilling to co-operate with the authorities 
and had refused to take the oath of allegiance required of 
members of the teaching profession and agents of the bureaux 
de charite33. 
In the small village of Parignargues, the Catholic mayor, 
having refused the oath of allegiance, was replaced by a Pro- 
testant. The outgoing mayor took the official bust of 
Charles X and locked it in the church. When his successor 
sought the keys of the church in order to remove the seditious 
object, an angry-crowd barred his way and threatened that any 
Protestant or Liberal to set foot in the church would be 
34 
carried out dead. 
Some months later, the anti-clericalism of the July 
Monarchy would provoke a more threatening and significant 
reaction from the Catholic community. 
Meanwhile, harrassment of July Monarchy officials con- 
tinued through the autumn. In November, Chaubaud-Latour 
remarked that not a day passed without officials in the three 
large towns of Nimes, Albs and Uzes being subjected to insults 
and threats from the Carlist population35. In the village of 
32 A. N. BB181315. Viger to minister of justice, 8 October, 1830, 
33 A. D. Gard V3. Prefect to bishop of Nimes 25 October, 1830 
34 A. D. Gard 6M 103. Mayor of Parignargues to prefect 25 
October, 18 30. 
35 A. N. BB18 1315. Chabaud Latour to Minister of Justice, 
5-November, 1830. 
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Arpaillargues, charged with bitterness since 1815, the liberals 
"tired of the threats made against them, and in the absence 
of adequate protection, have taken up a collection to pur- 
chase arms and powder for themselves"36. Tension increased 
in the-department during the preparations for the trial of 
Charles X's former ministers37. Angry liberals clamoured 
for similar charges to be brought against de Surville, de 
Vogue, de Bernis and de Calviere for their part in the White 
Terror38. 
Viger remained convinced that militant Carlist hostility 
was restricted to the Catholic working classes, and did not 
come from the "Carlist classes aisees" as no Catholic notables 
had been arrested since the July Revolution. Equally, 
39 
even though he had reported that the Carlists were planning 
a "Vendee meridionale",. neither he nor the Prefect, Chaper, 
attached any importance to the increasingly detailed in- 
formation that the Catholic royalists were organising mili- 
tarily under the leadership of the notables whom Viger dis- 
counted in his appraisal of the Carlist threat39 to the 
36 ibid. 
37 One of the State prosecutors, Adolphe Cremieux, was a 
Nimois. 
38 A. N. BB181315. Gasquet to minister of justice, 3 December, 
1830. 
39 A. N. BB18 1315. Viger to minister of justice, 27 Decembcr, 183C 
Dossier 3998 lists 57 arrests on charges of sedition in 
the last quarter of 1830. 
189 
security of the new regime40. 
Their error was revealed at- Christmas, when the Card 
Legitimists held a meeting in Nimes to rally their supporters. 
More than a hundred Catholic royalists attended the meeting, 
including the son of the Marquis de Calviýre-Vezenobres, 
and Quatretail. lons who had emerged from a well protected 
obscurity, armed with two pistols, a carbine and full 
40 A. D. Gard 6M 103. Mouzet fils to minister of war, 
3 December, 1830: "The Marquis de Valfons has a cache 
of over three hundred rifles that were in the possession 
of the National Guard untill its dissolution in 1818. " 
Commissaire de police, Beaucaire. Report of 6 
November, 1830. Money was being distributed to the 
Carlist population of Beaucaire. 
. 
Anon, n. d. (postmarked in Nimes) to minister of 
justice, affirming that the villages to the south and 
"east of Nimes, were the principal points on which a 
Carlist militia was being organised. 
Viger, (A. N. BB18 1315, )had reported to the minister of 
justice on 6 December that a number of Catholic drapers 
had sold out their stocks of green cloth recently. It 
was said that the cloth was to be used to make Verdet and 
Miguelet uniforms. 
In January 1831, the minister of justice received a note 
from the minister of war underlining that the 'secret 
organisation, denied by the local administration and by 
the general officer commanding the military division 
around Nimes' was deemed to exist by the troops of the 
local garrison, who believed, too, that it was being 
funded. 
A. N. BB18 1315. Minister of war to minister of justice, 
7 January, 1831. 
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bandoliers at this hour of need41. The meeting spent much 
time discussing plans for an armed insurrection which would 
overthrow the July Monarchy. 
The publication by professor de Sauvigny of the corres- 
pondence of that indefatigable conspirator Ferdinad de 
Bertier with the duchesse de Berry and Charles X, then in 
exile in Scotland, during the autumn and winter of 1830-31, 
places the Nimes meeting and the rumours of a Catholic militia 
in the broader context of a conspiracy to overthrow the July 
42 Monarchy. The correspondence also leaves no doubt about 
the importance of the royalist organisation in the Gard. 
While the Vendee was considered the more reliable and devoted 
part of France, the Gard was considered the best disposed of 
the southern departments, and the only one with a military 
potential comparable to the Vende'e43. An assessment made 
by Ferdinand de Bertier echoed -the thinking behind the 1790 
counter-revolution: "We can only intensify the war (in the 
41 The meeting had been infiltrated by a spy working for 
the prefect of the neighbouring Bouches du Rhone, who 
passed on details to Chaper. 
A. D. Gard 6M 10S. Thomas to Chaper, 27 December, 1830. 
Concerning Quatretaillons, Viger had written to the 
minister of justice complaining that changes brought 
against Quatretaillons by procureur Guillet in 1819 had 
never been pressed by officials after 1820, and that 
Quatretaillons had been left free to terrorise his native 
Pougnadoresse knowing he 'enjoyed the protection of 
powerful interests in the department'. A. N. BB 18 1048. 
Reports of 8 October and 16 November, 1830. 
42 G. Bertier de Sauvigny, "La Conspiration des Legitimistes 
et de la duchesse de Berry contre Louis-Philippe, 1830- 
32", Etudes d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine, Vol. III 
(1951), pp. xvii-125. 
43 ibid., pp. 18-35. Report by baron de Bordigne, n. d. 
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Gard) by making it a war against the Protestants". The 
main value of the Gard would be as a diversion supported by 
Spanish troops who would, it was believed, cross the frontier 
and engage the major part of the French army so that the 
Vendee could rise and march unhindered on Paris4. The French 
4 
Ambassador to Spain after 1827 had been Jacques de Calviere's 
brother in law, the Comte de Saint Priest. He assured the 
Legitimists of the goodwill of Ferdinand45. In the wake 
of the insurrection, a significant degree of political au- 
tonomy would be given to each province, and the electoral 
laws modified to exclude the liberal bourgeoisie by allowing 
for an alliance between the local notables and what the Le- 
gitimists called the 'classes-inferieures'46. In January 
1831, Bertier was able to argue to the duchesse de Berry that 
the Gard was organised militarily47, and a further report 
mentioned de Surville and Jacques de Calviere as the prin- 
cipal organis-ers48. Ultimately, the Spanish monarch was un- 
willing to risk war in order to return the favour he had re- 
ceived from his French cousins in 1823, and the project was 
abandoned until the duchesse decided to land in France and 
rely solely on the Legitimists and their followers. 
44 ibid., pp. 14-15. Report by Ferdinand de Bertier, 
September, 1830. 
45 ibid., pp. 40-41. Report by Baron de Bordigne, 
October, 1830. 
46 ibid., pp. 33-34. Report by Baron de Bordigne, 
October, 1830. 
47 ibid., pp. 14-15. Report by Bertier, January 1831. The 
Gard was part of the Carlists' 5th military division with 
the Herault and Bouches du Rhöne. According to Bertier, 
it could muster 5 000 men. 
48 ibid., pp. 18-35. Report by Baron de Bordigne, 
1831. 
i')" 
However, at the height of the conspiracy, the French 
government did not dismiss the preparations in the Gard as 
lightly as the prefect did. In January 1831, Montalivet, 
minister of the interior, gave Chaper information he had 
received from the neighbouring department, the bouches du 
Rhone, where police agents frequenting Carlist travellers 
between Nimes and Marseille had discovered that the Catholic 
quarters of Nimes were being funded by Catholic notables and 
that de Surville had offered the last Bourbon prefect two 
thousand armed men when news of the July revolution reached 
Nimes. 49 
Instructed to pay close attention to movements in his 
department, Chaper noted an unusually 1-b-igh number of travellers 
between the west and the Nimes Marseille area50, and three 
men were arrested on charges of drawing up lists of men based 
onthe rolls of the 1815 National Guard1. More conclusive 
5 
evidence of the intrigues was found in February, when an anti- 
clerical mob broke into the Archbishop's palace and the se- 
minary in Nimes. Angered by the growing rumours of a Carlist 
plot and by the ostentation of the Paris Legitimists on the 
anniversary of the death of the future pretender's father, 
the duc de Berry, a crowd ransacked both buildings in search 
of weapons and incriminating documents. While no weapons 
were found, a letter was found in the seminary that linked 
49 A. D. Gard 6M 106. Montalivet to Chaper, 20 January, 1831. 
50 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Chaper to director of police, 4 
February, 1831. 
r 
51 A. N. BB'1.74. Report of the Cour royale de Nimes, February 
18 31. 
1O3 
de Surville with the intrigue and indicated that the 
Legitimists were counting on foreign military aid to over- 
throw the July Monarchy52. 
Conspiracy gave way to rioting in March, when the 
government, acceding to pressures from its anti-clerical 
supporters, authorised prefects to remove from public places 
the huge crosses erected during the 1820s to commemorate 
missions preached in the towns. In the Gard, a number of 
crosses had been attacked at the same time as the seminary, 
and they were a Catholic cause celebre when the Prefect 
instructed the municipality to remove them. The prefect 
made a serious error, too, in authorising the measure on a 
Friday afternoon. When they left work or congregated in 
cafes, the Catholic working classes quickly formed crowds, 
and thronged the boulevards shouting "Vive la Croix et Vive 
Charles X". On the Saturday, 12 March, "at six o'clock, 
the whole Carlist population was in the streets". During 
the morning, a deputation of Catholic notables went to ask 
the prefect not to touch the crosses on pain of leaving Nimes 
swimming in blood, its buildings burnt to the ground. The 
prefect replied by offering to have the crosses placed inside 
the various Catholic churches. The compromise was greeted 
with an angry refusal from the crowds, who set about stoning 
the workmen involved and the National Guards protecting them. 
Shots were fired, but nobody was hit. The National Guard, 
terrified, withdrew, and regular troops were called out to 
52 ibid. 
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take over the task of removing the crosses. The Catholic 
demonstration continued through the weekend and led to the 
burning of property owned by Orleanists53. 
Similar scenes occurred in Ales, where the sub prefect 
noted that, while the Protestants, "who had scarcely any co- 
religionists of the working class" would undoubtedly welcome 
the measure, "the Catholic or Carlist party" would almost 
certainly seize an opportunity to demonstrate its hostility 
to the regime54. During three days of rioting, police found 
arms and powder stored in many of the Catholic households 
55 they searched for rioters. . The towns of Uzes and Le Vigan 
sought permission to leave the crosses alone: Le Vigan because 
the Protestant majority felt no need to provoke the local 
Carlist population unnecessarily 
56, 
and Uzes, because the 
Protestant minority felt it would be exposing itself dread- 
fully if the measure were carried out57. After the experience 
of Nimes and Ales, the prefect agreed with the sub prefects 
and left the crosses. Finally, the removal of the crosses 
benefited only the Legitimists of the Gard, turning away from 
53 A. N. F76780. Gendarmerie reports, 13-14 March, 1831. 
The property destroyed included a barn filled with hay 
for the post horses and the home of a National Guard 
commander. 
54 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Sub prefect of Ales to prefect, 13 
March, 1831. 
55 A. N. BB S8 174. Report of the Cour royale of Nimes, March, 
1831. 
56 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Sub prefect of Le Vigan to prefect, 
12 March, 18 31 . 
57 A. D. Card 6M 104. Sub prefect of Uzes to prefect, 14 
March, 1531. ' 
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the regime many moderate Catholics whose influence would 
have been useful to the local administration58. 
Some weeks after the March distrubances, Viger told 
the minister of justice that while two thirds of the de- 
partment's population was Carlist, the party did not pose an 
immediate threat to the local administration because its 
leaders believed that a successful insurrection could only 
take place with foreign support. In the absence of such 
support, the Catholics - the' procüreur, like many Orleanist 
officials, used the terms Catholic and Carlist interchangeably - 
were resigned to the government', indulging in nothing but 
sullen and deceitful opposition. Indeed, their opposition 
59 
expressed. itself chiefly in anonymous threats to Orleanists 
and malicious damage to their property, so contriving to 
maintain a feeling of uncertainty and fear in the Protestant 
community until the insurrection they dreamed of could become 
60 
a reality. There could be no doubt, however, that the 
Catholic royalists were preparing for a future rising. 
Police vigilance gave the authorities a more compre- 
hensive picture of the intrigues of the Gard Legitimists in 
the second half of 1831. Rene de Bernis and the two Calviere's 
58 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to Casimir Perier, 26 December, 
1831. "You cannot imagine how much damage was done to 
our cause, how many good citizens have cut themselves off 
from our administration because of it (the removal of the 
crosses)". 
59 A. D. Gard 1E- 1071. Viger to the minister of justice, 
2 ii- 1,1831. 
60 A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 127. Mme Fornier de 
Clausonne to.. Gustave, Easter Sunday, 1831. 
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emerged as the ringleaders, while other veterans of the 
White Terror - de Surville, Baragnon, Darnand-Vallabrix were 
their lieutenants61. There was a constant movement between 
Spain and the French coast, allegedly to obtain more guns and 
to negotiate with the Spaniards for more direct aid for a 
rising62. Shooting practices and drill were held at remote 
farms between Nimes and Arles63, while activity in the Catholic 
quarters of Nimes increased significantly. Baragnon, 
apparently the paymaster, assisted by Coulanges and Rouviere, 
spent many hours in the Bourgades and Enclos Rey64, distri- 
buting money that was all the more welcome for the increasing 
economic hardship in the town65. 
In November, the first Lyon insurrection of the 1830s took 
place and its ramifications were felt in Paris and in Rouen, 
61 A. D. Gard 6M 106. Reports of Commissaire general de 
Police, 21,29 September, 1831. 
62 ibid., Reports of 23,24 September, 1831. Catholic 
royalist links with Spain were long standing. Rene de 
Bernis and Jacques Alexis de Calviere had emigrated to 
Barcelona during the Hundred Days, and the latter's 
brother in law had served Charles X as Ambassador in 
Spain until the July revolution. 
63 ibid., Report of 26 September 1831. 
64 ibid., Report of 18 October, 1831. 
65 In 1831, the number of looms working in Nimes fell from 
7,200 to 5,500, and the value of the cloth produced fell 
by 300 000 francs. H. Rivoire, op. cit., II, pp. 28-29. 
The commissaire general of Nimes remarked that the low 
wages and the prospect of unemployment were providing 
many hirelings. A. D. Gard 6M 106, report of 13 November 
1831. By December, the wage offered for a 12 hour day 
was 16 sols for men, 8 for women. ibid., Report of 9 01 December, 1831. 
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where hardship was increasing, too66. In N'Tmes, however, 
the working classes remained calm and orderly67. The new 
prefect, Lacoste, who had already served in Nimes for a 
month in August 1830, remarked that working class agitation 
in the city was invariably related to sectarian matters, that 
the paternalism that characterised relations between the 
Catholic notables and their " eu le"was powerful enough to 
ý68. preclude "movements similar to that of the Lyon artisans ' 
Remarkably, the Legitimists did not even attempt to exploit 
the Lyon insurrection for the sake of publicity: 
"In the days following the events of Lyon, 
when it seemed to me impossible that the 
party could not remain detached from this 
great catastrophe, I naturally assumed that 
it was at the root of our own unrest. I was 
wrong. Sound sources have told me independently 
that the Carlists are taken aback 
and determined not to compromise 
themselves. The clergy is in no way 
involved either. " 69 
I 
66 E. Levasseur, Histoire des Classes ouvrieres en 
France (2 vols., Paris, 1902), II, pp. 6-10. 
67 There was a rumour of a Camp de Jales ouvrier, of 
workers in the north of the department meeting on the 
site of the chateau de la Banne and marching on Ales. 
A. D. Gard 6M 104. Sub prefect of Ales to prefect, 6 
December 1831. The prefect later said it was nothing 
but a rumour (see below). 
68 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to minister of interior, 
December 26,1831. He had already seen that the Republicans 
were so few that they were unable to exercise any 
influence. A. D. Gard 6M 106. Commissaire de police to 
prefect, 24 November, 1831. 
69 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to Casimir Perier, 26 
December, 1831. 
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The unrest Lacoste referred to, amounted to the up- 
rooting of three trees of Liberty and a cafe brawl which 
involved Orelanists and a number of reluctant conscripts70. 
Their refusal to make use of the domestic troubles of the 
July Monarchy is possibly the clearest indication of the 
Legitimists' outright rejection of the regime. A police 
report at the time of the Lyon rising noted that they were 
assuring their followers that the allied powers would inter- 
vene on behalf of Henry V in the Spring, that all must be 
71 
ready to speed his return. 
The agitation that characterised the Carlists through 
the early Spring of 1832 culminated in the landing of the 
duchesse de Berry at the end of April. In spite of the 
absence of support from Spain and the disapproval of Charles 
X and a number of well placed sympathisers, including Chateau- 
briand, the mother of Henry V was determined - and supported 
in her determination by Ferdinand de Bertier - to attempt 
7 
a restoration by force2. 
By 1832, however, the police could identify most of the 
leading conspirators and knew their functions in the organ- 
isation. At its head in the south was the count Narbonne- 
Pelet, who resided outside France in Nice. He was in 
correspondence with Charles de Surville, ex-colonel of the 
Nimes National Guard, who divided his time between Nimes and 
70 A. D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to Casimir Perier, 21 December, 
1831. 
71 A. D. Gard 6M 106. Reports of Commissaire general de 
n, police, 14 %lovember; 9,11, December, 1831. 
72 F. de Chateaubriand, Memoires d'Outre Tombe (Pleiade 
Edition, 2 vols., Paris, 1951 , II, pp. 
523-31. 
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Marseille. De Surville was the general secretary and 
treasurer of the organisation. He corresponded with a 
number of regional subalterns: Charles de Vogüe in Roussillon; 
the Marquis de Montcalm in Montpellier; Rene de Bernis in the 
Ardýche; Jules de Calviýre in Saint Gilles; Jacques de 
Calviere in Ales; and the count Chazelles Lussac in the hill- 
side village of Marguerittes, just outside Nimes. These 
local commanders were assisted by other leading Catholic 
royalists: the Vicomte de Rochemore, a former cavalry officer; 
Henri de Bernis; Trinquelague pere et fils; de Surville's two 
sons; the Marquis de Valfons; Baron, Boyer and Baragnon73. 
The organisation was dominated by landowners and local 
nobles, all of whom had long histories of counter-revolutionary 
activity. But they were supported by a number of influential 
Catholics in various walks of life. The police identified 
twenty four landowners, twenty merchants and industrialists, 
twelve members of the liberal professions, eight public 
officials, six former officers or police officials and four 
cures among the organisation's militants. 
74 
From the beginning of the year, the Catholic royalists 
concentrated their attention on the countryside between Nimes 
and Arles, the most convenient route from Marseille to Nimes 
and the south west. De Surville and de Bernis made journeys 
to Nice and Genoa75, where the duchesse de Berry had gone in 
the summer of 1831; Vampere and a retired captain, Payan, 
73 A. D_. Gard 6M 108. List of principal Carlists. 
74 ibid. 
75 A. D. Gard 6M 106. Commissaire general to prefect, 6 
November, 1831. 
0 
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were seen regularly in Bouillargues, a Catholic village 
76 to the east of Nimes. But their activities were being 
followed very closely by the police, who deduced from the 
military preparations and from the journeys to Piedmont that 
the duchesse de Berry was involved. The prefect of the 
Bouches du Rhöne, Thomas, had managed to infiltrate the 
Legitimist organisation in Marseille, and only two days before 
the landing, wrote to Lacoste in the Gard: 
"Our more fanatical Carlists have 
never been so audacious before. 
They are preparing for an insurrection 
which they believe will be 
imitated in Nimes. They are 
.., relying on the arrival 
by ship of the 
duchesse de Berry on the 28th. 
Marseille is to be the starting 
point of a revolt. " 77. 
An agent provocateur informed Lacoste that Rochemore 
and de Surville had designated Payan to occupy the prefec- 
ture and city hall of Nimes with a batallion of volunteers 
from the villages of Bouillargues and Garons. De Nuty was 
instructed to seize the National Guard armoury. The volun- 
teers were being paid 16 sols per day, and the promise of 
plunder had been made to encourage them78. 
When the landing took place, the Marseille police were 
7 
waiting and the conspirators walked into a trap9. The 
76 A. D. Gard 6M 107. Police report, Easter, 1832. 
77 A. D. Gard 6M 106. Prefect of the Bouches du Rhone to 
Lacoste, 26 April, 1832. 
78 A. D. Gard 6M 106. Police report-1 to LaCoste, 29 April, 1832. 
79 A. D. Gard 6M 107. Prefect of the Bouches du RhBne, to 
Lacoste, 4 May, 1832. 
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duchesse de Berry was spirited away from Marseille to a 
country property near Arles belonging to de Surville's 
80 
son in law In Nimes, the leaders of the intrigue - in- 
clukling general Bourmont - met with Charles de Surville in 
the Hotel du Midi to discuss the next moves, and a number of 
strangers were seen to offer unusually high prices for gold, 
resulting in the sale of almost all the gold in Nimes. But 
the duchesse de Berry did not pass through the city. Using 
the passport of de Surville's daughter, Madame d'Emery, she 
travelled to a country house near Sommieres, belonging to 
the bishop of Montpellier. Then, on 5 May, she went on to 
Montpellier and the west 
81 
Meanwhile, on 30 April, Rochemore, Nuty, Payan, Vampere 
and Roux were arrested for conspiracy82. While Nuty was 
released the next day, the others were detained, and Vamnere 
and Rochemore were not released until 24 May, when the 
authorities had given up trying to find evidence of their 
part in the intrigue83. Their prolonged detention had been 
the occasion of disturbances in the Catholic quarters, as the 
Catholic population protested against the incarceration of 
its notables84. In June, a summons was issued on de Surville 
80 ibid. 
81 A. D. Gard. 6M 107. Thomas, prefect of the Bouches du Rhone, 
to Lacoste, 8 June, 1832. 
82 A. D. Gard IE 1071. Viger to Minister of Justice, 
30 June, 1.8 32. 
83 ibid., and A. Pieyre, Histoire de 
p. 37. 
la Ville de Nimes, Is 
84 Pieyre, loc. cit. 
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that he had held banker's orders signed by the count Blacas 
to fund the rising, but de Surville had fled France to stay 
in-Piedmont 8S 
. 
The total failure of the insurrection to gain support 
was to have a dramatic effect on the Legitimist movement in 
France. Not only did it mark the end of reasonable hopes 
of a restoration brought about by force, but it also strength- 
ened the position of the government. The arrest of the 
duchesse de Berry and the subsequent birth of a second "enfant 
du miracle" turned a romantic conspiracy into a fiasco. More- 
over, the importance of the episode had been eclipsed in June 
by the more violent rising that the Republicans commenced at 
the time of the funeral of general Lamarque. By showing it 
could cope with attacks from Left and Right, the government 
consolidated its position and established itself more firmly.. 
In the south, where the duchesse's plot had been nipped 
in the bud, the local leadership had been identified easily, 
and the popular support expected for such a rising was simply 
86 
not forthcoming. Two years of determined conspiracy had 
led only to failure and dissillusion, while their dogged re- 
fusal to involve themselves in politics left the Legitimists 
without political influence. 
Rene Remond points out that a change in attitude, part 
ticluarly among the younger devotees, became evident in 
85 A. D. Gard- 6M 107. Thomas, prefect of the Bouches du 
Rhone to Lacoste, 24 June, 1832. 
86 A. D. Gard. IE 1071. Vigor to minister of justice, 30 
June, 1832. "since the July revolution... 500 individuals 
belonging to this party (Carlists) have been on trial". 
03 
Legitimist circles after 183287. More pragmatic than their 
fathers and reluctant to consign themselves to a premature 
retirement, many younger Legitimists concluded that hence- 
forth the Orleanist system should be contested from within. 
Thus, while the older generation persisted in increasingly 
fruitless drawing room conspiracies or shunned politics com- 
pletely, Legitimism gradually emerged as a political force 
after 1833. 
This divergence of attitudes was apparent in the Gard. 
There, however, peculiarly southern considerations obtained: 
the proximity of two borders across which strong links had 
existed since the Revolution of 1789, the importance, in a 
largely traditional economy, of a factious and independent 
minded local gentry. These factors, combined with con- 
fessional antagonism and a deep rooted tradition of clan- 
destine opposition to unacceptable regimes had helped main- 
tain the appeal of the conspiratorial brand of royalism in 
spite of the reversal of 1832. Unrelenting in their hos- 
tility to a regime they held to be illegal, de Calviere, de 
Rochemore, Chazelles Lussac and de Surville continued to 
favour unconstitutional methods of opposing the July Monarchy. 
As in 1817, the Chateau de Vezenobres, home of the Marquis 
de Calviere, became a centre of Catholic royalist activity88. 
87 R. Remond, La Droite en France, I, pp. 68-70 
88 Chateau de Vezenobres. Mss. notebooks of Pulcherie-Cecile 
de Saint Priest, Marquise de Calviere. 
Also A. D. Gard 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior, 
13 February, 1833; and 6M 116, prefect to minister of 
interior, 22 April, 1833. 
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The Marquis' son, Charles, had been involved with Emmanuel 
de Saint Priest, brother of Madamede Calviýre, in the ill 
fated conspiracy of the duchesse de Berry89, and in May 1833, 
after the Montbrison trial and amnesty, it was to the Chateau 
of Vezenobres that the southern ringleaders retired90. 
Their regrouping coincided with renewed intrigues in 
the Gard. Rumours circulated that the Catholic royalists 
were preparing for an insurrection planned by the Bourbon 
pretender in Spain, Don Carlos l. When the War of succession 
9 
broke out, it involved the Basque provinces on the French 
border, and offered the French Carlists an exceptional oppor- 
tunity. Their involvement in Spanish affairs for the next 
four years was one of the two principal focal points for their 
relentless resistance to the July Monarchy, and it gave them 
hope of carrying out the plans for an insurrection drawn up 
in the winter of 1830 by Ferdinand de Bertier, Blacas and 
1 
General Bourmont, who had just assumed a command in the army 
of Don Carlos. In effect, it was proposed that a victorious 
Don Carlos would carry the war across the Pyrenees, and the 
Midi and west would rise against Paris with the support of a 
89 Chateau de Vezenobres. Mss. notebooks of Pulchene-Cecile 
de Saint Priest, Marquise de Calviere. They had been 
members of the secret society since 1815. 
A. N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 20 April, 1818. In the 
autumn of 1833, Saint Priest accompanied the duchesse de 
Berry to Italy, and acted as her secretary. (Chateaubriand, 
op. cit., II, pp. 815-18; 828. 
90 Chateau de Vezenobres, loc. cit. Also, A. D. Gard 6M 109. 
Prefect to minister of interior, 11 May, 833. 
91 A. D.. Gard 6M 109. Minister of interior to southern 
departments, 28 April, 1833; and 6M 109, prefect of 
Bouches du Rhone to prefect of Gard, 8 May, 1833. 
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Spanish army92. 
Communications were established with Spain and the west 
via Bayonne, and fund raising activities recommenced 
9-). The 
principal organiser in the Gard, indeed in the Midi, was the 
Vicomte de Rochemore94. He made frequent journeys to 
Spain95 and organised the visits of Spanish envoys who came 
to France on recruiting missions96. De Rochemore was not 
the only Catholic notable actively involved. The Marquis 
de Calviere-Vezenobres allowed his chateau to be used for 
meetings and to shelter Spanish emissaries97, and he was 
92 A. D. 'Gard- 6M 109. Prefect of Bouches du Rhöne to 
prefect of Gard, 8 May, 1833; 6M 110. Minister of 
interior to all prefects, 11 July, 1833; 
6M 122. Prefect of Gard to minister of interior, 13 
July, 1833. 
93 A. D. Gard 6M 110. Prefect to minister of interior, 
10 December, 1833. 
94 A. D. Gard 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior, 
13 February, 183S. "M. de Rochemore is indeed the very 
soul of the Carlist faction here. He directs all the 
intrigues and plans. There is not one agent who does 
not report to him regularly. " 
95 A. D. Gard 6M 110. Prefect of the 
prefect of Gard, 19 October, 1833; 
of interior to prefect of Gard, 11 
de Rochemore is a serving officer 
Carlos, it is regrettable that the 
Bayonne saw fit to give him a visa 
Bouches du Rhone to 
6M 116. Minister 
June, 1836. "As M. 
in the army of Don 
authorities in 
for Nimes. " 
96 A. D. Gard 6M 115. Minis-ter of interior to prefect, 
27 January, 1835; prefect to minister of interior, 11 
December, 1835. 
6M 116. Minister of interior to prefect, 2 July, 1836. 
97 A. D. Gard- 6M 116. Prefect to minister of interior, 22 
April, 1836. 
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involved in briefing Spanish agents sent to recruit in the 
Gard and Bouches du Rh6ne98. The duties of general sec- 
retary to the Catholic royalist organisation were discharged 
by the Comte de Chazelles Lussac, another Catholic country 
squire whose property was near the notoriously Catholic 
royalist stronghold of Marguerittes99. Chazelles Lussac 
received most of the letters from Carlists in all parts of 
the Midi, in Spain and in Italy, and was described by the 
authorities as one of the most energetic agents involved in 
100 the Spanish war. Contacts with the Spanish Carlists 
were so numerous and frequent by sea as well as by land that 
the authorities gave serious consideration to the creation 
at Aigues Mortes - the principal entry and exit point used 
by the Carlists for both Spain and Italy - of a special 
police post charged with the surveillance of the Camargue 
and the Crau101. As events in Spain began to prove dis- 
appointing to the French Carlists, the authorities remarked 
102 
on the return of volunteers to the department 
98 A. D. Gard. 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior, 11 
December, 1835. One such meeting took place in the rooms 
rented in Nimes by the members of the 1815 National Guard. 
99 A. D. Gard, 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, 
December, 1834. 
6M 114 Minister of interior to prefect, 18 October, 
1834. 
100 A. D. Gard 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, 8 
November and 19 December, 1834. 
101 A. D. Gard 6M 118. Prefect of Gard to prefect of the 
Bouches du Rhone, 16 March, 1837. Prefect of the Bouches 
du Rhone to prefect of Card 20 March, 1837. Ultimately, 
the idea was considered impossible to implement effect- 
ively given the size of the Camargue. 
102 A. D. Gard 6M 118. Gendarmerie report, 8 March, 1837. 
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The other major consideration of the Catholic royalists 
was consolidation on the home front. Whatever foreign in- 
vasion might give an intitial-impetus to an insurrection, an 
equippped and prepared organisation would be required to as- 
sure military and civil control of the department. Thus, 
the royalists set about restoring their organisation and 
103 communications through the Midi, with Paris and the west, 
The authorities, aware of the Carlists' movements and meet- 
ings, generally believed that there was little chance of 
another armed rising and no hope of a successful one104, in 
spite of the avowed ambitions of men like de Rochemore105. 
The leadership was well known and closely observed. Thus, 
when the Gard Carlists gave serious consideration to an 
armed insurrection to be led by Bourmont in 1837, the 
authorities were aware of the plot and of its insignificance'06. 
The only occasion that appeared vaguely propitious was the 
103 A. D. Gard 6M 110. Minister of interior to prefect, 
11 July, 1833.6M 118. Sub prefect (Ales) to prefect, 
1 April, 1837. 
104 A. D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 25 
March, 1835; prefect to minister of interior, 13 July, 
1836. 
105 In 1837, the sub prefect of Ales observed to the prefect; 
"However, the leaders of the faction continue to dream 
of a third restoration ä la Charles II, in which M. de 
Rochemore has promised himself the role of General Monk. " 
(A. D. Gard 6M 118. letter of 1 April, 1837). 
106 A. D. Gard 6M 118. Prefect to minister of interior, 17 
March, 1837 and an anonymous Police report, 4 March, 
1837. According to th prefect, the Marquis dtAssas, 
charged with assessing the usefulness of an insurrection, 
said that a rising would not succeed unless Louis-Philippe 
had angered the people, and unless the duc le Bordeaux 
came to France to lead it himself. 
108 
prolonged ministerial crisis of 1839, but it was exploited 
by the Left rather than the Right, albeit unsuccessfully, 
when Blanqui's Society of the Seasons attempted an insur- 
rection in Paris. Nonetheless, the crisis raised the hopes 
of the Catholic royalists107. One of-the largest gatherings 
of Catholic royalist notables took place in N'Tmes in MMay108, 
but shortly afterwards the authorities in the Vaucluse un- 
covered an important Carlist conspiracy in Avignon, and pre 
109 
empted any further Carlist action. 
Nevertheless, as early as the summer of 1833, the 
Catholic royalists in the Gard were preparing for such an 
opportunity 
110. The establishment of a royalist government 
in the department posed no problems. The Catholic notables 
would assume control as they had in 1815. But a loyal, 
determined militia and the good will of the Catholic peuple, 
always a useful reserve force to appeal to if necessary, 
107 A. D. Gard 6M 121. Prefect to minister of interior, 
April, 1839. 
108 A. D. Gard 6M 121. Prefect to minister of interior, 
25 May, 1839. The meeting was held in the Hotel du 
Midi in the first week in May. It was attended by 
some thirty Carlist notables including Chazelles Lussac, 
de Surville, de Montcalm, de Bernis pyre et fils and 
other notables from the Ardeche, Herault, Vaucluse 
and Basses Alpes. 
109 A. D. Gard- 6M 121. Prefect of Vaucluse to prefect of 
Gard, 21 May, 1839. 
Also A. N. BB18 1377, Dossier 7873A8. 
In the course of house searches in Nimes, weapons and 
cartridges were found in Catholic areas. A. 
D. Gard 
6M 121. Commissaire dePol-ic report, 31 July, 1839. 
110 A. D. Gard, 6M 110. Prefect to minister of interior, 
10 December, 1833. 
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were essential, and it was to ensuring these that the leaders 
devoted much time and energy. 
The conspiracy involving the duchesse de Berry had met 
with failure at Marseille itself. Consequently the royalist 
militia in the Gard had not been obliged to commit itself 
and risk defeat and loss of weapons. The task of reorgan- 
ision was carried out from the remote country property near 
the Rhone owned by de Surville's son in law, d'Emery. Accor- 
ding to the prefect, the militia existed only on paper in 
111 1833. Four years later, the authorities were convinced 
that the militia was numerically strong and well organised 
across the eastern side'of the department. Its weapons 
were said to be concealed in a number of Catholic villages112. 
The existence of a Carlist militia was mentioned in reports 
in 1839 and 1841, although the authorities were unable to 
113 
obtain first hand evidence of it 
The good will of the "petit peuple 1egitimiste', 
114 
was 
maintained by the traditional forms of paternalism. Militia- 
men were paid for their service 
ll5, 
and the lower strata of 
111 A. D. Gard 6M 109. Prefect to minister of interior, 
20 June, 1833. 
112 A. D. Gard- 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 
29 April, 1837. 
113 A. D. Gard 6M 121. Prefect to minister of interior, 
25 May, 1839; 6M 125. Prefect to minister of interior, 
9 March, 1841. 
114 The prefect's expression in a report to the minister of 
interior, 14 January, 1835 A. D. Gard 6M 115 . 
115 A. D. Gard 6M 118. Prefect to minister of interior, 
10 December, 1833.6M 125. Minister of interior to 
prefect, 2 March, 1841. 
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Catholic society who were excluded from political partici- 
pation were wooed assiduously: the distribtuion of busts of 
Henri V by Chazelles Lussac on his return from Prague took 
place with a quasi religious solemnity116. The notables 
offered banquets and garden parties to workers' delegations 
and selected groups of the Catholic working class population 
117. 
Celebration of the feast of Saint Henry, which fell conven- 
iently on 13 July, was encouraged, and the notables provided 
funds for food, wine and fireworks 
118. 
Probably the most important element in the notables' 
recruitment of popular support. for their aims was economic 
hardship. Unemployment and poverty were constant threats 
to the working classes of the Gard in the 1830s and 1840s 
in both the traditional textile industries and the newer 
industries assembled around the Ales coalfield. 
A fall in demand on the foreign and home markets, due 
116 A. D. Gard. 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior, 
14 January, 1835 and Commissaire de police of Beaucaire, 
to prefect; 9 January, 1835. 
117 A. D. Gard- 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, 9 
December, 1834. A group of workmen arrived at the end 
of the olive harvest at Chazelle Lussac's country house 
bearing olive branches adorned with green and white 
branches. After a collation, they danced a farandole 
into the nearby village of Marguerittes. 
6M 129. Gendarmerie report to prefect, 3 July, 1835. A 
garden party was given by Forbin des Essarts at his 
house near Aramon for thirty Carlists of no particular 
standing. Seditious songs were plainly heard. 
118 A. D. Gard 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior 17 
July, 1835; 6M 125. Commissaire de police of Nimes to 
prefect, 19 July, 1841; 6M 126. Prefect to minister of 
interior, 20 December, 1841: "The inhabitants of the 
Enclos Rey are carefully cultivated by their leaders". 
LII 
in part to competition from Krefeld and Elberfeld had reduced 
wages in textile manufacturing. The value of the department's 
textile production fell from 17 000 000 F in 1834 to 6 000 000 
119 in 1837. In the autumn of 1834, after the second revolt 
of the Lyon silk workers, 81 000 F were distributed to charit- 
able agencies to alleviate misery in Nimes alone120, Where- 
as 5 000 looms had been working in the department in 1833, 
only 2 000 were left at the end of 1835, and 321 visas for 
Lyon had been given to textile workers in the last quarter 
l2 
of that year alone 
l Villerm6, who described the Nimes 
textile workers as virtuous and sober as a general rule, 
commented that the 3F per day average wage compelled many 
families to do without necessary food and clothing122. 
The newer industries were not spared. Iron and coal concessions 
had resulted in three large concessions , of which the Talabot -Veaute- 
Abric - Mourier company was the most important. While its 
assets were worth some three million Francs in 1835, and 
its total production had increased significantly, its ex- 
pansion into smelting and, ultimately, railways, was un- 
profitable. Bad management resulted in laying off 800 
119 H. Rivoire, op. cit ., II, pp. 28-29. 
120 A. D. Gard 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, 
7 November, 1834. 
In a report to the director of 
and commerce, the director of 
noted in 1837 that the prefect 
20 000 F to set up ateliers de 
A. N. F12 4476A. 9 Marc , 1837 
the department of industry 
the Ponts et Chaussees 
of the Gard had requested 
Charite in the department. 
121 A. D. Gard, 6M 115. Mayor of Nimes to prefect, 28 
November, 1845. 
122 L. R. " Villerme in Rivoire, op. cit., 
II, pp. 50-52. 
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workmen in the Autumn of 1835 and kept wages down for two 
123 
years 
The constant threat of hardship made the Catholic work- 
ing classes, particularly in Nimes, appreciative of the hand- 
outs given by the notables. In return, the latter were 
assured of a pool of men at arms in the event of conflict124, 
Besides the distribution of money, the notables undertook 
one most exceptional step to cultivate popular support. 
In 1836, a number of Legitimists including Saint Priest, 
Chazelles Lussac, Forbin Janson and de Bouillý, endeavoured 
to set up a desalination plant in the Camargue125. According 
to de Bouille, designated to sell shares in Paris Legitimist 
circles, the venture would employ some two thousand men, all 
of whom would be selected for their devotion to the Legitimist 
cause126. The project was commenced, but did not attain 
123 Rivoire, op. cit., II, pp. 179-181; A. Pieyre, Histoire 
de la Ville de Nxmes, I, pp. 79-80; 91. 
The company hadf is led to raise enough money to extend 
the Ales -Be. auc. aire Line to the mine, a measure that 
was indispensable to transport coal and iron to the 
Rhöne. A government loan of 6 000 000 F at 4% saved 
the company from serious difficulties. 
A. D. Gard 6M 130. Report from sub prefect of Ales, n. d. 
6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 29 
April, 1837. 
6M 115. Sub prefect of Ales to prefect, 29 
November, 1835. 
124 A. D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 29 
April, 1837; - 6M 118. Prefect to minister' of interior, 
14 August, 1837. 
125 A. D. Gard 6M 116. Minister of interior to prefect, 
9 May, 1836. 
126 ibid. 
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the importance predicted197, The minister of the interior 
noted, however, that the Legitimist party was "sowing today 
in the hope of reaping tomorrow", 128 Indeed, the interest 
taken by the Legitimist notables in the disenfranchised 
Catholic populace would bear fruits in 1848, when the latter 
129 obtained the vote 
The persistence of a strong conspiratorial tradition 
in the Gard did not impede the emergence, after 1832, of 
a moderate parliamentary tendency. Initially, this group 
was composed largely of younger men who believed that it 
was now essential to attack from within a regime that was 
already creating far reaching social discontent by its 
rapacity and neglect. Legitimists of this tendency rallied 
to the leading Legitimist newspaper, the Gazette de France, 
which, since 1827, had echoed increasingly the particular 
brand of royalism professed by its director, the abbe de 
130 Genoude. 
A Toulousain, former school master and protege of 
Villele, Genoude endeavoured after 1830 to reconcile the 
127 A. D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 
13 July, 1836. 
128 A. D. Gard 6M 116. Minister of interior to prefect, 9 
May, 183 . 
129 A. J. Tudesq points out that election results in the 
south failed to show the true strength of the Carlists 
because they did not take account of the influence of 
Carlism on the disenfranchised masses. Les Grands. 
notables en France 1840-49 (2 vols., Paris, 1964), I, p. 1S1. 
130 On the Legitimist opposition see A. J. Tudesq, 
"L'opposition Legitimiste dans le Midi'l Annales du 
Midi, 1956, pp. 391-407. 
J 
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apparently opposed principles of heredity and popular 
sovereignty. Genoude's doctrine, which he called the 
Monarchie nationale, incorporated "the double principle 
of the inviolability of the throne and approval of the budget 
l31. by the taxpayers,, 
The restoration of the legitimate king could be sanctioned 
by the people only, and the Legitimists, instead of with- 
drawing from politics, should be involved and concerned to 
lead opinion in France to accept a restoration as the most 
satisfactory solution to the country's ills132. 
The Gazette de France had subsidiary newspapers in each 
of the provinces. In the south, its adjuncts were the 
Gazette du Midi, publisied and financed by de Surville and 
a former prefect of the Gard, d'Arbaud Jouques133, and the 
Gazette du Bas Languedoc, published in Nimes by two Catholic 
lawyers, Boyer, son of the syyndic to the procureur of NQmes 
at the outbreak of the Revolution of 1789 and subsequently 
guillotined 
134, 
and Baragnon, whose son would be minister 
c 0 
131 Gazette du Bas Languedoc-, 10 February, 1833. 
132 Tudesq, o P. cit., I, pp. 205-206. Genoude's views were at 
odds with those of the exiled Court. 
133 A. N. F1cI 33. Police report on Midi Carlists, 8 September, 
1971. 
134 A. N. F7 9049. Gendarm 
police, August, 1814; 
for the Gard in 1870. 
the Politics of Moral 
u is rinceton, 197 
erie inspector to director of the 
Boyer's son was Legitimist deputy 
R. Locke, French Legitimists and 
Order in t ar es lyd Re - 
4) 2 pp. 22,59 an n. 
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in the early years of the third Republic135. The Gazette 
du Bas Languedoc became the official organ of the Gard 
Legitimists and, during the 1830s and 1840s, maintained in 
its columns a relentless critique of Orleanism while arguing 
136 for the alternatives offered by Legitism. 
Quite predictably, the newspaper echoed Legitimist views 
on the "vices of excessive centralisation" 
137 
and attacked 
divorce138, secular education139 and the unbridled capitalism 
of the July Monarchy", an aristocracy that dominates affairs 
140 and directs them to its own sole advantage" But the 
Gazette was not simply the voice of reaction. In contrast 
to the laisser faire philosophy of Orleanism, it preached 
the Legitimist doctrine of ordered progress related to human 
needs, not to human greed. To the individualism that they 
saw undermining France, the Legitimists opposed the trad- 
itional, corporate society based on Gallicanism and emphas- 
ising charity and mutual obligations. In these fundamental 
135 Locke, op. cit., pp. 90,22,254. Baragnon had defended 
a number of Catholic royalist terrorists of the 1815 
period, including Boissin, Roll, Reboul and Aurillon. 
A. N. F 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 12 March and 14 May, 
1818. 
136 A. D. Card 6M 119. Prefect to minister of interior, 31 
August, 1838. "This is the newspaper in which they launch 
all their polemics". 
137 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 10 February, 1833. 
138 ibid., 23 June, 1833. 
139 ibid., 2 June, 1833. 
140 ibid., 10 February, 1833. 
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critiques, the Legitimists emphasised the links between 
Orleansirr and Protestantism: 
"One can state that all the 
disastrous systems whose 
fruits we are now harvesting 
have their origins in Protestant 
thought. The very effect of the 
Reformation is to isolate and to 
disunite. It has no uniting prin- 
ciple other than hatred of its 
opponents. " 141 
The legitimists did, however, distinguish clearly between 
industrialism and the abuses that resulted from its mis- 
application 
142. They welcomed industrial progress when 
they considered it to be of use to the community at large. 
Thus, in 1832, Legitimists of the Nimes city council urged 
a considerable improvement in the supply of water to the 
city because it would help make the declining textile in- 
dustry more competitive. Nimes, they felt, might well have 
14 become the Manchester of France'ý3. They suggested, too, 
the creation of departmental credit banks which would be 
sensitive to local needs 
144, 
and they urged legal restrictions 
on speculative investment in order to ensure a stable economy 
1 in the department45. In 1835, the Gazette put the case 
for the extensive use of machines, arguing that the long 
141 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 21 June, 1837. 
142 ibid., 4 June, 1837. "We do not attack industry, but 
its abuses. " 
143 ibid., 26 November, 1837. 
144 ibid., 7 December, 1837. 
145 ibjd., 12 December, 1837. 
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term effects would bring more prosperity and employment, 
146 
not less. In 1838, Goirand Labaume, departmental 
councillor for the canton of Uzes, wrote an article empha- 
sising the benefits of farm mechanisation 147. 
When, in 1833, the question of participation in forth- 
coming elections arose, Legitimist representation on elected 
bodies was almost nil. The revised Charter of 1830 had made 
provision for elected municipal and departmental councils, 
and had extended the franchise enough to give the liberal 
middle classes a numerical superiority. In the Gard, as 
in 1789, the measures favoured-the Protestants. At the same 
time, the requirement of an oath of allegiance to Louis 
Philippe from both electors and candidates made participation 
impossible for most Legitimists. In January 1831, ten 
leading Catholics were removed from the department council 
because they would not take the oath8. A month later, more 
14 
than four hundred Catholic Mayors, adjoints and councillors 
149 
were dismissed. Then, in the summer, all five parlia- 
mentary seats in the department passed into the hands of the 
146 ibid., 19 February, 1837. 
147 ibid., 25 September, 1838. 
148 A. N. F1b II Gard 5. Prefect to minister of Interior, 
January, 1831. 
149 A. N. Flb II Gard 5. Decree of 3 Feburary, 1831 
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Orleanists, partly because of Legitimist abstentions'SO. 
When elections were held for the municipal councils in Dec- 
ember 1831, Nimes, with a two thirds Catholic population 
elected a municipal council with a two thirds Orleanist ma- 
jority. Within the Orleanist majority, there was a Protestant 
majority151. Once again, a change of regime brought about 
a transfer of power from the elite of one community to that 
of the other. Daunant, son of a Protestant mayor who had 
served Napoleon was appointed chairman of the departmental 
15 council and senior councillor at the prefecture 
2. Girard 
was nominated mayor of Nimes and held the post until 1838153. 
Pastor Samuel Vincent was appointed president of the Nimes 
consistorial, a position denied him in 1824 by an ultra 
royalist administrationl54. 
-The absence of Catholic political influence in depart- 
mental affairs and the increasing importance of political 
150 A. N. Flc III Gard S. Elections of 5 July, 1831. Uzes, 
where the duc de Crussol obtained 690-o of the poll in 
July 1830 (Flc III'Gard 5, election of 12,19 July, 1830), 
returned Teste twelve months later with the same percent- 
age of the poll. 
The revised electoral procedure increased the Gard's 
constituencies by dividing Nimes into two constituencies. 
151 A. Pieyre, op. cit., I, p. 25. The Legitimists elected to 
the council were all Catholics, but three Catholic 
moderates were elected also. 
152 D. Roque, "Positions et tendances des Protestants nImois 
au 19e si cle" in Droite et Gauche de 1789 a nos fours 
(Universite Paul Valery, Montpellier, 1975), p. 207. 
Appropriately, M. Roque calls the period 1830-1848 "Le 
triomphe de la bourgeoisie protestante". 
153' ibid.. 
154 D. Robert, Les Eglises reformees en France, p"236. 
J. D. Roque, loc. cit. 
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decisions taken locally - the Guizot education law for 
example - made the question of involvement all the more 
pressing. When, in August 1833, the electoral register for 
the departmental Conseil general elections was being drawn 
up, the Gazette du Bas Languedoc announced that the Royalists 
would not take part in the elections, but would present a 
petition protesting against the oath of allegiance, which 
prevented many citizens taking an interest in local affairs, 
and against the tax qualification that gave an unnatural 
l5 advantage to the Protestant community5. By the autumn, 
that position had been modified, and the Gazette urged royal- 
ists to participate as voters and as candidates "in order to 
assure an honest and faithful interest in the affairs of our 
towns"156. The editor remarked that the oath of allegiance 
should not be an obstacle. It had the Pope's approval and 
the French hierarchy took it. Was there any need to be more 
scrupulous than one's spiritual leaders? 
The views of the Gazette did not obtain the unanimous 
approval of the department's Legitimists. The marquis Dreux 
Breze, one of the leading Legitimists in Paris, came to the 
south, and received most of the local leaders to discuss the 
correct strategy57. Nevertheless, eight Legitimists took 
1 
155 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 15 August, 1833. 
A. N. Flc III Gard 5. Prefect to minister of interior, 
25 August, 1833. 
156 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 27 October, 1833. 
157 A. D. Gard 6M 110. Police report, 30 October, 1833. "The 
Legitimists of Ales, Beaucaire, Saint Gilles and Bagnols 
came (to N'Tmes) to see him. De Larcy, d'Anglas, 
de Cal- 
viere dined with him. De Rochemore, irrepressible as 
always, didn't miss one such dinner". 
GGV 
their seats on the thirty strong departmental council, to the 
jubilation of the Gazette 
1S9. 
In marked contrast to the 
landed gentry that dominated the military faction, the new 
councillors reflected urban professions to a significant 
degree: B6chard (Nimes), Ferrand Demissol (Marguerittes), de 
Larcy (Albs), Goirand Labaume (Uzes) were lawyers. Jalaguier 
(Saint Gilles) was a negociant. The other three, d'Anglas 
(Beaucaire), Deveau Robiac (Robiac) and la Fare (Albs) were 
proprietaires. None of the men had played a prominent part 
in Catholic royalist politics, but four at least had a counter 
revolutionary past: de Larcy was the son of an emigre who 'had 
been appointed sub prefect of Le Vigan by the provisional 
government in July 1815160; Demissol had been a royalist 
volunteer with the duc d'Angouleme in 1815161; Goirand Labaume 
was removed from the council in 1830 as a man "devoted to 
the Congregation"161 and the Marquis de la Fare was the son 
3. 
of the 1815 commander of the Uzes National Guard 
Twleve months later, half of the membership of the 
municipal councils was due for renewal. Once again, the 
Legitimists made inroads. Eight of the eighteen seats on 
159 ibid., 23 November, 1833. "The future of our educational 
institutions is assured". 
160 A. N. Fib 1 687, and A. D. Gard L4S2. 
161 A. D. Gard 4U 5-200. 
162 A. N. Flb II Gard S. Prefect to min Iister of interior, 
9 October, 1830. 
163 See p. 68, note 106 supra. 
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the Nimes council were won by the party, so that its strength 
was twelve out of*thirty-six. Once again, negociants and 
164 lawyers made up the majority of their contingent. The 
prefect, commenting on the sudden growth of Catholic royal- 
ism in local affairs, observed: 
"The life of the (Legitimist) party 
over the last four years divides into 
two distinct phases. During the first, 
which-ended with the expulsion of the 
duchesse de Berry, the party conspired 
openly. The second phase, including the 
present, appears to be more legal, but 
equally hostile to the government. The 
view of the party is: the government must 
fall, and we shall bring it down by 
occupying the majority of offices opened 
to us by the laws of 1831" 165 
A survey made early in the spring of 1835 revealed that the 
Legitimists dominated the cantons of Aramon, Beaucaire, 
Marguerittes, Sumýne, St. Ambroix, Uzes and St. Gilles as 
well as threatening Nimes and Alesl66. 
The conquest of local power was continued in 1837, when 
municipal renewals brought the Legitimists' strength up to 
15, nearly half the Nimes municipal council167. Thereafter, 
there were never fewer than thirteen Legitimists on the 
council, nine of whom were also on the departmental 
164 A. D. Gard 5M 9. Composition of Nimes municipal council, 
1834. 
165 A. D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 5 
December, 1834. 
166 A. D. Gard- 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 
25 March, 1835. A maximum-of 8 cantons were in the hands 
of the Legitimists against 30 controlled by the 
Orleanists. 
The Legitimist controlled cantons were to the east of the 
department, where the population was predominantly Catholic. 
167 A. D. Gard 5M 15. Municipal councillors, 1837. 
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council168. Among them were the sons of: Vallongues, former 
ultra royalist mayor of Nimes; de Surville; de Cabriere; 
Trinquelague; de Larcy and Goirand Labaume. 
The political involvement of these men did not limit 
itself to local bodies. As early as 1834, a decision was 
made to contest the elections to the national assembly. The 
result of the 1834 election proved a failure, partly because 
of the persisting internal divisions in the Legitimist move- 
ment on the question of participation 
169, 
and because the 
Legitimist candidates were not local men. The Gard had put 
up national figures: Hyde de Neuville and Fitzjames in Nimes, 
Dreux Breze at Uzes. Only in Ales, where the unremarkable 
Berard de Montcalm stood against the son of baron Daunant, 
a former Protestant mayor, did the Legitimists come near to 
victory. In the Intra Muros constituency of Nimes, the 
transfer of votes from the "progressive candidate", Lafitte 
to the Consitutional Chastellier, led to the defeat of 
170 Fitzjames. Nevertheless, the result in the extra Muros 
constituency was contested. In the re-election, the Legit- 
imists put up a candidate who withdrew once the Orleanist, 
Viger, had failed to obtain a majority, thus leaving the 
constituency in the hands of the Republican, Teulon171. 
168 A. D. Gard 5M 15,24,31,39. Municipal council 1837-48. 
169 
170 
In Uzes alone, 108 Legitimists abstained. Gazette 
du 
Bas Languedoc, 21 June, 1834. 
A. N. Flc III Gard S. Election of 21 June, 1834. 
171 A. N. F1c III Gard S. Election of 6 September, 1834. 
Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 11 September, 1834. 
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The next legislative elections were held in November 
1837, barely a month before the renewal of the municipal 
councils. The conflict in the Legitimist party seems to 
have been largely overcome by then, partly by the effects 
of local Legitimist councillors and also by the fading pro- 
spects of an armed revolt against the July Monarchy. Con- 
sequently, an electoral committee was formed, including de 
Surville, which paid a full time electoral agent to ensure 
that the prefect did not exclude qualified Legitimist voters 
from the electoral registers. The committee liaised with 
the Republican opposition, too2. After a very fierce 
17 
struggle, Bechard, the Legitimist candidate, was elected 
against the moderate Catholic former mayor, Chastellier. 
Teulon retained the second Nimes seat 
173. Shortly after- 
wards, agreement between the military men and the parliament- 
arians seemed to be firm. In the summer of 1838', a re- 
ception was held in honour of Bechard at the end of the 
parliamentary session. The reception was attended by the 
politicians and the soldiers of Catholic royalism, and toasts 
were proposed to electoral reform, to the royalists, to 
Bechard and to de Rochemore'74. 
The parliamentary opposition was maintained until the 
fall of the July monarchy, although Bechard lost his seat in 
1846 as a result of government bribery in favour of a Catholic 
172 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 27 July and 14 September, 1847. 
A. D. Gard 6M 118. Prefect to minister of interior. 
173 A. D. Gard 6M 118. Elections of November, 1837. 
174 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 8 July, 1838. 
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constitutional candidate, baron Feucheres. 175 In 1842, his 
second attempt to win a seat, Felix de la Farelle, a Prot- 
estant, won Ales for the Legitimists and retained the seat 
until 1848. 
The Gard Legitimists complained constantly that the 
electoral Cens reduced unnaturally the party's represent- 
ation and influence. 
176 While this was correct, as the Second 
Republic would show clearly, the Cens encouraged the Catholic 
bourgeoisie to assume a type of leadership in local Legitimist 
politics that distinguished Catholic royalism in the south 
from the Chateau based variety that so often obtained elsewhere 
in France. Throughout the July Monarchy, Legitimist 
opposition to Orleanism in the Gard remained the opposition 
of Catholic elites to the Protestant elites who profited 
then from the July Monarchy as they had previously profited 
from the Revolution and the Empire. 
177 
175 Pieyre, op. cit., I, pp. 212-3. L. Boyer, a long standing 
Legitimist supporter, was induced to vote for Feucheres 
in exchange for a post as Inspecteur des Theatres de Paris. 
Also, see, the report of the Procureur neral of Nimes 
to the minister of justice, 9 August, 1846. A. N. BB 17 
A 146). 
176 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 22 March, 1838, for example. 
177 It would be incorrect to suggest that Catholic royalism 
merely represented landed wealth and its clientele in 
opposition to capitalist, industrial modes of production. 
Deveau Robiac and de Larcy had considerable shares in 
the mines and foundries of La Grand' Combe and Bess6ges 
(A. D. Gard 6M 104. Anon. report, spring, 1848), and 
Felix de Surville exploited the Nimes-Montpellier railway, 
paying an annual rent of 381 000F to the government 
(Pieyre, o cit., I, p.: 181). Benoist d'Azy, elected 
Legitimis ty for the Gard in 1849, had, of course, 
extensive industrial interests. 
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Chapter 6. 
News that the July Monarchy had been overthrown brought 
great rejoicing to the Gard Catholics. The Gazette du Bas 
Languedoc commented with an air of self righteousness: 
"Is there not in this sequence of events something that 
inspires, recollection, that compells one to ponder on God's 
justice? "1 The ferociously sectarian Catholics of the 
Enclos Rey joined with those of the Enclos Mathieu in planting 
a tree of liberty in the square, before the barracks. 2 
The February revolution, which had no violent reper- 
cussions in the Gard, threw open the political debate in 
the department once more. The declaration of a republican 
form of government and the promise of universal male suffrage 
which gave the Catholics a numerical superiority were both 
accepted by the Catholic notables without criticism. The 
Gazette du Bas Languedoc publishQd'. a statement by Berryer, 
a leading Legitimist parliamentarian, pledging his support 
to the republic and to the principle of universal suffrage3, 
Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 2 March 1848. News of the 
Paris events reached Nlmes on the morning of 2S February 
by telegraph. The communication from the provisional 
government stated that Emile Teulon, republican deputy 
for Names, was appointed Commissioner of the republic 
in the department. A. Pieyre, op. cit., I, p. 241. 
2 Pieyre, op. cit., I, p. 244. 
3. Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 29 February, 1848. 
J 
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and the same newspaper declared: 
"The revolution has all our sympathies. It 
was made by France and for France. It was 
pure and admirable. It has proclaimed its 
respect for God, for man and for liberty. " 
just, 
4 
The Legitimist attitude to the events of February was 
expressed more clearly by the Marquis de Riviere: 
"The whole of France, and soon all 
Europe must be obliged to rally round the 
flag that bears the device Liberty! Equality! 
Fraternity! Well, we desire this flag to be 
our own, and that the device be applied lit- 
erally and integrally to everyone. 
We are no longer in the age of systematic 
hatred, of dogmatic opposition. Monopoly power 
is undesirable for any one group. It is no 
longer a matter of Catholics and Protestants 
here; we are all Christian citizens (des citoyens- 
chre't iens) . 
Some people seem astonished that we, the 
party known as Legitimist, the constant 
opponents of all usurpations, give our support 
to the provisional government. 
Quite simply, in our opinion, the 
provisional government is Legitimate and will 
remain so as long as it does not deviate from 
the presidential mission that circumstances have 
conferred on it. 
Legitimacy does not signify monarchy 
any more than democracy. The republic is just as 
legitimate in our eyes as we are. We both believe 
that all the citizens ought to desire that which 
the nation desires; that this alone is legitimate, 
of Divine right. 
We have felt, to the present, that the 
head of state, or of the republic, the title 
matters little, should be hereditary as at Sparta, 
not elected as in the United States. " 5 
4 ibid., 
5 ibid., 
11 March, 1848. 
5 March, 1848. 
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Thus, the Legitimists were prepared to recognise the 
republic as the legitimate caretaker until the people gave 
their assent to a permanent successor to the Orleanist 
regime. The Legitimists were in a generous mood. The 
fall of the July monarchy had eliminated the Protestant 
elite as a credible political force, and the Catholic leaders 
commanded a numerical majority in the department. Like 
Legitimists throughout France, they were inclined to see 
the republic as a stepping stone to a restoration. Indeed, 
the principal danger appeared to come from the socialists. 
Not only were the activities of the parisian left disturbing, 
at Albs, working class discontent about working conditions 
and food led to strike action and the threat to burn down the 
homes of Talabot, Benoft d'Azy and Deveau Robiac6. 
Consequently, as the department prepared for the 
election of a constituent assembly, there were signs that 
a coalition of Orleanists and Legitimists was emerging to 
defend class interests against the threat of socialism7. 
6 A. D. Gard 6M 145. Police reports (sub commissioner 
of Ales) to Commissioner of the republic, 5,7,10 
April, 1848. 
7 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Vice president of the electoral 
committee of Genolhac to minister of interior, 17 
April, 1848. . "The party of 
the regency and the 
Legitimists have raised their audacious aristocratic 
heads here as in the rest of the department. They 
will be successful with the aid of certain officials, 
stupidly left in office, and priests, who shamelessly 
hawk the reactionary list from house to house. " 
Similar comments came from the sub commissioner for 
the arrondissement of Ales concerning St. Ambroix 
(2 April, 1848), and from a national guard officer of 
Sauve (22 April, 1848). 
)8 
When the lists were drawn up8, the Legitimists included 
four Protestants: Emile Toulon, Auguste Demians, Orleanist 
avocat general, Favand and Paul Bousquet, former Orleanist 
deputy for Le Vigan from 1831 to 1837.. As in 1790, the 
9 
Catholics were offering the Protestants a proportional 
representation, but in an electoral system that would almost 
certainly return a Catholic list. As in 1790, the Pro- 
testants would reject a minority share in a Catholic list. 
The Catholic list, with the four Protestants, was elected, 
but the publication of the results on 7 April showed that 
the Catholic electorate had voted for the Protestant can- 
didates as well as the Catholics, but the Protestant voters 
had refused their votes to the Catholic candidates, preferring 
8\ A decree of 5 March made each department a con- 
stituency. A deputy was elected for every 40 000 
citizens. The electorate could vote for lists 
recommended by the parties, or cut across the 
lists. A minimum of 2 000 votes was required to 
elect a deputy, irrespective of the size of the 
electorate. R. Remond, La Vie politique en 
France, II, pp"33-7. 
In the Gard four lists were presented: the 
Legitimist list; a conservative Protestant list 
that included the Catholics De Larcy and Be chard; 
a moderate republican list (the Protestant list 
less de Larcy and Bechard); a republican socialist 
list. Some candidates - de Larcy, Bechard, Teulon 
and his brother, Bousquet and Gilly fils appeared 
on more than one list. 
9 Pieyre, op. cit., I, p. 259. 
4 
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to vote as far to the left as possible 
10. 
The results led to extensive sectarian rioting. 
two p. m., a Catholic crowd thronged the boulevards that 
circumscribed the old city chanting: 
"Vive Henri V! A bas les Liberaux! 
Vive Henri V! A bas les Hugenots! " 
At 
The crowd halted outside the cafe Gibelin, meeting place of 
the republican and bonapartist opposition. Thereafter, 
there are two versions of what occurred, one Catholic, the 
other Protestant, both recorded by the police. According 
10 Indeed, the Protestant electorate had not even 
supported the two Orleanist Protestants on the list, Bousquet and Demians. The results were: 
Teulon (rep) 92 523 
Favand (rep) 88 615 
B6chard (leg) 55 418 
de Larcy (leg) 53 491 
A. Demians (Orl) 52 740 
Roijx Carbonnel (leg) 51 546 
Reboul (leg) 51 470 
la Brugulere (leg) 51 404 
Bousquet (Orl) 50 540 
Chapot (leg) 50 026 
Annuaire politique, 
1850 
The difference between the votes obtained by Teulon and 
Favand, who were on the republican list as well as the 
legitimist list and those obtained by the other can- 
didates, corresponds quite closely to the votes obtained 
by the unsuccessful candidates of the republican list; 
Gilly 46 344; Almire Cavalier 45 762; G. Teulon 41 353; 
Lichere 39 969. 
The point was made in 1852 in a memorandum from Charles 
de Calviere on the subject of confessional representation 
in the legislative elections of February 1852: "The 
Catholics used their majority with moderation in the 
1848 election. Their leaders put on their list the names 
of four Protestants who were elected unanimously, while 
the Catholic candidates were elected by only 52 000 votes". 
(i. e. the Catholic electorate). A. N. F1cIII Gard S. Etat 
actuel des partis Mss. memo randumdrawn up for de Calvi re 
by a colleague, Casimir Murias. 
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to the Protestants inside the cafe, shots were fired into 
the cafe, and those inside returned the fire to defend 
themselves, unfortunatley wounding one of the demonstrators. 
The Catholic version claims that shots were fired from the 
ll cafe with no other provocation than singing. 
A full scale confrontation developed. Within an hour, 
the Catholics of the Bourgades, Enclos Rey and the Bouquerie 
were in arms. Snipers lurked at street corners, firing 
into nearby Protestant quarters. The Protestants retaliated, 
and when the firing stopped at eight in the evening, three 
Catholics had died. Martial. law was imposed at eleven 
o'clock, but the two camps sealed off their areas and kept 
patrolling the town through the night to recommence their 
fighting the next dayl2. 
Any chance of political alliances on lines other than 
sectarian rivalry had been destroyed. Protestant ex- 
clusiveness was matched by Catholic determination to win 
control of the department. A lull, all too familiar to 
NImoisr followed the rioting and did little to reassure the 
authorities for the future. Signs of antagonism could 
13 
11 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Police report, 27 April, 1848. 
12 ibid., reports of 28,29 April, 1848. 
13 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Police report, 7 May, 1848. 
"I would not advise the authorities to have any faith 
in the apparent calm. One side hold meetings that ex- 
asperate members of other clubs. We shall soon 
have 
revenge, some say. We are ready for battle, reply the 
others". 
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be seen in many parts of the department as the Catholics 
began to assert their numerical superiority. In Saint 
Ambroix, they took over the national guard and clamoured for 
weapons 
14; in Uzes, they refused to admit proportional 
Protestant representation on the municipal council that was 
is be formed. Political attitudes were already being 
shaped in relation to traditional tensions. 
In the summer, two important issues, the composition 
of the national guard and local elections widened the split 
that had revealed itself in April.. 
A decree of 4 March 1848 opened membership of the 
national guard to all males of 21 years with six months 
residence in the commune. As a result, the composition of 
the national guard had undergone a radical modification, 
Catholics of all classes outnumbering the Protestant middle 
classes who composed the Orleanist national guard. Conflict 
and resentment had been widespread in communes where there 
was a large Protestant population, for the Catholics had 
endeavoured to exclude Protestants from the service, and had 
used the guard to intimidate the Protestant populationl6. 
But the guard had not been extensively armed. After the 
April riots in N'mes, the guard's acting commanders asked 
for arms so that it might discharge its duties effectively. 
Realising that such a measure would amount to arming the 
14 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Gendarmerie report, St. Ambroix, 
24 May. 
15 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Report of sub commissioner for 
X-1-as 9 May, 1848. 
16 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Commander of the St. Ambroix 
Gendar- 
merie to commissioner of the republic, 
24 May, 1818. 
_,, ._ of Pont St. Esprit to police commissioner, 1010 
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Catholic population, the Protestants, including the deputies 
Teulon, Bousquet and Favand, opposed the apparently leg- 
itimate request17. The question was brought to a head by 
three more days of sectarian rioting in June. A brawl 
between a Catholic and a Protestant led to extensive fighting 
in which an attempt was made on the life of Farjeon, chair- 
man of the temporary municipal council18. 
The national guard, called out to end the rioting, was 
of little use against armed adversaries. On 14 June, regular 
troops were deployed, and took four hours to dislodge marks- 
men entrenched at the Porte d'Ales and the Moulins a vent, on 
the north side of the city. The prefect, Salives, decided 
to arm the national guard, which had been deployed at points 
19 
where Protestant and Catholic communities met. 
Immediately, the Protestants reacted to a measure they 
perceived as a threat. Men of the cafe Gibelin formed up 
with weapons in front of the cafe and sought to intimidate 
the national guard. At eight o'clock the following 
20 
morning, a deputation marched to the prefecture to seek the 
dissolution of the guard. A Catholic counter demonstration 
assembled, and the crowd had to be dispersed by the army21. 
Salives refused to accede to the Protestants' demands. 
17 Piýyre, op. cit., I, pp. 260 ff. 
18 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Reports of police commissioner, 
Nimes, 12,13, June, 1848. The rioting began on 11 June. 
19 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Police report, 14 June, 1848. 
Also Pleyre, op. cit., I, pp. 266-70. 
20 Pieyre, loc. cit. 
21 A. D. Gard 6M 144. Police report, 15 June, 1848. 
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The attitude of the Protestants provoked an immediate 
outburst of indignation from the Gazette du Bas Languedoc: 
"What, then, has become of the skill, 
so vaunted, of bygone Protestantism 
in Nimes? What has become of its elite? 
of its ascendancy? of its influence? 
What! Faced with a government that 
proclaims through the mouth of its 
local representative, the rights of 
all men, you stand as the partisans 
of narrow privilege, of exclusiveness, 
of intolerance. You dare to dictate 
insolently to the magistrate of the 
Republic, to the representative of 
the popular principle, your seditious 
and absurd claims. 
For eighteen years, the Protestants 
kept 1800 guns in Nimes, under the 
gaze of the enslaved and unarmed 
Catholic population. Fewer than 1500 
guns have been distrubuted to the citizens 
of Nimes so far, and the privileged class of 
1830 liaises its voice in despair". 22 
Such were the tensions in Nimes, that the prefect. 
saw fit to suppress news of the June insurrection in Paris, 
which, he believed, would have given the Protestant people 
a pretext to revolt against the authorities23. The question 
of the national guard was ended in August, when the Catholics 
succeeded in gaining the posts of colonel and lieutenant 
-colonel in elections during which the Protestants tried in 
vain to win at least one of the key positions24. 
The elections to the municipal and departmental councils 
provided the context for another clash between the two 
22 Gazette du Bas Lan guedoc, 18 June, 1848. 
23 Pieyre, op. cit., I. pp. 280 -81. 
24 ibid., p. 300. Protestant resentment was expressed in 
the Courrier du Gard of 1 September. 
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communities. In February, Teulon, commissioner of the 
provisional government until his election to the constituent 
in April, had nominated a temporary Municipal commission in 
Nimes, and the other communes had formed ad hoc councils 
under the guidance, where possible, of the sub commissioner 
in each arrondissement. The Nimes commission reflected 
all political shades, and no group had a clear majority. 
The chairman was a Protestant, Emile Causse25. 
Elections to a permanent municipal council were fixed 
for August, after the divisions between Catholics and 
Protestants had become acute. For the purposes of the 
election, Nimes was considered to be a single constituencey. 
Consequently, the Protestants, who were numerous in the 
first, second and tenth urban sections of the city, had no 
guarantee that they would be represented. Shortly before 
the elections, the Gazette du Bas Languedoc expressed the 
hope that the elections could bring about a rapprochement 
if the Catholics chose to ensure proportional representation 
for the Protestant minority26. The results of the first 
ballot on 10 August showed clearly that rapprochement was 
. 
far from the minds of the Catholic electorate. Among the 
twenty five councillors elected that day, there was not 
a single Protestant. De Surville, de Rochemore, Nourry 
Treboulon and de Cabrieres, all long standing members of 
the Catholic royalist secret society, were among those 
25 Piýyre, op. cit., I, pp. 245-246. Thirteen members of the 
municipal commission are identifiable as Legitimists. 
26 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 27 July, 1848. 
0 
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elected. The result produced a response from the Prefect, 
who issued a proclamation to "the majority", declaring 
they were compromising their material and political in- 
terests by their exclusiveness. How could he be expected 
to endorse a municipal authority that excluded a portion 
of the city's notables? How could the citizens expect a 
Republican governemnet to encourage a municipality that 
was so openly biased against a large part of the republican 
electorate? Salives ended his statement with an appeal 
to the citizens of the Bourgades, of the Enclos Rey, to 
be generous 
27. 
On the same day, 15 August, the most successful Pro- 
testant candidates, Causse, Granier, Mourier, Roux and 
Vincens, published their intention to withdraw from the 
second ballot. The Courrier. du Gard, in which they 
published their intention, lamented. "Only God can see 
and prevent the public misfortunes which we are destined to 
witness and suffer. , 
28 
The prefect's appeal went unheeded, and in the absence 
of strong Protestant contenders, the entire municipal 
council went to the Catholics29. The municipalities 
27 A. Pieyre, op. cit., I, pp. 289-90. A. D. Gard 5M 44. 
Municipal elections (N^imes), August, 1848. 
28 Courrier du Gard, ' 15 August, 1848. 
29 A. D. Gard 5M 44. Election of August, 1848. 
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of Uzes30 and Ales31 were won by legitimists, and most 
of the towns to the south east of N'Imes were dominated by 
the legitimist party 
32. 
Success in the municipal elections was followed by 
a strong legitimist presence on the departmental conseil 
general 
33 
and in the conseils d'arrondissement, but in 
both instances, the constituency was the canton, thus 
assuring the Protestants of representation in cantons 
where they were in a majority. 
34 
The first repercussion of the Catholic victories was 
the dismissal of the Prefect, Salives. As he left Nimes, 
the Courrier du Gard noted: 
"The extraordinary administration to 
which we were subjected could not endure. 
From the moment of his arrival, Monsieur 
Salives was the instrument of a particular 
30 A. D. Gard 6M 145. anon. to prefect, 3 September, 1848. 
31 A. D. Gard 6M 154. anon. to prefect, n. d. 1848. 
32 They included Beaucaire, Aramon, Marguerittes, 
Remoulins, Villeneuve les Avignon, Roquemaure and 
Bagnols. A. D. Gard 6M 154. Prefect to minister of 
interior, 31 March, 1849. Charles de Calviere stated 
that "while Protestant majorities expelled Catholics, 
the Catholic majorities left proportional representation 
to Protestants, except in Nimes. The elections were 
8 days later there, and Catholics, aware of what had 
taken place, became extremely angry" (A. N. Flc III Gard S. 
Notes sur l'etat des partis dans le Garte-, February, 1852. ). 
33 A. D. Gard 4MI 8. Roughly 2/3 of the thirty eight 
councillors were legitimists. 
34 Nine out of ten cantons in Le Vigan returned Pro- 
testants; four in the canton of Ales; and four in the 
canton of Nimes. (A. D. Gard 4M 1 8). 
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party. He did not cease to speak and 
work for one exclusive interest" 35 
A number of reports of Legitimist intimidation were 
sent to the Prefect as the resentment felt by the Pro- 
testants became more acute36. Within a matter of months, 
the Gard had become a republic with no republicans. Sectarian 
suspicions were so strong that the new prefect felt obliged 
to order an inquiry into the percentage of public offices 
held by each denomination 37 , while the Courrier du Gard 
35 Courrier du Gard, 5 September, 1848. Salives had 
certainly offended the Protestants since his arrival 
in mid June. Besides arming the national guard, he 
had commented adversly on the Gard's judiciary (un- 
changed since the July Monarchy): "They (the judges) 
are always ready to hurl themselves on the Catholics. 
If a case concerns a Protestant, the most serious 
offences are deemed to be unimportant. " A. D. Gard 
6M 145. Report to minister of interior, 17 August, 
1848. 
The Courrier was owned by the Orleanist Protestant 
Daunant. 
36 Most such reports came from "mixed" areas: Uzes, 
Sommieres, Pont Saint Esprit (where there was a mili- 
tant republican population), Ales and St. Ambroix, where 
Protestants and republicans felt they were unfairly 
denied representation. A. D. Gard 6M 154, last quarter 
of 1848. 
Three deputies, Demians, Chapot and Bruguiere wrote 
to the republican newspaper La Liberte pour Tous (28 
August, 1848) deploring the difficulties that the 
Catholic monopoly would cause. 
The Courrier du Gard (8 September) hypocritically 
admonished the "Carlists" for taking full advantage 
of their numerical superiority. 
37 A. D. Gard 6M 154. The prefect asked the three sub 
prefects to send him the numbers of Catholics and 
Protestants employed by the administration in their 
arrondissement. The replies were not standardised, 
but revealed that the proportion of Protestants employed 
was roughly commensurate with their overall size 
in 
the department. The lists were far less detailed than 
that of the Courrier, which had a point to make. 
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published a detailed list of paid public posts in Nimes, 
concluding that only 36 of the 269 positions were filed by 
Protestants. 38 
For their part, the Catholics were satisfied with their 
domination in the department. In contrast to the first 
half of 1848, no rioting occurred between the elections 
and the end of the year, although there were sporadic 
manifestations of Catholic royalist triumphalism. 
39 
In December, the first direct election of the head of 
state was held. On this occasion, the whole of France 
formed the constituency. No immediately local issues were 
at stake, but a marked distinction between Catholic and 
Protestant choices was evident. In accordance with le- 
gitimist policy, the Catholics voted, faute de mieux, for 
Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who, in the eyes of the conser- 
vative coalition, called after its headquarters the "rue de 
Poitiers", appeared to be a stronger guarantee aginst the 
left and who was prepared to foster Catholic interests as 
40 7 
the. Falloux law and the Roman expedition had shown. 
. 38 
Courrier du Gard, 29 August, 1848. 
39 A. D. Gard 6M 145. Mayor of Bellegarde to prefect, 
3 September, 1848; Mayor of Aujargues to prefect, 7 
September., 1848; Commissioner of police, Uz6s, to 
prefect, 12 September 1848; Commissioner of police, 
Sommieres, to prefect, 16 September, 1848. 
40 The views of the Gard legitimists, like those of many 
of their confreres throughout France, were summarised 
by the sub pre ect of Uzes: "Louis Napoleon will have 
the support of the Legitimists, who desire a policy of 
reaction, and who see beyond him to a restoration". 
A. D. Gard 6M 154. letter to prefect, 17 November, 1848. 
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The Protestant vote, however, went to the two republican 
candidates, giving them both a share of the poll that was 
condiderably higher than their national vote4l. 
A closer look at the Protestant vote in Nimes shows 
that preferences for Ledru Rollin were not necessarily 
determined by economic factors. In the first urban section 
which included the residences of the Protestant haute 
bourgeoisie, around the auai de la fontaine and the lower 
slopes of the Mont Cavalier (Tour-Magne), and where Pro- 
testants made up just over half of the population, the 
candidate of the left obtained 28% of the votes cast in the 
section. In the two Other sections with a considerable 
Protestant population, Ledru Rollin won more votes than 
Cavaignac. 42 It would be facile to conclude that the 
Protestant vote for the "Montagnard" candidate was determined 
solely by the resurgence of Catholic royalism, and its 
41 The results of the election of 10 December were: 
France Gard Nimes 
L. N. Bonaparte M 74,2 47,6 62 
Gal. Cavaignac M 19,5 36 21 
Ledru Rollin M 4,9 14,7 16,5 
Sources: R. Remond, La Vie p oliticýue en France, II, p. 276. 
A. Pieyre, op. cit., I, p. 315. 
42 The first urban section voted as follows: 
L. N. Bonaparte 46% 
Ledru Rollin 28% 
Cavaignac 26% 
See J. D. Roque, "Positions et tendances des Pro- 
testants nimois au 19e siecle" in Droite et 
Gauche, 
p. 212. 
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attendant threats, but votes for a party that resurrected 
the slogans of 1793 were uncharacteristic of a bourgeoisie 
that had paid dearly at the hands of the Jacobins for their 
federalism. Nevertheless, the dichotomy between the two 
communities was perceived by the local administration as 
being very largely the Protestant community's attempt to 
counter the Catholic threat. 43 
Republicans were increasingly concerned after the 
election of Louis Napoleon. After appointing a cabinet 
drawn from most shades of opinion in the constituent as- 
sembly, he nominated Thiers to lead it and then withdrew 
to make a tour of the provinces while political opinion 
polarised around two blocs, Order and Progress. After 
the promulgation of a constitution and election of the 
president, the constituent assembly ceased to have a purpose. 
Consequently, it dissolved itself in January, and the 
politicians began to prepare for the third national election 
in a year. 
In the Gard, the campaign began against the background 
of smouldering sectarian tension. Since the autumn of 1848, 
the Legitimists had been pressing vigorously in the assembly 
and on the departmental council their perennial demands for 
greater measures of local autonomy and more power for 
43 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Prefect to minister of interior, 
31 March, 1849. (quarterly report). 
Also L. Loubre, "The emergence of the extreme left in 
lower Languedoc, 1848-51: Social and economic factors 
in politics. " American Historical. Reviely, 1968, pp. 1019- 1051. 
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departmental councils. In the course of a heated discussion 
in the Conseil general, the Protestants and the Prefect 
vetoed a motion on decentralisation proposed by the Letit- 
imists. Reporting the debate, the Courrier du Gard re- 
vealed the fears of the Protestants: 
"(Centralisation) is a safeguard of 
individual interests and of local 
minotities against malicious in- 
fluences, narrow prejudice, the 
oppression of coteries and even of 
majorities in communes and de- 
partments... It makes civil war 
impossible". 44 
The antagonism was not limited to debating chambers 
and newspaper columns. In his quarterly report in the 
spring of 1849, -the prefect reported that Patriots in many 
towns claimed they were living in daily fear of their lives 
and property because the Legitimists controlled the local 
national guard. He urged the minister of the interior 
to dissolve the national guard in Uzes, Bagnols, Beaucaire 
and Roquemaure. 
45 
Aware of the polarisation towards the extremes that 
was taking place in France, the minister of the interior, 
Leon Faucher, was committed to obtaining a coalition of 
conservatives of all shades in order to prevent the emergence 
of both the left and the Legitimists as an influential 
44 Courrier du Gard, 25 January, 1849. The Legitimist 
policy was stated in the Gazette du Bas Languedoc of 
18 October, 1848, when a speech by Bechard in the 
assembly was reported fully. 
45 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Prefect to minister of interior, 
30 March, 1849. 
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political force. 
46 Thus, he was concerned that the prefect 
should encourage the more reasonable Legi_timJ_sts and Orleanists 
to agree to a common list of candidates that would win votes 
47 
from moderates and reflect both communities. 
A similar view was expressed in March by a dozen Pro- 
testant notables, all closely associated with the July 
monarchy, and who were anxious that a split Protestant vote 
like that of December would only serve the cause of Legitimism 
or else give undue influence to the extreme left, sought an 
alliance with Catholic moderates by proposing a conservative 
list in which confessionalism was subordinated to economic 
interests. 48 
46 For a study of Faucher's views, see T. Zeldin, 
"Government policy in the French general election of 
1849". English Historical Review, 1959, pp. 240-48. 
47 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Minister of interior to prefect, 
5 April, 1849. "You seem to believe that the fight to 
the death that exists between the two cults will result 
in a complete Legitimist victory. That would be a mis- 
fortune for the department and a very poor example to the 
country. I am inclined to believe that the moderates of 
the Legitimist party would regard it as disturbing, too". 
idem., 7 April 1849. "I am trying to persuade the 
leaders of the Legitimist party to select three moderates 
from their ranks". 
48 A. Pieyre, op. cit., I, p. 329. The notables were 
Mourier, Cavaillon, Daunant, Coste, Vincens, Amalry, 
La Farelle (who had been Legitimist deputy for Ales 
from 1842 to 1848), Sagnier, Valz, Cazeing, Granier and 
Michel. Their list was Orleanist and commerical in 
flavour: Daunant, Troupel, Perouze, Mourier, Cavalier, 
Pelet de la Lozýre and two Catholics, Roux Caf'bonnel, 
a silk merchant, and Denys Benoit d'Azy, ma1tre de 
forges. 
The committee was called the 'rue des Flottes" committee 
after its location next. to the petit temple. 
L4 ) 
I 
The Legitimists responded by elaborating their own 
list, 49 composed entirely of Catholics, equally dedicated 
to defeating the "Reds". S0 This "rue de Se uier"committee 
accepted nominations from cantonal committees and sought to 
produce a definitive list that had the assent of Legitimists 
all over the department. 51 According to the sub prefect 
of Ales, 
"No rapprochement seems 
possible between the two 
religious parties (sic), 
who reproach each other 
with deceit in the previous 
elections, and who will in no 
circumstances accept the 
candidates of the other party. 
The Catholics, all Legitimists, 
are awaiting the instructions 
of the Nimes Catholic committees, 
the Protestant merchants, mainly 
moderate Republicans, seem to be 
waiting for guidance, and if the 
republican committee has the wisdom 
to make a wise choice, they will 
almost certainly accept its 
list. " 52 
49 Pieyre, op. cit., I, p. 334. 
50 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 3 May, 1849. 
"If we divide, the enemy will pass. The enemy, do 
not forget, is socialism, the common enemy: enemy 
of the rich whom it ruins; enemy of the poor whose 
misfortunes it aggravates; enemy of property which 
it destroys; enemy of the family which it breaks up; 
enemy of religion which it blasphemes. " 
51 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Sub prefect of Uzes to prefect, 
20 April, 1849; mayor of Beaucaire to prefect, 19 
April, 1849; police report to prefect, 24 April, 1849: 
"According to my information, M. de Surville will 
replace de Riviere on the final list so as to avoid 
giving offence to the Cotes du Rhone". 
52 A. D. Gard 6M 154. report to prefect, 24 March, 1849. 
The first sentence is ambiguous in French: "aucun 
rapprochement ne semble possible entre les deux partis 
religieux qui se reprochent de s'etre trompes 
mutuellemont dans les precedentes elections". Did they 
deceive each other, or themselves? 
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The administration's efforts to bridge the sectarian 
gulf and create a list based on social and economic interests 
failed. S3 Three days before the election took place, the 
Gazette repeated the importance of voting only for the 
Catholic list, which it published in full. 54 
On 13 May, the Catholic list was elected in its 
entirety. Five of the constituent deputies were returned, 
and the votes they obtained in 1849 did not vary greatly 
from those of the previous year. 
55 
53 In April, Faucher agreed to the prefect's request to 
dissolve the national guard in Beaucaire, Bagnols and 
Roquemaure, but preferred not to authorise the measure 
in Uzes to avoid the risk of upsetting his attempts to 
win over the Legitimists. (A. D. Gard 6M 154. letters 
to prefect, 7 and 14 April, 1849). 
54 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 10 May, 1849. The same issue 
printed statements from Charles de Calviýre and Chazelles 
Lussac that they would not stand as "indepen dents" and 
would support t he Catholic list. 
55 The results were: 
(1848) 
Benoist d'Azy, maitre de forges 52 514 - 
Roux Carbonnel, President of the Chamber 52 383 51 546 
of Commerce 
de Larcy lawyer 50 808 53 491 
Bechard lawyer SO 748 S5 418 
Chapot lawyer 50 797 50 026 
Debeaune Proprietor at 
Roquemaure 50 033 - 
la Bruguiere Proprietor 49 658 51 504 
d. e Surville Proprietor, member 
of the conseil general 49 510 - 
Sources: Annua ire politique, 1850; Pieyre, op. cit., I, 
pp. 258-60. 
I was unable to find detailed records of the May 1849 
election. Consequently these comparisons. do not take 
account of abstentions, which R. Remond estimates as 
31,9%, practically twice as high as in April, 18-18. 
Vie politique, II, p. 80. 
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The average of the votes for the Catholic list, 50 780, 
corresponded closely to the total Catholic vote in the 
department, 56 and the list received the greatest support 
from the eastern part of the department, while in the Pro- 
testant north west, preference was given to candidates on 
the moderate and Montagnard republican lists. 
57 Catholic 
loyalty was strong and very successful. The sub prefect of 
Le Vigan observed: 
"The most disappointing feature is that 
political opinions are the consequence 
of religious attitudes. Thus, every 
Catholic is, or is believed to be, a 
Legitimist. By the same token, only 
the Protestants produce liberals and 
republicans of all hues. This class- 
ification is accepted by public opinion, 
and it corresponds closely to reality. 
It is all the more annoying that even the 
most independent and intelligent men are 
influenced unconsciously by the society 
they keep. 
Would you believe, Monsieur le prefet, 
that the Protestants, who, in the Gard, 
are the richest, and so have most to lose, 
voted as a man for Ledru-Rollin and 
Joigneux? " 58 
56 See note 10 supra. 
57 A. D. Gard 6M 154 contains an incomplete list of 
cantonal returns for the election. Nonetheless, 
a pattern can be seen. The Catholic list was 
elected completely in: Nimes (three cantons), Uzes, 
Ales, Remoulins, Roquemaure, Aigues Mortes and 
Sommieres. In contrast, Alzon rejected La Bruguiere 
and Benoist d'Azy for Almir Cavalier and Bergeron; 
Le Vigan rejected Debeaune for Almir Cavalier; Lasalle, 
St. Jean du Gard and Sauve rejected the whole list and 
voted for the montagnard list, which included Ledru 
Rollin. 
58 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Sub prefect of Le Vigan to prefect, 
10 October, 1849. 
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The electoral success of May 1849 was a watershed 
for Catholic royalism in the Gard. Universal suffrage 
and the reduction of political conflict in a way that 
emphasised traditional lines of cleavage had enabled 
the Legitimists to regain control of the department 
with remarkable ease through the ballot box. But there- 
after, there was little that the department's royalists 
could achieve without national endorsement of Legitimist 
principles. Such endorsement was unlikely. In the national 
assembly, the Union liberale dominated with some 450 seats, 
but it was a makeshift alliance of all shades of conservatives, 
and was bound together by little more than a common fear of 
the democrates who had re emerged with strengthened resolve 
after the June reaction, and who had gained some 210 seats 
in the assembly. 
The political impasse and the absence of clear dir- 
ectives from Chambord, who was unwilling to become embroiled 
in the politics of the second Republic, left the Legitimists 
confused and prone to division. What they had welcomed in 
1848 as a revolution based on aspirations was rapidly pro- 
ducing frustration and impatience in some, and provoking 
revolutionary tendencies that grew from the frustration. 
Thus, in the midst of the indecision and growing fear 
of the "red spectre", Genoude and his allies began a 
campaign to seek the immediate restoration of the monarchy 
by popular consent. 
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The Appel au Peuple had a particular appeal to the 
Catholic people of the Gard, who had been taught for 
eighteen years that the advent of Henri V would re-establish 
Catholic ascendancy in the department, and would con- 
sequently put an end to the economic hardship they had 
been enduring since the early 1830's. In 1849, the 
effects of the economic recess 
Popular disenchantment at the 
among the parliamentarians was 
rate of electoral abstentions, 
the simple, direct politics of 
to have more to commend itself 
ion were severe and widespread. 
S9 
lack of political initiatives 
expressed in the growing 
and not surprisingly, 
the Droit national seemed 
than the excessive caution 
of the parliamentarians. 
The divergence of opinions in the Legitimist party 
was first evident at the time of the election of the 
president of the republic. Genoude published a number of 
articles exhorting Legitimists to abstain because any 
head of state save Henri would be a usurper. The Gazette 
du Bas Languedoc responded: 
"The Republic is instituted in France. 
We do not have any traditional sympathy 
with it, but we are not in conflict with 
it at the moment. The principle on which 
it is founded is not ours, but it is 
honourable, and we shall not seek to 
inhibit its natural development. " 60 
59. See Rivoire, op. cit., II, pp. 28-9; H. See, Histoire 
economi ue de -la France (2 vols., Paris, 1942). , 
pp. -41; Ph. Vigier, La Seconde Republique dans la 
R6 ion alpine (2 vols., Paris., 1963). II, pp. ll -25; 
760-83. 
60. Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 5 November, 1848. 
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Genoudists quickly capitalised on the blatant oppor- 
tunism of the parliamentarians, and in the spring of 1849, 
a number of Legitimists in the Beaucaire and Uzes districts 
sought the inclusion of Genoude in the Catholic electoral 
list. A brochure supporting his nomination contained ele- 
ments of a social and economic policy that were designed to 
appeal to the working class Legitimists rather than the 
61 
notables. Droit national supporters demanded half the 
seats on local nominating committees, but were rebutted by 
the notables. Further, the administration, concerned about 
the emergence of popular royalism that was clearly diverging 
from the patronage of its traditional leaders, strove to 
swing the Legitimist committees behind the moderate candidates, 
Bechard, Roux-Carbonnel and Chapot. 
62 
Genoude was not included in the list, but the Droit 
national was not. deterred. In the summer of 1849, it pub- 
lished a newspaper, the Etoile du Gard. Aiming to outflank 
the Gazette du Bas Languedoc, which broke with the Gazette 
de France and remained loyal to the "official" Legitimists 
of the Gard, the Etoile put forward policies that were simple 
and comprehensible to the working class Catholics - it re- 
jected politics at the national level and demanded popular 
61 Candidature de Monsieur Genoude dans le Gard (Beau- 
caire, n. d0 ). 
62 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Mayor of Beaucaire to prefect, 19 
April, 1849; Sub prefect of Uzes to prefect, 20 April, 
1849; Minister of interior to prefect, 7 and 21 April, 
1849. 
0 
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participation in the political system: 
"Universal suffrage, the Appel au peuple, 
there is the whole political. gospel of the 
masses of the Gard, just as it is our own. 
France, long repressed by revolutions, 
can be reborn. It was Paris that delivered 
France into the convulsions of revolution. 
It is from the provinces that her res- 
urrection must come. " 63 
Moreover, a number of political societies affiliated 
to the Droit national were founded. These societies ap- 
pealed chiefly to Catholic workers, although they drew 
support from all sections of the Catholic community. The 
most important societies were the Cercle du Droit national, 
whose rooms were in the popular Enclos Rey; the Societe des 
Travailleurs, also known as the Comite central des ouvriers 
64 
of Nimes, and the Cercle de Saint Patient of Uzes. 
By the end of 1849, the popular royalism of the Droit 
national was a disturbing political force in the Gard: 
"The majority of municipal and general 
councillors, all the deputies, face no 
greater threat than their own moderation 
which could alienate popular support and 
threaten their chance of re election. 
The Catholic workers have their own societies 
ostensibly founded as pious confraternities, 
but whose chief effect is to promote political 
rivalry. " 65 
63 Etoile du Gard, 1 July, -1849. 
64 The Droit national had over 400 members who included 
N6&ociants, avocats and agriculteurs 
A. D. Gard 4U5 111. Dossier on the Droit national, 
report of Procureur de la Republique, 17 January, 1851. 
The Cercle de Saint Patient had a membership of over 
400, and was composed chiefly of "ouvriers et -tgri- 
culteurs. " A. D. Gard 6M 149. Sub prefect of Uzes 
to prefect, 31 August, 1850. 
65 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Prefect to minister of interior, 
20 December, 1849.1 
Z ! )U 
Thus, the notables found themselves challenged by the 
emergence of a Montagne blanche. 66 The rise of popular 
royalism in 1849 was undoubtedly related to the inability 
of the traditional leadership to cope with the political and 
economic crisis that crippled France. The popular royalists 
made their own many of the social and economic policies that 
Bechard, La Farelle and Goirand Labaume had expounded ten 
years earlier, and which applied specifically to the 'Jacobins 
enfarines" of the Droit national: the establishment of local 
credit banks for small producers, mutual aid societies for 
workers organised on a departmental basis. They clamoured, 
too, for cuts in taxation. 
67 
The movement was fostered by three dissident landed 
"frondeurs": C hazelles Lussac, who had constantly displayed 
a marked preference for conspiracy; the duc de Crussol 
Uzes, and the marquis de Riviere. These notables revelled 
in the paternalistic relationship they enjoyed with their 
clientele, 
8 but there was undoubtedly no small measure of 
6 
11 
66 See R. Huard, `tMontagne rouge et Montagne blanche in 
Droit et Gauche de 1789 ä nos jours, pp. 140-60. 
67 Etoile du Gard, 8 May, 1850. 
68 The Cercle de Saint Patient described the duc d'Uzes 
as "L'ami des ouvriers" (A. D. Gard 6M 155.11D6liberation 
de la societe de Saint Patient . In the summer of 
1850, 
the society prepared a traditional Serenade welcome for 
him, with an arc de triomphe, when he returned from the 
Conseil general meeting. The sub prefect commented that 
"Monsieur le duc had been generous to the society on 
more than one occasion". A. D. Gard 6M 149. Sub prefect 
of Uzes to prefect, 31 August, 1850. 
Chazelles Lussac was the chief sponsor of the osten- 
tatious celebration of the feast of Saint Henry in 1850. 
A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 16 
July, 1850. 
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self interest in their flirtation with an essentially working 
class movement. Both Crussol Uzes and Chazelles Lussac had 
large estates to protect at a time when the rural populations 
were hostile to landowners because of the erosion of forest 
and pasture rights. 
69 
De Riviere and Crussol Uzes, too, 
had failed to be nominated as Legitimist candidates in the 
1849 legislative elections. 
70 
Perhaps it was no coincidence 
that the duc d'Uzes used the support of the Cercle de Saint 
Patient in an attempt to regain influence on the electoral 
committee in 1850.71 
In December 1849, one of the deputies, Debeaune, died. 
A partial election was held in January, and this provoked 
a head on collision between the Droit national and the 
"official" Legitimists. 
Debeaune was from Roquemaure, so the initial choice 
of a candidate was left largely to the Legitimist committees 
along the Rhöne. Their choice fell on Edouard du Grail, a 
wealthy vigneron from the Tavel district, and a man 
"remarkable by his strict observance of the Catholic faith". 
72 
69 Remusat, Memoires de ma vie (4 vols., Paris, 1962), 
notes that Crussol Uzes had always been swayed by his 
property interests. He owned 4000 hectares of woodland. 
vol. IV, p. 106 and note. 
Dr. Gwynn Lewis points out in his forthcoming book The 
Second Vendee that the duc d'Uzes' father had been tie 
victim of a serious attack by local peasants who burned 
down much of the estate in 1792. 
70 A. D. Gard 6M 154. Sub prefect of Le Vigan to prefect 
29 April, 1849. 
71 See p. 252 infra. 
72 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, S 
January, 1850. 
252 
However, the choice was rejected by the Cercle de Saint 
Patient, whose committee issued a statement demanding a dem- 
ocratic choice of a candidate by the electors, from a list 
of candidates submitted by the electors. The Cercle said 
it was proposing the duc d'Uzes, "ami des ouvriers" but it 
would ultimately accept the wish of the majority. 
73 
When the demand was refused by the notables, the Cercle 
called a democratic electoral assembly to discuss the merits 
of nominees. The meeting was chaired by Peladan, editor 
of the Etoile du Gard. In the end, the Droit national chose 
to put up Lourdoueix, the new editor of the Gazette de France 
and an even more intransigent supporter of the appel au 
ep uple than Genoude, who had retired through ill health. 
74 
The campaign was bitter, and the sub prefect of Le Vigan 
commented that the partisans of the Droit national were em- 
ploying the rhetoric of Jacobinism to discredit the mod- 
erates, urging the people to ignore the "aristocrates" and 
warning of even higher prices if. du Grail won. 
7S In the 
words of the prefect, the struggle was bitter beyond all 
expectations. 
76 The Droit national gained enough support 
to split the Catholic vote and permit, unintentionally, the 
73 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Deliberation de la soci6te de Saint 
Patient d'Uzýs, 29 December, 1849. 
74 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Sub prefect of Uzes to prefect, 6 
January, 1850. 
75 A. D. Gard 4U5/111. Procureur of Le Vigan to Procureur 
-6 116, ral, Nimes, 24 January, 1850. 
76 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior 
14 January, 1850. 
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election of the republican candidate, Favand. 77 
After the election, antagonism between the official 
Legitimists and the Droit national, encouraged by its support, 
was considerable. Popular Legitimism was clearly a grow- 
ing threat to stability. Through the spring and summer 
of 1850, the Droit national dominated politics in the 
Gard, opposing vociferously the limitation of universal 
suffrage, which the Gard's Legitimist deputies voted, 
78 
and 
worrying the local authorities by the character of its plans 
to celebrate the feast of Saint Henri. Indeed, the 
summer of 1850 marked the heyday of the movement. Flying in 
the face of the local authorities, 
79 its leaders invited 
Lourdoueix to festivities that included fireworks, street 
banquets and serenades in the popular quarters of Nimes as 
77 Favand won 34 219 votes, du Grail 22 719, Lourdoueix 
11 619. Annuaire politique, 1851. 
78 The 
_Etoile 
du Gard (25 May, 1850) declared that universal 
suffrage was the strongest guarantee of order by giving 
everyone a share in politics. The Droit national con- 
stantly made common cause with republicans in seeking the 
repeal of the law of 31 May. 
See R. Huard, "La defense du suffrage universel sous la 
seconde. Republique.: les reactions de la population gardoise 
et le petitionnement contre la loi du 31 mai 1850". 
Annales du Midi, 1971, pp. 315-336. 
79 In February 1850, the prefect had imposed a ban on public 
meetings and banquets (A. D. Gard 6M 153, prefectoral 
arr8t6,18 February, 1850). 
As the "marching season" approached, the Nimes city council 
(Legitimist) imposed a ban on fireworks which were an in- 
tegral part of all popular celebrations. (A. D. Gard 6M 153. 
Municipal arret6,10 July 1850). Even Vidal, son of the 
1815 police chief, and adjoint at the Nimes city hall, 
could not dissuade the Droit national from proceeding with 
its plans. Vidal, and other "of icial" Legitimists were 
dismissed as collaborators. (A. D. Gard 6M 155. Vidal to 
prefect, 13 July, 1850. ) 
2 54 
well as more formal banquets at the home of Chazelles Lussac. 
The climax of the festivities was marked by the reproduction 
in the Etoile du Gard of the inflammatory Deliberation des 
Catholiaues de Nismes of 1790. The text was prefaced by 
the comment: 
"We are pleased to place the following 
document before our readers. They will 
see what manner of men the Nfmois of 1790 
were, and will be able to compare them with 
those of the present day. " 80 
However, in a country that was increasingly concerned 
for law and order, the very violence of the Droit national, 
regardless of its professed Legitimism, made the movement 
as dangerous as. any of the republican clubs, and both the 
authorities and the official Legitimists, afraid of full 
scale rioting, moved to restrain the movement. Thus, police 
proceedings were begun against the Cercle du Droit national 
8 for illegal gatherings and displays, 
1 
while Ferdinand Bechard 
brought a civil action against the Etoile du Gard for de- 
famation. 82 The most devastating blow came from Chambord 
himself. In September 1850, he disavowed the notion of a 
plebiscitary monarchy that had been the core of the Droit 
national's political programme. Chambord's denunciation of 
80 Etoile du Card, 17 July, 1850. 
81 A. D. Gard 4U5/300. Procureur of Nimes to Procureur 
g n-ral, n. d. 1850. Also 4U5 111, dossier on the Droit 
national. 
82 A. D. Gard 6M 149. Police report, 22 September, 1850. 
Pelac. an, who refused to publish an apology, was 
imprisoned 
for 5 days, fined 1 000 Francs and obliged to pay the 
costs of the case. The case was a source of great amuse- 
ment to the-republicans. 
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the Droit national weakened the movement considerably, and 
drew the bulk of its leaders back into the main stream of 
Legitimism, 83 although the popular clubs it had engendered 
continued to function. leaderless, under the watchful eye 
of the authorities. 84 
In contrast to the radicalism of the Droit national, 
the orthodox legitimists, led by the department's deputies, 
displayed a cautious attitude to political developments. 
Increasingly conscious of the threat of popular disorder, the 
parliamentarians reiterated their policies of decentralisation 
and paternalism. If more authority was invested in the de- 
partmental councils "which, since their creation have not 
ceased to give distinguished service", the antagonism between 
citizens and a remote, monolithic administration would be 
eliminated. "In times of peace, the conseils generaux would 
oversee the most rapid expedition of administrative affairs, 
and in times of unrest they would provide a daunting bulwark 
against anarchy. 
JS 
For the working classes, the Legitimists prescribed 
religious education86 and the creation of certain types of 
working men's associations as an antidote to "competitive 
83 See Huard, "Montagne rouge... " pp. 156-7. 
84 The Cercle du Droit national changed its name to Cercle 
de la Concorde, and continued to meet until it and other 
political clubs were closed in August, 1851. See pp. 25-9-60 
infra. 
85 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 1 July, 1849. 
86 ibid., 27 June, 1849. 
LI 
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individualism": 
"To refuse the working classes 
the freedom of seeking in the spirit 
of Christian association, the antidote 
to socialism, and to revitalise through 
a free and spontaneous elan the work 
of Saint Louis, from which the civil- isation of the middle ages sprang 
almost completely, is a double crime. 
It is a crime against humanity and 
against God. " 87 
The notion of "free and spontaneous 'elan" did not, how- 
ever, prevent the lawyer Ferdinand B6chard from proposing 
that towns should keep a register of workers in order to 
monitor their movements and to regulate the labour market. 
88 
Expressing such views, it is not surprising that the deputies 
voted for the 31 May law, imposing a three year residence 
qualification on voters in order to diminish the influence 
of the "nomadic populations of ne'erdo wells (faineants) and 
"8 troublemakers who disturb the peace of our cities. 
9 
But the elites were incapable of resolving the political 
and economic crisis. In the summer of 1850, the chance of 
a monarchic restoration based on a fusion of the two dynasties 
failed, leaving much mutual recrimination and suspicion. 
90 
87 ibid., 7 October, 1849. 
88 ibid., 20 May, 1849. 
89 idem. 
90 The orleanist Courrier du Gard commented acrimoniously: 
"We-know of nothing more conservative than the principle 
of Legitimacy, but we k now of nothing more revolutionary 
than Legitimism. What is the role of the Legitimists? 
It is always the same. It consists in conspiring against 
every government, consp iring to undermine its 
foundations, 
to weaken the laws, to prepare revolution when it 
does 
not exist. " Courrier du Gard, 17 September, 1850. 
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At the same time, the uncovering of a widespread republican 
plot revealed the determination of the left to bring about 
its own solution by whatever means it had available. 
91 
Finally, Chambord's rejection of compromise and of the 
policies of the Droit national left the Legitimists in an 
impotent attentisme. 
After a visit to Chambord, who was sojourning in Wies- 
baden, 92 the Gard's Legitimist deputies arranged a series 
of meetings in the department. They urged "true Legitimists" 
to be patient and united, for the country was on a volcano, 
and the government lacked unity. According to the police, 
their words were mild and restrained. 
93 At the largest 
of the meetings, held in N'Tmes and attended by more than 
four hundred people, they were challenged on the efficacity 
of their work by Guillo, a militant of the Droit national. 
Instead of debating the extent of the president's powers, 
Guillo told them they should be seeking to revitalise 
politics by proroging the 31 May law that restricted the 
suffrage. 
94 But the challenge had no suport, and the 
f 
91 The Gard was significantly involved in the plot. See 
M. Dessal, "Le complot de Lyon et la resistance au coup 
d'etat dans les departements du sud-est", Revue des 
Revolutions contemporaines, No. 189 (1951), pp. 83-96. 
Also R. Huard, "Correspondances des Militants, A. Ode 
et ses freres, 1849-50", Annales historiques de la 
Revolution fran 3aise, No. 222 (1975), pp. 584-602. 
92 Pieyre, op, cit., II, p. 29; A. Peladan, Lettres de 
Henri V. (Avignon + Nimes 1887), pp. 34-35. 
93 A. D. Gard 6M 149. Letter from Niebel, Sommieres, to 
prefect, 8 October, 1850. Report from sub prefect of 
A16s to prefect, 15 October, 1850. 
94 A. D. Gard 6M 153. Police report, N'mes, 20 October, 1850. 
Jacobins enfarines who sought the repeal of the law made 
common cause with the republican left in a petition campaign 
in the spring of 1851.95 
The Legitimist leadership, unable to pursue a fruitful 
"Legitimist" policy, slipped into support for Louis Napoleon. 
In 1851, Chapot, de Larcy, de Surville, Roux Carbonnel and 
Bechard voted in favour of constitutional revision that 
would enable the president to stand for a second time. 96 
The failure of the project to obtain the required two thirds 
majority increased feelings of uncertainty about the im- 
mediate future. 97 In the second half of 1851, de Larcy 
and de Surville travelled to Fröhsdorf to explain their 
provisional support for Louis Napoleon: 
"It is generally acknowledged that 
instructions given to the legitimist 
party hitherto were to impede every political 
act that could endow Prince Louis Napoleon 
with strength and permanence that exceed the 
limits traced by the constitution. Doubtless, 
the honourable representatives of which I 
speak, having consulted the populations of 
the department, will have judged that a re- 
storation of the elder branch is the event 
for which France is least prepared; that, 
waiting for more propitious circumstances, 
the maintenance of order should be the single 
great concern of. les honnetes Bens. If this 
95 See Huard, "Defense du 
. suffrage universel", pp. 
335-6. 
de Surville and de Larcy did, however, sign a petition 
drafted by the Gard conseil general seeking both 
electoral revision ann constitutional revision. 
(A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 
26 October, 1851). 
96 Pieyre, op. cit., II, pp. 125-6. 
97 According to the prefect, political uncertainty was the 
single major cause of the slow recovery of industry in 
the department. (A. N. F12 4776 c. prefect to minister 
of agriculture and commerce, -13 August, 1851). 
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is the case, I can understand that the 
deputies of the Gard should want to explain to the comte de Chambord their reasons and 
obtain from him some approval for their new 
attitude in the assembly, approval that will justify them in the eyes of the blinder, 
more violent men of the party". 98 
Indeed, the Legitimist population of the Gard had 
never understood their deputies' support for the one 
man who stood between them and their ambition. The 
prefect reported: 
"Their clubs meet all the time. Every 
night, walking along the boulevards and 
opposite the barracks, one hears their 
shouts of Vive Henri V and songs in his 
honour. " 99 
Popular celebration of the feast of Saint Henry in 
1851 again defied bans on public gatherings, carrying 
weapons and letting off fireworks. Moreover, the cele- 
brations almost led to a sectarian riot. 
100 A police en- 
forced closure of four legitimist clubs revealed the senti- 
mental bric a brac that had always characterised popular 
Catholic royalism: pictures and busts of Chambord as Henri V, 
as le jeune Ecossais; pictures of Louis XVI; scenes from 
the tribulations of the royal family during the Revolution; 
potraits of leading Legitimists - Kergorlay and Saint 
Priest. 101 The prefect gauged the character of popular 
98 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 
26 October, 1851. 
99 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 
21 June, 1851. 
100 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 
16 July, 1851. 
101 A. D. Gard 6M 153. Police report, 26 July, 1851, relating 
to items siezed in the rooms of the Cercle de la 
Concorde; 
Cercle de la Redoute; Cercle de la Violette; erc e it 
e1 'H pital. 
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Catholic royalism in the Card very well: 
"The Legitimists, twice as numerous 
as their adversaries, are celebrating 
the feast of Saint Henri with even 
more enthusiasm, noise and unity. But 
their exaltation is matched by their 
sincerity. For over twenty years they 
have awaited with imperturbable candour 
and good faith the return of Henri V. 
They are so certain of the coming of 
their pretender that they believe every 
excess they commit in his honour will 
not only go unpunished, but will guarantee 
a future reward. " 102 
The action of the authorities against the clubs and 
the hostility of the rank and file Catholic royalists to 
the notables indicated plainly that almost twelve months 
after the collapse of the Droit national, the rift and an- 
tipathy between the notables and the peuple of the Catholic 
community had not been overcome. 
103 
When the coup d'etat was carried out, the Legitimists 
of the Gard were remarkable by their passiveness. Unlike 
the Protestants, who constituted the core of the republican 
opposition to the coup, the Catholics were politically and 
socially divided to such and extent that opposition was 
inconceivable even though it was undoubtedly desired by 
extremists who had been hostile to Louis Napoleon and his 
increasing hold on conservatives. 
102 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 
12 July, 1851. 
103 A. D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 
21 July, 1851. The measures taken against the Legitimist 
clubs caused acute embarrassment to certain Legitimists 
on the municipal council, and these considered resigning 
in the face of the abuse heaped on then by the societaires. 
Vidal, acting in lieu of the indisposed mayor, and "who 
was in 1815 one of the most unbridled royalists of that 
sad epoch, and whose great age does not prevent from being 
one of the most outspoken Legitimists now" implemented the 
closure. He was reviled as a traitor and a collaborator. 
The absence of clear and coherent directives from 
Chambord and his representatives had left Legitimists without 
a rudder. The lack of orientation was then exaggerated by 
the social and political rift that weakened the traditional 
cohesion of the Catholic community. Faced with the increasing 
probability of social disorder, the Catholic notables had 
made it plain in 1851 that support for Louis Napoleon, whose 
policies were favourable to the Catholics, was essential. 
As far as the peuple legitimiste was concerned, it had 
not acted independently of its masters since the Revolution, 
save for the embryonic organisation it began to evolve under 
the tutelage of the Dr6it national. Traditionally armed 
and trained to respond to the call of the Catholic landed 
notables, it was not equipped to react on its own. More- 
over the Protestant character of the militant opposition 
would have alienated Catholic royalist support for it. 
In Paris, the department's deputies made a gesture of 
protest against the coup. They took part in the meeting 
headed by Benoist d'Azy and Falloux in the Mairie of the 
Xe arrondissement, and were arrested as they made their 
way to the Elysee to protest formally to the president. 
104 
104 The results of the plebiscite of 20 December were: 
YES 70 283 (78%) 
NO 18 919 (21%) 
475 spoilt votes 
89 677 votes cast Pieyre, op. cit., III, 
pp. 158-9. 
The total number of votes cast corresponds closely to 
the number cast in the presidential election of 
1848 
(82 690). 
Support for Louis Napoleon was lower than the national 
average of 92% YES. R. Remond, Vie oliti ue7 
I I, p. 136. 
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The coup d'etat was sanctioned by a large majority 
of the Gard's population. los Charles de Calviere stated 
that the Catholics voted "Yes" while the Protestants 
voted "No". 
106. The Legitimist party, however, greeted 
the new regime with sullen, impotent silence, having 
no clear policy, and reluctant to make common cause 
with the Socialist, and essentially Protestant, opposition. 
107 
The consolidation of the Prince President's power 
and the promulgation of a new constitution which required 
an oath of allegiance to Louis Napoleon from elected 
officials split the Legitimists seriously. De Larcy, 
Barbut and Pontmartin refused the oath, as did de Surville 
and Chapot who were appointed to the new Bureau du Roi, 
the central Legitimist body that replaced the old and 
ineffectual royalist committee. 
108 But the Legitimists 
remained without a clear directive until the belated 
instruction Chambord gave in April, 1852, barely two 
months before the first elections to the new Corps 
. 41 gislatif109Then, however, many minds had been made up, le 
and the order to abstain from political participation 
105. Pieyre, op. cit., II, pp. 178-9. 
106. A. N. F1cIII Gard S. Notes sur 1'etat des partis, 
February, 1852. 
107. Pieyre, loc. cit. 
108. B. Latzarus, "L'Opposition legitimiste au plebiscite 
des 20 et 21 novembre 1852 dans le Gard", Memoires 
de l'Academie de Nimes, XLIII, 1926-7, pp. 122-44. 
p. 129. 
109. ibid., pp. 124-6. 
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received a mixed response. While de Surville, Chapot, 
de Larcy and Benoit d'Azy persisted in their abstention- 
ism, two of the prominent landed aristocrats of the 
department, Charles de Calviere and the duc d'Uzes were 
elected to the Corps legislatif. It was clear from 
the support these long standing royalists received that 
local issues counted for more than dynastic fidelity did 110 
Indeed, the victory of the duc d'Uzes over the government 
candidate, General Teste, was a clear rejection of the 
government's policy of having one Protestant elected 
in the department and of adjusting electoral boundaries 
to achieve the desired result. 
"' 
In the local elections, too, sectarian rivalry 
continued to play a significant part. An overwhelming 
I 
Catholic majority on the Nimes municipal council led to 
the resignation of the three Protestants elected in the 
first urban section and of the single Protestant adjoint, 
Mourier. 112 
110. A. N. F1CIII Gard 5; A. D. Gard 
'. 
4m 
-I 
10. Reports on 
the elections of 31 July, 
111. Under the revised electoral law, the Gard was all-` 
ocated three seats. The constituency boundaries 
were redrawn in order to reduce"-the chances of a 
Catholic monopoly. See A. N. Flc III Gard 5: Letters 
of the prefect to the minister of the interior, 21 
and 23 January, 1852; Calviere's memorandum on 
L'etat des partis and his accompanying letter to the 
minister of thinterior., 6 February, 1852. 
112. The authorities had intended the Protestants to 
have twelve seats from the 1st, 2nd, 10th and 12th 
sections. The complete failure of the plan was 
due 
to internal Protestant divisions and to the un- 
willingness of moderate Catholics to vote 
for a 
Protestant candidate. A. D. Gard 5M 57. Municipal 
election of 1852; Pieyre, op. cit., II, pp. 180-3. 
264 
The Second Republic, far from serving as a prelude 
to the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, had plunged 
the Legitimist party into a profound crisis, tearing 
its adherents between loyalty to the dynasty and the 
pressing need to find a solution to the apparently in- 
evitable social and economic copflagration that loomed 
over the country. In the absence of clear and realistic 
leadership from Chambord, the party had stumbled and 
dithered, gradually merging more and more with the 
broad mass of conservatives as fear of revolution took 
precedence over ideological squabbles. The coup d'etat, 
by removing the threat of revolution, brought principles 
to the foreground once more, and revealed the considerable 
r 
divergence of opinions in Legitimist circles. 
The Gard did not escape this crisis, as the elections 
of 1852 showed. Whilst some Legitimists gave priority 
to their allegiance to the Pretender, others, conscious of 
the need for order and security, preferred to retain 
their influence in politics and ranged themselves, however 
reluctantly, behind the President who had been careful 
to offer guarantees that satisfied the religious convictions 
of the royalists as well as their temporal requirements. 
Catholic ascendancy in the department seemed to be assured 
by the influence the Church had acquired since 1850 even 
if the authorities had tried to ensure a modicum of 
representation for the Protestant community. 
J 
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Among the factors that led so many Catholic royalists 
to place practical considerations before matters of 
doctrinal purity, one must certainly single out the 
evolution that had taken place among the Catholic workers, 
the petit peuple legitimiste that had constantly accepted 
the leadership of the Catholic notables. By 1850, social 
and economic change, universal suffrage had given the 
Catholic working class some sense of an independent iden- 
tity, and it began to articulate its own grievances and 
demands to the astonishment and horror of its traditional 
leaders. Popular Catholic royalism did not develop 
beyond the embryonic stage, principally because it could 
not merge with the Republican Left. Its self awareness 
remained tinged with a substantial residue of anti- 
Protestantism and devotion to an ideal vision of a benign 
monarch. Nevertheless, it was clear in 1850 that the 
peuple catholigue was no longer a force at the beck and 
call of the notables, but that. it was capable of 
independent action reminiscent of Jacobinism -a term 
that one observer had applied to it as early 
113 
as 1815. 
113. A. N. F79049. General Lagarde to minister of police, 
7 December, 1815. 
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Conclusion. 
During the period with which this thesis is concerned, 
the political fortunes of the Catholic royalists in 
the Gard coincided considerably, as one might expect, 
with the fortunes of the Ultra royalist party in France. 
Thus, the last ten years of the Restoration marked the 
zenith of Catholic royalist triumph, while the "liberal 
phase" of the Restoration, and the July Monarchy 
stripped them of their power and forced them into a 
bitter and relentless opposition. They experienced, 
as well, the internal dissensions that beset Ultra 
royalism in 1827, and Legitimism in 1833 and 1850. 
Yet Catholic royalism in the Gard retained a 
separate identity, one that reflected the very partic- 
ular and local character of politics in the depart- 
ment, and which distinguished Catholic royalism there 
from the main stream of Ultra royalism and Legitimism 
1W in France. The difference was most striking 
in the 
period from 1815 to early 1817, and later, during the 
Second Republic, when the Gard royalists gained control 
of their local administration, only to find that they 
were significantly out of step with their allies 
in most of the other French departments. 
The singularity of Catholic royalism derived from 
the unchanging nature of political and social conflict 
in the-Gard after the Revolution. Throughout the 
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period that concerns us, the conflict between Catholic 
and Protestant elites, each with its own clientele, 
continued to dominate politics, and political all- 
egiances continued to be defined in socio-religious 
terms instead of developing around the issues that 
divided French political society of the day. 
However, each party looked to national political 
events for the support it needed in order to ensure 
its ascendancy over the other, and political change 
in Paris had far reaching consequences in the Gard. 
The political upheavals and changes of regime that 
occurred led inevitably to a transfer of power in 
the Gard from one party to the other. Compromise, 
whether that attempted by Dargout in 1817, or that 
sought by a number of notables in the face of social 
unrest in 1849, failed because there was no viable 
middle ground or centre group, and compromise was 
unacceptable to each party, which had its own patronage 
11 to distribute, its own enrages to appease. 
The primitive and very emotive sectarian cleavage 
that subsumed local political, social and economic 
issues gave Catholic royalism its strength and cohesion 
for more than half a century, and enabled the Catholic 
notables who were in competition with their Protestant 
counterparts for positions of local influence to 
mobilise all sections of the Catholic community 
behind 
them. 
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Originally, the conflict had been between Catholic 
.. 
landed and Patrician interests and the Protestant, 
capitalist interests that had benefited considerably 
from the Revolution and Empire. Understandably, then, 
Catholic royalism was dominated for some time by an 
oligarchy of landed notables, related often by marriage 
as well as by their economic and social interests, and 
most of whom had emigrated during the Revolution. Men 
like baron Jules de Calviere; his cousin, Jacques-Alexis 
de Calviere-Vezenobre; the vicomte de Rochemore; count 
Rene de Bernis, married to a sister of Calviere-VezenobreIs 
wife; the marquis de Montcalm; the marquis de Valfons; 
the duke de Crussol-Uzes; vicomte de Saint Priest, brother 
in law of Calviere-Vezenobre and de Bernis; vicomte de 
Vogue, were intimately involved in planning and directing 
the White Terror of 1815 to restore the pre-revolutionary 
balance of power in the Gard, Herault, Lozere, Ardeche 
and Vaucluse, where they owned property and enjoyed a 
traditional influence. These were the men, too, who were 
most deeply involved in the unsuccessful attempt in 
the summer of 1815 to secure a considerable measure of 
autonomy for the Midi under the tutelage of the duc 
d'Angouleme. During the Restoration, they were the 
respectable representatives of Catholic royalism, and 
they frequented, in many cases, court and Parisian 
Ultra royalist circles. They were well rewarded 
for 
their zeal, most of them becoming prefects or deputies. 
0 
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The presence of these seigneurs diminished significantly 
after 1830, when many of them retired from public life. 
De Rochemore, Crussol-Uzes and de Calviere-Vezenobre were 
notable exceptions, devoting themselves to Legitimist 
conpiracies, then standing for public office as Legitimist 
candidates. 
However, Catholic royalism was not a narrow, chateau 
based movement. In 1790, the violent reaction to the 
Revolution had come from urban and semi-rural sections 
of the Catholic population in the first place, and Catholic 
royalism continued to reflect the legal and administrative 
middle classes in its leadership. Froment, Trinquelague, 
de Surville, Baron, Boyer, Vidal, du Roure, Vallongues and 
de Larcy, all men with a counter-revolutionary past and 
all denounced by comites revolutionnaires as aristocrates, 
and most of them forced to flee the department during the 
Terror, served the Catholic royalist cause with zeal well 
into their old age and sometimes to their death. In the 
way the landed notables influenced the Catholic rural 
populations, these men, and their commercial counterparts 
-like Bernavon, Nourry Treboulon and the Clerge' brothers, 
had access to the Catholic tradesmen and working classes. 
After the Revolution of 1830, the importance of the 
Catholic bourgeoisie in the Catholic royalist party was 
considerably enhanced. Many of the older nobles retired 
from politics, but the Catholic bourgeoisie, competing 
with the Protestants for trade, employment and public office, 
was anxious to ensure representation on local bodies such 
as the municipal and departmental councils, which began to 
J 
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acquire greater importance in local decision making 
during the July Monarchy. 
Among the aristocracy and the urban notables, the 
continuity of counter-revolutionary zeal is striking- 
1 
Jacques-Alexis de Calviere-Vezenobre emigrated in 1792 
and joined the Armee des Princes. He returned to France 
in 1803, and married one of the daughters of Emmanuel de 
Saint Priest, a former minister of Louis XVI, whose 
other daughter married Rene de Bernis. In 1814, Calviere 
was commissioned in the Mousauetaires du Roi, and went 
to Spain with de Bernis and Angouleme at the end of 
the unsuccessful attempt these men made to cut off the 
advance of Bonaparte in March 1815. In June 1815, Calviere 
was responsible for organising the royalists of Aigues- 
Mortes, and later, during the White Terror, he commanded 
a royalist cavalry troop in the department. During the 
period of Decazes' domination, Calviere lost his commission 
because of his political opinions and his involvement with 
the royalist committees in the Midi. After the July 
revolution, he was a fervent Legitimist, allowing his 
chateau at Vezenobre to be used as a meeting place for 
conspirators. He and his son Charles participated with 
their Saint Priest relations in landing of the duchesse 
de Berry in 1832. After his death in 1844, Charles de 
Calviere took his father's place in Legitimist politics, 
and became mayor of Vezenobre, departmental councillor 
and, in 1852, deputy for the Gard. 
1 See G. Lewis, "The White Terror of 1815 in the Department 
of the Gard: Counter-Revolution, Continuity and 
the 
Individual", Past & Present, 58, pp. 108-35. 
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Jean Louis de Surville, styled "Bourgeois, prop- 
rietaire, 10 000 F de revenus" in the 1811 tax register, 
was a nephew of the strident abbe Lapierre, a leader of 
the counter-revolution in the Gard. In 1793, de Surville 
was forced to flee the department after the comite 
reyolutionnaire of Nimes brought accusations of hoarding 
flour and of holding aristocratic principles. In 1811, 
he was appointed Receveur general of the department, a 
position he held, with the exception of the Hundred Days, 
until 1830. After exaggerated displays of royalism in 
1814, de Surville served as an aide de camp to Angouleme 
in the brief campaign of 1815, and was later described 
as one of the cruellest agents of the White Terror. 
He was ennobled the same year, and became commander of 
the fiercely sectarian national guard of Nimes. After 
the dissolution of the guard in 1818, de Surville 
commanded the clandestine Catholic royalist militia 
that was maintained , and in 1830 he offered two thousand 
armed men to the last Bourbon prefect of the Gard 
when news of the revolution reached the department. 
Until his death in 1847, de Surville worked incessantly 
for the Bourbon cause in his capacity as secretary and 
assistant to the count Narbonne Pelet, who directed 
the royalists of the Midi from Nice. He and his children 
were involved in the landing of the duchesse de Berry, 
and his son Charles became a leading Legitimist politician 
in the south, deputy for the Gard in 1849 and member of 
the Bureau du Roi in 1852. 
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De Larcy, sub prefect of Le Vigan during the 
M. 
White Terror, emigrated in 1792 from a predominantly 
Protestant part of the Gard where he owned considerable 
property. His appointment to the sub prefecture by 
the provisional prefect, Jules de Calviere, was terminated 
by Dargout in 1818 because of de Larcy's unbridled 
royalism. His son, Roger, trained as a barrister, 
became notorious during the July Monarchy for his defence 
of the most infamous royalist agitators, and was deputy 
for the Gard in 1848 and 1849. After the coup d'etat 
in 1851, Roger de Larcy refused to take the oath of 
allegiance to Louis Napoleon, and continued to work 
for Chambord into the 1870's. 
There are other examples of such long lasting 
allegiance to the Catholic royalist cause in the dep- 
artment, notably those of the Vidal and Goirand Labaume 
families. Ironically, there is no reference after 1816 
to Francois Froment, the instigator of the Bagarre de 
Nimes of 1790, and indefatigable counter-revolutionary. 
Had he not become disillusioned by the bad faith of 
those he had served so well, no doubt he and his family 
would have continued to figure prominently in the 
Catholic royalist movement after the Revolution. 
The most striking feature of Catholic royalism was 
the massive popular support it enjoyed through the period 
with which this thesis is concerned. Boulangers, 
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portefaix, tafetassiers, faiseurs de bas, tailleurs de 
pierre, decrotteurs, cabaretiers, travailleurs de terre 
and f enassiers did the dirty work of the notables, and 
figure prominently in riots and on membership lists of 
the various royalist clubs that flourished from 1814. 
The support, generally in the form of muscle, given 
by the Catholic working classes and peasants was crucial 
to the success of the movement, and was carefully exploited 
by the notables. Popular anti-Protestant prejudices had 
been magnified since the 1780's by economic grievances. As 
the traditional textile industries of the department went 
into a decline that lasted throughout the period that 
concerns us, Protestant merchants, who controlled most of 
these industries, were accused of exploiting the shortage 
of work to depress wages, and of giving available work 
to their coreligionists in the north and west of the 
department, so bypassing the formal structures that 
regulated wages and work in the towns, as well as undercutting 
urban wages. As the population of the towns grew after 
the Revolutionary period, unemployment became a constant 
source of concern, -and one that was easily translated 
into 
sectarian terms. Food prices were unstable, too, causing 
concern and hardship to producers and consumers. The 
serious crop failures from 1815 to 1818, then from 1827 
to 1831 had very serious consequences in the Gard, as the 
requests for relief and the rise in the incidence of 
theft and brigandage showed. 
In such conditions, the Catholic poor were easy prey 
to the notables who realised very clearly the value of 
274 
of a dissatisfied populace that could be used to 
keep the Protestants, many of them employers who had 
laid off workers, in a state of fear. By providing 
money and food to the Catholic workers, and by giving 
them preference over Protestant workers when they 
controlled the distribution of patronage, the Catholic 
notables ensured that sectarian loyalty prevailed over 
working class solidarity. In 1834, the Legitimist leaders 
in the Gard took great care not to exploit the troubles 
in Lyon because of the class antagonism inherent in them. 
However, much of the popular support for Catholic 
.a 
royalism could be traced to the beginning of the Revolution 
or to subsequent Protestant abuses of power. In 1794, 
Alexis Lavondes was accused of counter-revolutionary 
attitudes and forced into hiding with his father. The 
family business was ruined, and in 1814 Lavondes was 
a bitter man, ridden with debts; Souchon had served 
with the Armee des Princes for three years; Vampere was 
one of Froment's lieutenants in 1789. All three were 
sent from the Gard into internment during the Hundred 
Days. Dupont, alias Trestaillons, described as a simple 
travailleur de terre, lost his father in the Bagarre de 
Nimes. At the beginning of the Hundred Days, his 
olive trees and vines were destroyed by Protestant 
neighbours while he was away with Angouleme's volunteers. 
Besides money and plunder, when available, these 
men enjoyed immunity from the law as far as the notables 
could guarantee it. Trestaillons was never convicted of 
'A 
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the crimes he committed in the name of Catholic royalism, 
and, in 1819, when the government appeared to be intent 
on pursuing untried terrorists, the prefect of the Gard, 
Haussez, made arrangements to spirit Trestaillons out 
of the department. Graffand, alias Quatretaillons, was 
permitted to live in tranquility in his native Pougna- 
doresse, barely eleven kilometers from Uzes, the town in 
which he had committed several brutal murders in 1815. 
In 1830, Quatretaillons was brought out of his retirement 
when the Catholic notables were organizing resistance to 
the Orleanist authorities. When some of the terrorists 
were put on trial, the royalist organisation provided them 
with a defence. Boissin, Aurillon, Servent, Reboul, 
Trufemy and Pocheville were defended by maitre Baragnon, 
an officer in the Nimes national guard, to which they 
had belonged before it was established in a regular 
manner. Police officer Gibrat lost his job because 
he stole documents from Dargout's office, and leaked 
confidential information to the royalist leaders. He 
was immediately provided for by the Calviere family, 
and was then given a job as secretary to the vicomte 
de Vogüe, inspector of the department's national guard. 
But popular royalism proved to be a double edged 
sword. Already, in 1815, after unleashing the people 
on the Protestant population, the notables were embarrassed 
by some of the excesses committed, and which 
drew unwanted 
attention to the department. They found that 
it was 
extremely difficult to impose some kind of 
discipline 
on their Miguelets, too. Moreover, the rank and 
file 
royalists were profoundly suspicious of their 
leaders' 
motivation. There were frequent complaints that some 
of the notables were pursuing policies that were dictated 
by self interest, and accusations that the wealthy were 
not contributing as much to the cause (and the cash box) 
as they might. Men like Trinquelague and Jules de Calviere, 
in spite of the touching receptions they received from 
their clientele, were constantly looking over their 
shoulders. 
Until 1848, the royalist eu le had no means of 
4w 
expressing its opinions independently of the notables. 
Universal suffrage gave the rank and file royalists this 
means, and revealed a' current of opinion in the Catholic 
working class that rejected the previously unchallenged 
authority of the notables. The unexpected emergence 
of a Catholic Montagne that made economic and political 
demands with a distinctly Jacobin flavour shocked the 
Catholic notables who had always sought universal suffrage 
believing that the Catholic majority in the department 
would consolidate their supremacy without questioning it. 
The style of the Droit national was undoubtedly a factor 
in the decision of many Catholic bourgeois to support law 
and order and to welcome the coup d'etat in 1851. 
The upheavals of the Second Republic revealed the 
various shades of royalism in the Gard. Besides the 
Droit national episode, defections from the path of 
pure legitimism, admittedly a meandering and apparently 
unrewarding path, illustrated an essential characteristic 
of Catholic royalism - the desire for local ascendancy 
without any interference from outside. This aspect of 
L/i 
Catholic royalism was remarked by Eymard in 1814, by 
Lagarde in 1815, and by Ferdinand de Bertier in 1831, 
and it revealed itself in opposition to any government, 
including Bourbon governments, that sought to prevent 
a Catholic monopoly of power. In 1814, when the government 
of Louis XVIII did not meet their expectations, the 
Catholic royalists transferred their loyalty to Artois, 
and did not hesitate to try to thwart the plans of 
Louis' favourite. Henri V was the ideal monarch until 
he began to lay down Legitimist policy. He provided 
a symbol, an object of veneration, a source of fervour, 
but made no demands on the Catholic royalists who were 
free to legitimize their deeds and demands by invoking 
his name. 
In such attitudes, it is possible to detect an element 
qw 
of the particularism that characterized southern traditions. 
The proximity of borders with foreign states - Spain, 
Piedmont, Nice and, until 1790, the Papal possessions just 
across the Rhone - combined with the importance of 
Mediterranean trade to forge economic and cultural 
ties that took precedence over those with Paris and 
other northern French towns until the railway and 
the telegraph opened the southern departments to the 
influences and scrutiny of the capital. Merimee, 
arriving in Avignon from Lyon in the 1830's, felt he was 
in a Spanish town, so different were the customs, language 
and physical traits of the people. The Royaume 
du Midi 
of Angouleme and the "frondeur" aristocrats of the south, 
and, to some extent, southern federalism, should 
be placed 
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in the context of this awareness of a separate identity 
that was common in the south, and which was by no means 
exclusive to conservative traditions; the southern 
Republicans' Ligue du Midi in 1871, with its capital 
at Lyon, is in the same tradition. 
The Catholic royalism of the Gard was but one 
manifestation of a royalism that extended across the Midi. 
Moreover, it must be said that the recent and largely 
artificial boundaries of the Gard did not delimit 
sphere of activity or influence of Catholic royalism. 
The southern Ardeche and the north eastern Gard were, 
in terms of support and terrorist activities, a single 
region with a royalist tradition that established itself 
in 1790 at Ja1es, Uzes, Pont Saint Esprit and Bagnols; 
White Terrorists sought refuge in the Bouches du Rhone 
and Vaucluse until the hunt died down; Avignonnais and 
Marseillais contributed to the murders and pillage 
undertaken in the Gard in the name of Catholic royalism. 
The royalist network spread so far that the Gard 
authorities were obliged to hold the trials of important 
White Terrorists in towns as far away as Grenoble and 
Riom to avoid rioting and to reduce the intimidation 
of judges and witnesses - when these could be persuaded 
to testify. Nimes itself occupied an important position 
on the roads from Lyon, Marseille and Piedmont to 
Toulouse and Spain. It was a convenient town for 
Ultras and Legitimists from the south east and the south west 
to meet in, and certain pro-royalist hotels were popular 
meeting places. In 1833, a large gathering of 
Legitimists 
from the Ardeche, Dröme, Isere, Basses Alpes, Vaucluse, 
and Bouches du Rhone took place in the hotel du Midi 
in order to review tactics after the collapse of the 
duchesse de Berry's plot. 
The small town of Aigues Mortes, and its adjacent port, 
Le Grau du Roi, were excellent points for bringing 
arms and agents discreetly into the south east, and for 
bypassing the stringent surveillance of the main roads 
to Spain. Beyond the Camargue, the country residences 
of men like de Surville, Valfons and Fontareche were 
convenient overnight halts on the back roads to 
Arles and Marseille or Avignon. 
Notwithstanding this involvement in wider royalist 
enterprises, it was no secret to the agents of the 
Bourbons, from Froment to Ferdinand de Bertier, that 
royalism in the Gard drew its strength and persistence 
from peculiar local circumstances that made the movement's 
usefulness and dedication to the Bourbon cause 
questionable. It generally received unfavourable 
comparisons with the idealism of the western royalists. 
2 
Indeed, the aims of the Catholic royalist movement 
identified it as a local counter-revolutionary movement, 
whose royalism was a necessary characteristic in the 
particular circumstances of the Gard, but was not the 
fundamental one, nor a disinterested one. The Catholic 
2 See, for example, the comments of Ferdinand de Bertier 
and baron de Bordigne on the relative merits of southern 
and western royalists, and on the value of Catholic 
royalism in 1831, when the Gard Catholics were particularly 
militant. Bertier de Sauvigny, "La Conspiration 
des 
Legitimistes", pp. 13-14; 32-34. 
LOU 
population in the Gard needed a Catholic monarchy, 
aristocratic privilege and a special position for 
the Catholic church in order to ensure its political 
ascendancy over the Protestants. Through the period 
with which this thesis has been concerned, Catholic 
royalists strove with whatever means were at their 
disposal to reverse the effects of 1789 in their area. 
A prefect who had been given the unenviable task of 
administering the department in the months that 
followed the July Revolution captured the vendetta 
spirit that fired Catholic royalists and their 
Protestant rivals in the Gard when he commented in 
1842: 
"Outside the department, these men 
are tolerant and reasonable; when 
they return home, they put on the 
livery of the region once again, 
and give in to hate filled pre- 
judices which they justify com- 
pletely in conversations with 
strangers to the area. " 3 
Ap 
3 A. D. Loire Atlantiaue 3J 201. Achille Chaper to 
D'Arcy, 18 November, 1842 (Cited in Tudesq, 
Les Grands Notables, I, p. 154) D'Arcy was about 
to move to the prefecture at Nimes. 
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NEWSPAPERS r 
The following newspapers concerning the Gard were found to be 
of some use, although in no case was a complete run of the 
newspapers in question available. 
L'Abeille. This newspaper was directed for its short life by 
Louis Coulanges, the former Miquelet whose biography forms the 
substance of Fernand Daudet's Souvenirs d'un vieux ro aliste. Copies for the period 1832-33 are held in te Bibliot eque 
municipale of Nimes. The paper echoed the unrelenting hostility 
and anti Protestantism of many of the Catholic royalists. Usually 
of eight pages, the Abeille was obliged to change its name 
regularly to outpace legal proceedings. I 
ýLe Courrier du Gard. Founded by Baron Daunant and Girard, it 
is the pro government paper from 1831 to 1848. It continued 
to appear during the Second Republic as the voice of Orleanist 
Protestants. Copies for 1831-1852 are held in the Bibliotheque 
municipale of Nimes. 
L'Etoile du Gard. This paper first appeared in July 1849. It 
was the local mouthpiece of the Lourdoueix royalists who expounded 
Genoude's Droit national, the monarchy founded on popular consent. 
Its editor, Adrien de Pelardon, broke with the Gazette du Bas 
Languedoc as Lourdoueix, successor to Genoude, broke with the 
Gazette de France. Copies are held in the Bibliotheque nationale 
(ref: JO 486) for 1849-50. 
Gazette du bas Languedoc. The "official" organ of the Gard 
Legitimists from 1833 to 1849, when it broke with 1'Etoile and 
continued to support the Gard's deputies, and, consequently, the 
notables. The Gazette was the paper in which Legitimist policy, 
national and local, was publicised. It is of great value in 
tracing the recovery of Legitimism in the Gard after 1833. Copies 
are held in the Bibliothe ue municipale of Nimes (to 1842), and 
in the Bibliotheque nationale ref J0129) from 1848-52. 
Journal du Gard. The government newspaper from 1814 to March 
1815, and from 1816 to 1831. At the beginning of the second 
Restoration, the Journal was Catholic royalist in sympathies. 
Gaude, the publisher, was an active Catholic royalist and member 
of the secret society. In an attempt to reduce the influence of 
the secret society on the paper, Dargout gave the printing con-. 
cession to Guibert, and arranged to have the editorial comments 
written by his own agents.. The newspaper is useful as a general 
record of the period of the restoration in the Gard. 
Copies are 
kept in the Departmental. Archives, Nimes. 
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La Minerve franSaise. A Liberal newspaper that 
appeared from February 1818 until March 1820, when the 
reaction after the murder of the duc de Berry obliged 
it to close down. From autumn 1818 until February 1819, 
a number of articles on events in the Gard were printed 
under the title L'Hermite, the name used by Jouy. 
While these articles were clearly sympathetic to the 
Gard Protestants, they offer, nonetheless, an interesting 
impression of Nimes at the time. See: 
Volume III, pp. 315-325; 402-11; 552-62. 
Volume IV, pp. 64-75; 267-75. 
Volume V, pp. 139-41. 
(Bibliotheque nationale, in-8°, Lc2 1105). 
Le Moniteur Universel. (Archives nationales, reference) 
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I 
A 
294 
British Museum. French Revolution Tracts... 
F 1584 (2). Adresse du Club des Amis de la 
Constitution de Nismes ä 1'Assemblee nat- 
ionale, le 4 Mai, 1790., 
F 1585 (S). Compte Rendu les 22 et 23 Fevrier 
1791 a l'Assemblee nationale, au Nom de la 
Municipalite de Nismes des Troubles du 
Mois de Mai, des funestes Exces du Mois de Juin 
1790, ains i que les Causes qui les ont prod- 
uites, par Monsieur le Maire de Nismes. 
1141 h4 (5). Causes veritables des Troubles 
arrives I Nismes en Juillet 1815, signe C. R. 
R 159. Correspondance des Princes franSais , 
Emigres, avec le Sieur de Saillans, Chef de 
la Conspiration du Midi (Paris, Imprimerie 
nationale, 
F 141 (9). 
1792). 
Declaration et Petition des 
Catholiques de Nismes. 
R (Louis XVI I I) .' Des Ultra en 1818 et 
de la 
Note Secrete, par le Chevalier de N***. 
F 1584 (5). Precis historique des Massacres 
commis par les Protestants sur les Catholi ues 
de Nismes dans les Journees des 13, 14 et 15 
Juin, 1790. 
Chabannes, Ms. de. Lettres du Marquis de Chabannes au 
Comte de Blacas (London, April, 1815). 
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